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Abstract
Keynesian economics has devoted particular attention to out of
full employment equilibrium phenomena, but the lack of an analytical
framework for describing how economic agents interact and organize
their production and consumption decisions has made it difficult to es-
tablish whether the economic system is self-adjusting at an out-of-full
employment equilibrium.
One of the purposes of Sraffa’s book Production of Commodities by
Means of Commodities was to understand the conditions that allow
the system to reproduce itself. But how trade takes place remains
an open question. For Sraffian economics, the lack of an analytical
framework for describing how economic agents interact and organize
their production and consumption decisions, has made it difficult to
consider out-of-equilibrium behaviour.
The present thesis is a first attempt to model Keynes’s principle of
effective demand with the aid of Sraffian schemes. The notion of effec-
tive demand requires the possibility for buyers and sellers to buy and
sell thanks to the existence of newly generated or previously accumu-
lated financial purchasing power. Stated differently, the very notion of
out-of-equilibrium exchanges may require the emergence of new credit
and debt relations.
Sraffa’s original production schemes have been enriched with algorith-
mic behavioural functions that describe agent decisions and exchanges
of property rights.
In the resulting algorithmic model of an economic system (with labour
and goods market), decisions of production and consumption are made
by a population of algorithmic rational agents (ARAs), divided be-
tween producers and workers. The ARAs are characterized by be-
havioural functions, specific trading rules, and are connected in a net-
work. Exchanges are made by signing virtual contracts that involve
the use of financial means. The creation of new financial means of ex-
change, credit and debt, is endogenous. Production is heterogeneous
and conceived as a circular process.
The fundamental conclusion is that this digital economic laboratory
has generated virtual economies able to converge towards production
prices, uniform wage rates but non-uniform profit rates with an un-
equal distribution. The virtual economies result to be stable and ef-
ficient from a technological point of view despite economic policy can
improve the performance of the whole economy.
The digital economic laboratory is a powerful instrument able to an-
swer different research questions. It represents an answer to the need
to develop models able to explore the complexity of out-of-equilibrium
behaviour, grounded on bookkeeping principles and computable meth-
ods.
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According to Walrasian general equilibrium theory, under perfect competi-
tion, marginal productivities are at equilibrium equal to the prices of the
factors of production. This theory implies that producers decide the pro-
duction level that would maximize profits under given budget constraints
and consumers would maximize utility subjected to their budget constraints
and they all are, producers and consumers, price takers. Given the standard
assumptions related to free market conditions and well behaved production
and utility functions (see Debreu, 1959; Arrow and Hahn, 1971) it is claimed
that equilibrium prices where market clearing is realized exist and are also
implicitly assumed to be actual market prices. From such a setting it could
be possible to claim that the distribution of the produced surplus is fair
and equal because it is determined by the “laws of nature” embedded in
the so-called “well-behaved” production functions, utility functions and free
market conditions. In modern dynamic (equilibrium) macroeconomics the
Walrasian general equilibrium is assumed to hold at each point in time (or
interval). The sources of oscillations are due only to exogenous shocks that
lead agents to modify their decisions and with markets “adjusting” instan-
taneously so that there is always instantaneous market clearing (e.g., the
Real Business Cycle (RBC) model of Kydland and Prescott, 1982), but are
not to be explained as attempts by the system to adjust with respect to
out-of-equilibrium not market clearing prices.
The Keynesian Cambridge school from the Keynes’s General Theory of
Employment, Interest and Money (Keynes, 1936) to the Sraffa’s Production
of Commodities by Means of Commodities (Sraffa, 1960)1, has challenged
mainstream neoclassical theory2 and questioned the validity of most of its
assumptions. Keynesian economics dominated economic theory for decades
after the publication of Keynes’s General Theory. Nevertheless, it fell out
of favour with the emergence of the Great Stagflation of the 1970s, a phe-
nomenon that Keynesian economics was not able to explain because the
Phillips curve excluded the simultaneous presence of high inflation and high
unemployment. Milton Friedman’s alternative explanation of stagflation
(based on the natural rate of unemployment developed also by Edmund
Phelps) and the introduction of the rational expectation hypothesis (Lucas,
1Hereafter PCMC.
2It is worth remembering that Keynes’s aim, inside the General Theory, was to criticize
Classical economists. With this term Keynes was referring to Ricardo’s followers such as
Mill, Marshall, Edgeworth and Pigou (Keynes, 1936, p.3). Nevertheless, Keynes’s critique
to the postulates of the classical economics (Keynes, 1936, ch.2) holds perfectly also to
the subsequent neoclassical interpretation of unemployment, which is based on the same
postulates.
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1976) induced a rethinking of the whole Keynesian economics. As a conse-
quence, the 1980s witnessed the dominance of monetarism and new classical
macroeconomics and the emergence of new Keynesian economics3. As a
result, much of current research has followed the main guiding principles
of the new neoclassical synthesis, and currently focuses mostly on Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models in which new Keynesian
features may be introduced (e.g., Woodford, 2003). Also the new research
field of the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) theory (i.e., models
on the Herbert Scarf tradition) or the models based on agent based com-
putational methods (see for a summary Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006) do not
represent attempts to displace the pre-eminence of neoclassical theory but
a questionable attempt to put realism in the model, a “complement not a
substitute” of modelling approaches (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006, p.864).
The emergence of the financial crisis in 2007, however, has dramati-
cally underlined the fragility of this framework. Even the Nobel laureate
economist Robert Lucas had to admit that the crisis was unpredictable
because, according to the modern economic theories (such as the efficient-
market hypothesis), such events are not considered (see Lucas, 2009). In
addition, one of the principal colleagues of Lucas, Thomas Sargent, con-
firmed the importance of the “rational expectation revolution” by claiming
not only that remarks about mathematics are “foolish and intellectually
lazy” but also that most criticisms after the crisis “reflect[ed] either woeful
ignorance or intentional disregard for what much of modern macroeconomics
is about and what it has accomplished” (Rolnick, 2010, p.28). With refer-
ence to the macro Seminars at Princeton, in 2009, Thomas Sargent argued
that:
There were interesting discussions of many aspects of the financial
crisis. But the sense was surely not that modern macro needed to
be reconstructed. On the contrary, seminar participants were in the
business of using the tools of modern macro, especially rational expec-
tations theorizing, to shed light on the financial crisis (Rolnick, 2010,
p.28).
But for workers, businesspeople, and policymakers, things are not so
easy. The pointlessness of these mathematical models has been underlined
by the former President of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet,
who found “the available models of limited help” and “felt abandoned by
conventional tools” (Trichet, 2010, p.18). The financial crisis of 2007 has
rapidly become the Great Recession through the sovereign debt crisis. This
3New Keynesian economics represents a response to the critique of new classical
macroeconomics. Its objective is to provide a Walrasian microfoundation to Keynesian
economics. It accepts rational expectations but consider the possibility that market fail-
ures (wage and price stickiness) and imperfect competition could bring to under-full em-
ployment equilibria.
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development has implied unpredictable social and political costs that seem
to confirm how inappropriate the unconditional trust in modern macro has
been. Paul Krugman observes that:
What is almost certain is that economists will have to learn to live
with messiness. That is, they will have to acknowledge the impor-
tance of irrational and often unpredictable behaviour, face up to the
often idiosyncratic imperfections of markets and accept that an elegant
economic “theory of everything” is a long way off (Krugman, 2009).
As a consequence, it seems a matter of common sense to reconsider se-
riously the Cambridge school’s criticisms in order to comprehend current
difficulties, such as distributional inequality and unemployment, and to de-
velop more responsible economic policies (i.e., alternatives to the debatable
austerity measures supported by mainstream economics).
1.2 The problem
Despite the wide recognition of Keynes’s relevance, during the current crisis,
the revival of Keynes has been superficial, restricted only to the so-called
Keynesian economic policies (Pasinetti, 2012a, p.1435). Nevertheless “those
who seek to develop an alternative to the conventional neoclassical theory
are well advised to take into account both the findings of Keynes and those
of Sraffa” (Kurz, 1995, p.84). As claimed by Roncaglia, among others:
The integration of Sraffa’s and Keynes’s analyses could constitute the
core of non-neoclassical economics. However, this integration requires
that Sraffa’s analysis of relative prices and their relationship with in-
come distribution should not contradict basic elements of the Keyne-
sian paradigm [...] Proceeding along this path we will discover, I be-
lieve, that a solid stream of non-neoclassical economics is already avail-
able, integrating not only Keynes’s and Sraffa’s analyses, but also the
contributions of a wide group of economists (Roncaglia, 1995, p.120,
emphasis added).
Despite this, there is widespread agreement that Keynesian Revolution
remains incomplete (Pasinetti, 2007, p.49). The reasons behind this state of
the art are twofold. Indeed, Keynes’s ambiguity on the real consequences of
his General Theory for the orthodox scheme (Robinson, 1963, p.78) created
a sort of doctrinal fog (Blaug, 1980, p.221) that promoted the controversial
neoclassical synthesis. This ambiguity is determined by the impossibility for
Keynes to escape from the marginalist theory of value and the Marshallian
perspectives at the base of his analysis. Moreover, the alleged lack of micro-
foundations in Keynes’s theoretical construction has reinforced mainstream
economists’s arguments (Lucas and Sargent, 1979).
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Sraffa, who instead was coping for a “foundation” of economic theory
starting from the classical theory, was surely a great candidate for fill in the
blank inside Keynesian theory. Unfortunately, Sraffa’s objectivism (proba-
bly) prevented his analysis from considering money, contracts, debts, dy-
namics, and behavioural or psychological features. This because Sraffa’s
purpose was primarily to derive the “production prices” (i.e., the equilib-
rium prices) by solving a simultaneous equation system in order to explain
the concept of value. As a consequence, he did not consider, at that stage,
the possibility of a lack of coordination as a result of an interacting process
between producers and workers. Moreover, a widespread interpretation of
Sraffa, that interprets his production prices as long-run equilibrium positions
towards which the economy should gravitate, puts doubts on the possibility
to merge the Keynesian short run approach characterized by instability with
the supposed long-run equilibrium approach of Sraffa.
1.3 The Solution
Even though it is true that Keynes and Sraffa gave rise to parallel Revolu-
tions and that they worked on different topics with different methodologies,
it should be underlined that some observations about their apparent lack
of compatibility are not exact. One fundamental point of connection be-
tween Keynes and Sraffa that should be emphasised here is their reliance
on bookkeeping principles and constructive mathematics. This topic will
be developed in the next chapter. The purpose of the present thesis
is to contribute to fill this gap by merging Keynes’s effective de-
mand with Sraffa’s production schemes through the construction
of an algorithmic model based on bookkeeping principles and able
to consider market out-of-equilibrium behaviour. The final result
is the construction of a coherent set of computer code so as to allow for
the construction of a virtual market, in which decisions of production and
consumption are made by a population of algorithmic rational agents (ARA
producers and workers) which interact exchanging quantities and property
rights on the base of a double-entry bookkeeping coherency. The impor-
tance of the construction of the algorithmic model is due to the fact that
the combination of some important elements of Keynesian theory with Sraf-
fian schemes could be attempted only if the “constructive mathematics” at
the base of the Sraffian schemes is respected (Velupillai, 2008b). As a con-
sequence, Sraffian schemes should be considered as algorithms that can be
improved on the basis of the computable principles, in order to sustain only
logical propositions and conduct simulations. In details, the algorithms have
been developed to include micro units (workers and producers) which have
been programmed as algorithmic rational agents interacting, exchanging,
and producing goods. This implies that market prices, instead of produc-
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tion prices, have been derived and the market out-of-equilibrium behaviour
has been considered. This novelty has the power to free Sraffian Schemes
from their role of pure (supposed) long-run equilibrium positions introducing
the key role of debt and credit relations fundamental conjunction ring with
the Keynesian conception of the economy as a real-world entrepreneurial
economy. Indeed, this simulation approach has generated an accounting
out-of-equilibrium dynamics in which monetary credit and debt relations
have emerged. This model represents a digital economic laboratory.
1.4 Innovative Aspects
The idea to construct thought experiments able to capture the mechanism of
exchange is not a complete novelty. Among many, at the beginning of last
century, Irving Fisher has struggled with the thought experiment of think-
ing how to capture the elements describing individual exchanges, occurring
at different prices, and made by a huge number of agents into an aggre-
gate equation: the quantity theory of money (see Irving Fisher’s Purchasing
Power of Money (1911)). Irving Fisher did also construct an analogue ma-
chine with the aim of “computing” aggregate values. In fact, the very scope
of Walras’s work was that of modelling a system where there is an immense
amount of exchanges. Despite this, the difference between previous thought
experiments of this type and those of the present thesis is the care put
on the accounting coherence, the presence of heterogeneous and multiple
production (coherently with Sraffian schemes) and the consistency with the
mathematics of digital computers.
In Physics experiments, after the famous Fermi-Pasta-Ulam (FPU) 1955
digital experiments, are not any longer conducted exclusively on real lab-
oratories, but also on digital or analogical ones (Weissert, 1997; Galavotti,
2008; Zambelli, 2015). The FPU problem and the way computer simulations
were effectively utilized to understand a theoretical problem is instructive
for economists, in particular, for the tailoring laboratory experiments. It is
here instructive to quote Ulam:
Fermi became interested in the development and the potentialities of
electronic computing machines [...] We decided to try a selection of
problems for heuristic work where in absence of closed analytical solu-
tions experimental work on computing machines would perhaps con-
tribute to the understanding of properties of solutions. This could be
particularly fruitful for problems involving the asymptotic-long time
or “in the large” behaviour of non-linear physical system. In addition,
such experiments on computing machines would have at least the virtue
of having the postulates clearly stated. This is not always the case in an
actual physical object or model where the assumptions are not perhaps
explicitly recognized (Fermi et al., 1955, p.977, emphasis added).
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The relevance of the digital computer for the economic theory is evident.
Indeed, it is undoubtful that the “enormous developments in the theoretical
and practical technology of the computer have made a tremendous impact
on economic methodology in general, but also in economic theory in par-
ticular [and] it must be emphasised that these references are to the digital
computer.” (Velupillai and Zambelli, 2011, p.260, emphasis added).
Surely one effect of this impact is the even stronger necessity to be aware
of the difference between the mathematics of the digital computer (i.e., re-
cursion theory and constructive mathematics) with respect to the real anal-
ysis at the core of the mathematics of the general equilibrium theory (i.e.,
set theory plus axiom of choice) (Velupillai and Zambelli, 2011, p.260). This
difference is important. Indeed, even though theoretical abstraction cannot
match reality, they have to be meaningful, which implies that they have to
“produce an effective algorithm for the solution of a problem” (Zambelli,
2010, p.34). According to Velupillai (2012), most neoclassical economic re-
sults (such as the standard choice theory, the Walrasian equilibrium, and De-
breu’s theory of value) are meaningless from a constructive prospective (i.e.,
they are uncomputable, unsolvable or undecidable) because of the “non-
algorithmic content of mathematical economics” (Velupillai, 2012, p.23)4.
4This distinction could help not to confuse the digital economic laboratory of the present
thesis with models inspired by the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) theory (i.e.,
models on the Herbert Scarf tradition) or by the modern agent based computational meth-
ods. Indeed, the models inspired by this filed of research have not as purpose a critical
investigation of the validity of the mainstream’s postulates. Tesfatsion explains clearly
this point with reference in particular to Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE):
“ACE modeling is surely a complement, not a substitute, for analytical and statistical
modeling approaches. As seen in the work by Sargent (1993), ACE models can be used to
evaluate economic theories developed using these more standard tools. Can agents indeed
learn to coordinate on the types of equilibria identified in these theories and, if so, how?
If there are multiple possible equilibria, which equilibrium (if any) will turn out to be
the dominant attractor, and why? ACE models can also be used to evaluate the robust-
ness of these theories to relaxations of their assumptions, such as common knowledge,
rational expectations, and perfect capital markets” (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006, p.864).
The fundamental problem is that CGE theory has not developed a clear definition of
computability and constructiveness. Indeed, despite the importance of constructiveness
is sometimes claimed (see for example Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006, p.865), there is not a
clear definition of constructiveness, computability, neither a serious study of the pioneer-
ing works of Turing, von Neumann or Ulam fundamental in order to develop agent based
computational methods (Velupillai, 2011, p.16). Indeed, starting from these pioneers, the
consequence would have been the recognition that Computable General Equilibria are
neither computable nor constructive so that, as a consequence, one should have to admit
that “Agent-Based Economic Modelling have no foundations in any kind of rigorous algo-
rithmic formalism and, hence, epistemologically vacuous” (Velupillai, 2011, p.4). Briefly,
the reason is that the foundations of CGE theory lie in Uzawa’s Equivalence Theorem.
This theorem demonstrates the equivalence of two existence theorems: the existence of a
Walrasian general equilibrium in an economy with a continuous excess demand function
and the Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. But the problem is that Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem is not valid (it is non-constructive and uncomputable) because it invokes in its
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The digital economic laboratory of the present thesis is coherent with
the mathematics of the digital computer. All the solutions are algorith-
mically grounded and based on effectively computable methods (Velupillai
and Zambelli, 2011, p.279). The digital economic laboratory is coherent with
the principle of Computable Economics, - i.e., “every concept must have an
operationally relevant content so as to be understood and implemented by
the virtual economic agents” (Zambelli, 2010, p.38). In other words, all the
model is represented by mathematical equations that can be computed also
by hand without using stochastic elements or theorems. Only on this com-
putable basis the digital economic laboratory will be able to represent an
environment to be used to run thought experiments; where by thought ex-
periments we mean computations where theoretical economic questions are
posed to the computer and the computer provides answers to these questions.
The construction of a digital economic laboratory can represent a con-
crete answer to the aims of Herbert Simon’s empirical microeconomics. In-
deed, Herbert Simon stated clearly that empirical research is fundamental
for a real progress of microeconomics, and that simulation models can play a
crucial role for a deep understanding of decision processes and economic be-
haviour (see Simon, 1997, pp.79-81). It is interesting to report what Herbert
Simon said:
Alternatives to neoclassical economics, including the theory of bounded
rationality, have often been accused of attacking the existing theory
without making concrete proposals for an alternative. In these essays
I have tried to show that such a criticism is not warranted. First,
the difficulties of the neoclassical theory are real, and ignoring them
will not remove them. The theory is grossly inadequate for describ-
ing what goes on inside the business firm [...] and for either under-
standing the events that occur in the whole economy or providing a
basis for macroeconomic policy. [...] The alternatives to neoclassical
theory do not depend any less on empirical facts. Their advantages
are twofold: first, they embody much weaker assumptions about hu-
man rationality; assumptions whose validity has considerable empirical
support. Yet they are able to reach most of the empirically validated
conclusions reached by neoclassical theory on the basis of these weaker
assumptions: dispensing with the need for a “principle of unreality”,
and meeting the test of Occam’s Razor. (Simon, 1997, pp.89-90).
In particular, Herbert Simon has been a pioneer in the development of
a constructive theoretical alternative to the homo oeconomicus based on
bounded and procedural rationality (i.e., Classical Behavioural Economics,
as explained by Kao and Velupillai, 2012), for the construction of models in
proof the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem that can be proven to be undecidable (see for more
details on this point Velupillai, 2011, pp.4-7).
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which the behaviour of agents is constructive and comparable with empiri-
cal evidence. Another content that can be developed thanks to the digital
economic laboratory is the concept of near-decomposability as described by
Simon (1962). Near-decomposability is a property of hierarchic system i.e.,
systems composed by interrelated subsystems (Simon, 1962, p.468). In a
nearly decomposable system “the short-run behaviour of each of the compo-
nent subsystems is approximately independent of the short-run behaviour
of the other components [while] in the long run, the behaviour of any one of
the components depends in only an aggregate way on the behaviour of the
other components” (Simon, 1962, p.474). The digital economic laboratory is
able to map interrelation starting from elementary parts, and to construct
hierarchical systems in which the property of near-decomposability can be
concretely experimented. The fact that “there is widespread agreement that
it is necessary to introduce into economics both dynamical relations and gen-
eral interdependence” (Goodwin, 1947, p.181) is another way to sustain that
economic system should be recognized as complex systems. A definition of
complex system can be found in the words of Herbert Simon:
Roughly, by a complex system I mean one made up of a large number
of parts that interact in a not simple way. In such systems, the whole
is more than the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate, metaphysical
sense, but in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties
of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter
to infer the properties of the whole (Simon, 1962, p.468).
The complexity of the economic system makes of the digital economic
laboratory a precious tool for economic theory. The fundamental units ob-
ject of this interaction able to generate complexity (the parts that make up
the whole) are the algorithmic rational agents (ARAs). The notion of Algo-
rithmic Rational Agent is inspired by the work of Kumaraswamy Velupillai.
The exact phrase algorithmically rational agent is to be found in Velupillai
(1991, p.32) and represents a conception of agent distinct with respect to
the perfectly rational optimizer, the homo economicus. Indeed, the concept
of ARA is coherent with Herbert Simon’s economic actor characterized by
bounded and procedural rationality:
A theory of rational behavior must be quite as much concerned with
the characteristics of the rational actors - the means they use to cope
with uncertainty and cognitive complexity - as with the characteristics
of the objective environment in which they make their decisions. In
such a world, we must give an account not only of substantive rational-
ity - the extent to which appropriate courses of action are chosen - but
also procedural rationality - the effectiveness, in light of human cogni-
tive powers and limitations, of the procedures used to choose actions.
As economics moves out toward situations of increasing cognitive com-
plexity, it becomes increasingly concerned with the ability of actors to
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cope with the complexity, and hence with the procedural aspects of
rationality (Simon, 1978, pp.8-9).
The transition from the theories of substantive rationality to the theories
of procedural rationality requires a methodological jump:
The shift from theories of substantive rationality to theories of pro-
cedural rationality requires a basic shift in style, from an emphasis
on deductive reasoning from a tight system of axioms to an emphasis
on detailed empirical exploration of complex algorithms of thought
(Simon, 1976, p.85, emphasis added).
One important instrument for the “exploration of complex algorithms of
thought” is the digital computer. Simon expresses explicitly this concept:
Like a modern digital computer’s, Man’s equipment for thinking is
basically serial in organization. That is to say, one step in thought
follows another, and solving a problem requires the execution of a large
number of steps in sequence. The speed of his elementary processes,
especially arithmetic processes, is much slower, of course, than those of
a computer, but there is much reason to think that the basic repertoire
of processes in the two systems is quite similar. Man and computer
can both recognize symbols (patterns), store symbols, copy symbols,
compare symbols for identity, and output symbols. These processes
seem to be the fundamental components of thinking as they are of
computation. (Simon, 1976, p.71, emphasis added).
These words of Simon demonstrate the importance of the digital com-
puter for the development of algorithms able to investigate the complexity
of the human mind and its decision-making processes. The lesson that eco-
nomic theory should learn from these words of Simon is, above all, the
recognition of the importance of the algorithm with respect to the axiom,
the empirical exploration with respect to the deductive reasoning for the
construction of a coherent macroeconomic and microeconomic theory:
Economists have been relatively uninterested in descriptive microeco-
nomics - understanding the behavior of individual economic agents -
except as this is necessary to provide a foundation for macroeconomics.
The normative microeconomist “obviously” doesn’t need a theory of
human behavior: he wants to know how people ought to behave, not
how they do behave. On the other hand, the macroeconomist’s lack of
concern with individual behavior stems from different considerations.
First, he assumes that the economic actor is rational, and hence he
makes strong predictions about human behavior without performing
the hard work of observing people. Second, he often assumes com-
petition, which carries with it the implication that only the rational
survive. Thus, the classical economic theory of markets with perfect
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competition and rational agents is deductive theory that requires al-
most no contact with empirical data once its assumptions are accepted.
Undoubtedly there is an area of human behavior that fits these assump-
tions to a reasonable approximation, where the classical theory with
its assumptions of rationality is a powerful and useful tool. Without
denying the existence of this area, or its importance, I may observe
that it fails to include some of the central problems of conflict and
dynamics with which economics has become more and more concerned.
(Simon, 1959, p.254, emphasis added).
We interpret these words of Simon as an encouragement to cope to solve
these central problems in economic theory through the development of new
instruments, able to recognise the importance of the algorithm and of the
digital computer. The digital economic laboratory developed in this thesis
represents an attempt of development of one of these “new instruments” for
a coherent investigation of the complex microeconomic and macroeconomic
problems.
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The structure of the thesis is divided into the following chapters:
2 Literature review: in this chapter the theoretical background that
supports the relevance of the thesis is analysed: the connection be-
tween Sraffa and Keynes and the importance of their integration.
3 The digital economic laboratory: here a summary of the research
questions inside the laboratory5 is presented. Then, the building blocks
of the laboratory and the fundamental equations are presented. Fi-
nally, a detailed description of the mathematical structure of the lab-
oratory is reported.
4 The setting of the thought experiments: here a detailed descrip-
tion of the experimental setting and behavioural functions that have
been developed in order to run the thought experiments is presented.
5 Experiment 1: simulation of a virtual market economy with the set
of methods used by Sraffa in his example given at page 19 of PCMC.
A study of the convergence properties and the relationships between
preferences, surplus and prices follows.
6 Experiment 2: simulation of different virtual economies with differ-
ent sets of methods. A study of the convergence properties follows.
7 Experiment 3: with respect to experiment 2, this chapter considers
the possibility for producers to choose the best method among a set
of different methods. The convergence towards the wage-profit fron-
tier has been examined. Moreover, the role of innovation has been
investigated.
8 Experiment 4: with respect to experiment 3, in this chapter the
effect of the introduction of an economic policy (exogenous and en-
dogenous interest rate) has been considered.
9 Conclusions: analysis of the results, considerations about the poten-
tialities of the digital economic laboratory and further investigations.
10 Appendix: a numerical example, details about technology and meth-
ods, notes about machine learning and artificial neural network in the
digital economic laboratory and, finally, the table of contest have been
added in the Appendix.
5We will use the terms laboratory and digital economic laboratory as synonyms.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Keynes and Sraffa
Even though it is still controversial whether the passage from classical to
neoclassical theory represented a natural evolution or a strong discontinuity,
it is evident that the marginal revolution has entailed deep methodological
and theoretical changes. For classical economists, distribution “is the prin-
cipal problem in Political Economy” (Ricardo, 1817, p.1). They interpreted
economics as a sociological science and focused on the elaboration of a labour
theory of value.
In the 1870s, the Marginal Revolution transformed economics into a
pure mathematical science that can be hardly recognized as political econ-
omy (Lunghini, 2003, p.71) and changed also the object and the foundation
of the economic investigations. Indeed the central concepts were no more
producibility of commodities and surplus but scarcity and marginal utility
(Lunghini, 1971, p.11). The final destination of this evolution has been, not
without jumps, the modern neoclassical theory that can be defined as “the
science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and
scarce means which have alternative uses” (Robbins, 1935, p.16).
The Cambridge school, which includes the group of economists, pupils,
and scholars that surrounded Keynes, such as Joan Robinson, Piero Sraffa,
Nicholas Kaldor, and Richard Goodwin (Pasinetti, 2007), could be consid-
ered the principal adversary of marginalism. Neoclassical theory has been
questioned by them in different ways, but surely a key role has been played
by Keynes and Sraffa. Even though they were at Cambridge, they worked
apparently on complete different topics, giving rise to different revolutions
(Skidelsky, 1986, p.73). In 1936, after the Great Depression, Keynes’s Gen-
eral Theory claimed the centrality of underemployment and disequilibrium
revolutionizing macroeconomics and political economy. In 1960, Sraffa wrote
a short and cryptic book, Production of Commodities by Means of Commodi-
ties (PCMC ), which became the milestone of the Cambridge capital contro-
versy. The debate challenged the neoclassical interpretation of production
and distribution at a strictly logical and mathematical level6. One of the
most important results of this debate has been the proof of the fallacy of the
aggregation procedure of capital goods that is the basis of the Cobb-Douglas
production function. As a consequence, neither distributive justice nor equi-
librium can be ensured. Even though the value of this criticism has been
confirmed by Samuelson (1966), nowadays the controversy is simply consid-
ered as an episode, or a curiosum (Lunghini, 1975, p.xiii). Cambridge school
scholars have tried to question marginalism on other occasions (Pasinetti,
6The debate was between some economists at the University of Cambridge (such as
Joan Robinson and Piero Sraffa) and other economists at MIT (such as Paul Samuelson
and Robert Solow).
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2012a, p.1433) without significant influence on the mainstream.
This also because despite Cambridge capital controversy has been rec-
ognized to be destructive for Wicksellian capital theory, the original capital
theory of Walras (in particular the Arrow-Debreu version of the general equi-
librium theory that is considered the development of the general equilibrium
approach in the intertemporal dimension by neoclassical economists) has
been claimed not to be touched by the controversy (see Bliss, 1975; Malin-
vaud, 1953; Mandler, 2002; Bidard, 1990)7. Indeed, while Walras developed
a model of general economic equilibrium based on the assumption of hetero-
geneous capital goods available in arbitrary given initial quantities; Wicksell
built on the notion of aggregate capital measured in value terms in order to
overcome the logical contradictions in the Walrasian construction once cap-
ital is introduced (Tosato, 2013, p.106). As said, Sraffa’s analysis has been
recognized by the neoclassical side to be destructive for Wicksellian capi-
tal theory but not for the Arrow-Debreu version of the general equilibrium
theory. One criticism to this line of defence has been that in the Arrow-
Debreu version “the issues concerning the production of new capital goods
are, to some extent, ‘concealed’ inside an extremely general formulation of
the production sets which sidesteps the distinction between fixed capital
goods and other factors of production and of consumers’ choices, which ob-
scures the aspects concerning the saving decision” (Tosato, 2013, p.106).
Garegnani tried to demonstrate that Sraffian critique of neoclassical capi-
tal theory applies as much to general equilibrium as to aggregative models.
First of all, Garegnani accused the modern neoclassical models to solve Wal-
ras’s contradictions simply by abandoning Walras method, in other words,
by abandoning the traditional concept of equilibrium in favour of short-run
equilibrium models that allow an arbitrary initial physical condition for the
capital stock (see Garegnani, 1976). But aside this, Garegnani claims that
anyway the concept of capital as a single quantity reappears necessarily in
the market of savings and investments inside intertemporal equilibrium:
Intertemporal equilibrium does not avoid the dependence on the no-
tion of the capital as a single magnitude. Though it no longer occupies
its highly visible position as a fund among the factor endowments, the
homogeneous commodity ‘future income’ demanded by savers, can be
shown to emerge as a flow, with the respective demand and supply
functions and the corresponding market. They are respectively what,
after Keynes, we are used to call (gross) savings supply, (gross) invest-
ment demand, and saving-investment market. The implications of the
inconsistency of that notion of capital - the same implications which
7For example Bidard claims that “the aggregate version à la Clark or the Austrian
version à la Böhm-Bawerk of the marginalist theory are faulty from a logical standpoint
[...]. The main stream of modern economic thought has basically ignored this discussion
because it does not affect its core, the Arrow-Debreu version of the general equilibrium
theory inherited from Walras” (Bidard, 1990, p.129).
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enforced the abandonment of the traditional analysis in pure theory -
are still there to be faced (Garegnani, 2012, p.1431).
This debate remains open but without significant effects on the main-
stream.
2.2 The school of thought after Keynes and Sraffa
While Keynesian economics has been developed mainly by new Keynesians
and post Keynesians (even though deep differences exist among them8),
Sraffian analysis has not generated a real Sraffian School (Aspromourgos,
2004, p.181), but rather contradictory interpretations (Blankenburg et al.,
2012). Sraffa’s PCMC is an “amazingly concise little book” (Pasinetti,
2012b, p.1303), based on strict logical reasoning and dense “mathematical
and methodological elixirs” (Velupillai, 2006, p.2), with profound conse-
quences for economic theory but lacking detailed explanations (Newman,
1972). PCMC had the fundamental aim of criticising the marginal method,
indeed its subtitle is Prelude to a critique of economic theory, and rehabili-
tated the forgotten classical theory through the resolution of the Ricardian
problem of an invariable measure of value (i.e., the Standard commodity).
Sraffa interpreted the economy as a circular flow, demonstrating how it is
possible to determine prices, wages, and profits. The fundamental result is
that distribution, independently from value theory, depends not only on pro-
duction conditions, but also on sociological patterns, realising the conflict
between wages and profits.
A first point of debate is the grade of compatibility of Sraffa’s analysis
with neoclassical theory. Some researchers have tried to interpret PCMC
as a special case inside neoclassical theory (for example Hahn, 1975, 1982)9
or as a non-destructive critique to neoclassical theory (for example Sen,
8Indeed, new Keynesians, starting from the Lucas Critique, try to reconcile Keynesian
economics inside the mainstream orthodox framework. Gregory Mankiw and David Romer
can be recognized the pioneers of these approach that accepts the neoclassical microfoun-
dations, the rational expectation hypothesis, but supposes the presence of market failures
and stickiness of prices and wages that require a fiscal and monetary policy intervention
(see Mankiw and Romer, 1991). The extreme development of this school of thought is
the construction of DSGE models with Keynesian features (for an introduction to this
evolution see Gaĺı, 2008, pp.4-6). The post Keynesians decisively disapprove the interpre-
tations of Keynes’s thought of the neoclassical synthesis and of the new Keynesians and
try to demonstrate the total incompatibility between the real Keynes and the neoclassi-
cal approach. Starting in particular from Keynes’s General Theory, the post Keynesians
attempt to develop a Keynesian framework that reject methodological individualism and
focus upon the role of money and effective demand (see Fontana and Realfonzo, 2005,
p.9-10). The most important economists considered the pioneers of this school of thought
are Joan Robinson, Michal Kalecki, Nicholas Kaldor, Hyman Minsky, Paul Davidson, Au-
gusto Graziani, Jan Kregel and Alfred Eichner. Important contributions came also from
Robert Clower and Axel Leijonhufvud.
9According to Hahn “there is no correct neo-Ricardian proposition which is not con-
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2003)10. It is worth underlining how these positions are questionable espe-
cially because Pasinetti (1988) has claimed that it could be demonstrated
“that Sraffa’s analysis is entirely incompatible with marginal economic the-
ory” (Pasinetti, 2012a, p.1436). A position confirmed in particular by Gareg-
nani (2003) who engage in a detailed demonstration of the fallacy, in partic-
ular, of Hanh’s positions in Hahn (1975, 1982)11. More interesting debates
about PCMC have been raised because Sraffa’s model is not closed; its
simultaneous equation system leaves one degree of freedom - i.e., one dis-
tributional parameter has to be exogenously defined. Sraffa’s reference to
a closure of the model inside financial markets, through the definition of
“money rates of interest” (Sraffa, 1960, p.33), is a foundation “of a theory
of income distribution” (Pasinetti, 1988, p.135); open to different closures
(see Blankenburg et al., 2012). While some researchers are convinced that
Sraffa’s price system is the result of a gravitational process through free
competition (Caminati, 1990), others focus instead upon the interdepen-
dence between societal configurations and the “surplus product” (Garegnani,
1979). Another debate focuses upon the relationship between Sraffa and
Marx (Steedman, 1977). The claim that Sraffa has solved the transforma-
tion problem invalidating at the same time Marx’s analysis should consider
that while Marx’s analysis is an historical-sociological-philosophical inter-
pretation of capitalism’s dynamics, Sraffa’s PCMC is a logical-mathematical
analysis of a production system. Few results have come from attempts to
insert the typical features of Marxian (and Keynesian) economics inside
Sraffian schemes, such as money12, institutions, technology, or dynamics.
Pasinetti noted that researchers have been unable to elaborate satisfactory
dynamic production models (Pasinetti, 1988, pp.245-246). The only result
has been the elaboration of quasi-dynamic models, with population as the
only dynamic variable (i.e., no disequilibrium or sociological-behavioural
patterns can be considered).
An interesting evolution has been experimented by the so called mone-
tary theory of production who seems to find a possible connection between
Keynes and Sraffa. The idea of a monetary theory of production is traced
tained in the set of propositions which can be generated by orthodoxy” (Hahn, 1982,
p.353), he emphasised the need to distinguish between Sraffa and his followers and the
fact that (according to Hahn) it can be demonstrated that Sraffa should be considered as
a special neoclassical case.
10Amartya Sen, after a short description of Sraffa’s results in PCMC, claims: “This
is a powerful technical result. We can ask: what difference does it make? Aggregative
neoclassical models with capital as a factor of production are irreparably damaged. But
neoclassical economic theory need not be expounded in an aggregative form” (Sen, 2003,
p.1246).
11The arguments of Garegnani on this point make reference to what has been already
explained in section 2.1. See in particular the answer of Garegnani to Hahn in Garegnani
(2003).
12For example, Hodgson (1981) introduced money as a good.
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back to Keynes (1973a)13. The fundamental idea is that money affects mo-
tives and decisions and plays an essential role in transforming a real-wage
economy into a money-wage or entrepreneur economy (Keynes, 1979, p.81).
According to Keynes, fluctuations in effective demand are the mayor fac-
tor explaining the difference between the two types of economies and are
strictly connected to the fact that money plays a fundamental role in the
entrepreneur economies (Keynes, 1979, p.76). Following these intuitions,
especially after 1984, started a strong debate between heterodox economists
around the monetary theory of production (see Graziani, 2003). Whereas
most of these heterodox economists share a critical view of Walrasian ap-
proach to money, they have not been able to share a common view for the
construction of an alternative theory of money; for these reasons there are
different school of thought (i.e., the circuitist school and the post Keyne-
sian school). Despite the differences a common body of doctrine has been
built up: all reject methodological individualism and feel the need of a the-
ory of endogenous money, recognize the role of effective demand and uncer-
tainty and follow a Kaleckian-Keynesian analysis of income distribution (see
Fontana and Realfonzo, 2005, pp.9-10). Inside the theory of the monetary
circuit (developed in particular by Augusto Graziani, Edward Nell and Alain
Parguez), the credit nature of money and the role of credit and money for
the circulation of commodities has been emphasised. In particular Edward
Nell found some interesting connections between the theory of the monetary
circuit and the classical theory of production as revived by Sraffa (see Nell,
2004, 2005). These connections seem important for the construction of a
monetary theory of production based on Keynes’s and Sraffa’s contributions
(see for example Febrero, 2006).
2.3 Keynes and Sraffa: is an integration possible?
One interesting point of debate is the possibility to integrate Keynes’s and
Sraffa’s findings. The answer to this topic is not trivial. The difficulty of
using production theory and Keynes’s economics as an alternative microe-
conomic foundation for constructing satisfactory macro-dynamic models is
a matter of fact (Pasinetti, 1975). The first issue is the explanation of why
it has been so difficult to create a synthesis between Sraffa and Keynes.
The strictness of the Sraffian methodology could be one of the reasons
for the difficulties in finding a synthesis with Keynes’s approach. Sraffa’s
approach was based on the “reliance on observable measurable quantities
alone, to the exclusion of all ‘subjectivist’ concepts” (D3/12/7: 4614, quoted
13Despite some researchers say that the monetary theory of production has a longer
tradition; see for example Fontana and Realfonzo (2005).
14This notation make reference to Sraffa’s unpublished manuscripts of the Sraffa Archive
kept in the Wren Library at Trinity College, Cambridge. The notation follows the cata-
logue prepared by the archivist Jonathan Smith.
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in Davis, 2012, p.1342). For Sraffa, the concept of social surplus was funda-
mental in explaining value, in opposition to the Marginalist method, which
Sraffa considered “basically ideological in nature” (Davis, 2012, p.1343).
For Sraffa, value was a sort of “physical or chemical quality” (D3/12/12:
7, quoted in Kurz, 2012, p.1548), and he elaborated his equation like a
chemist who presents “chemical reactions first as a balance sheet and then
as an algebraic equation” (Kurz, 2012, p.1547), following the principle that
“for every effect there must be sufficient cause” (D3/12/7: 161(3) quoted in
Kurz, 2012, p.1547).
This approach allowed him to surpass the concept of value used by classi-
cal economists. According to Sraffa, their error has been to “regard ‘labour’
as a quantity, to be measured in ... [terms] of human energy, and thus com-
mensurate to value” (D3/12/11: 36 quoted in Kurz and Salvadori, 2005,
p.418). What Sraffa suggested, instead, was to restart from Quesnay’s Eco-
nomic Tables in order to obtain a measure of value consistent with the
physiocrats’s concept of real cost. Indeed, the combination between Ques-
nay’s circular flow model and the simultaneous equation solution method
would provide, according to Sraffa, “the value of a set of commodities in
terms of how those commodities were used up in production” (Davis, 2012,
p.1344).
On the other hand, Keynes’s ambiguity on the real consequences of his
General Theory for the orthodox scheme (Robinson, 1963, p.78) created a
sort of doctrinal fog (Blaug, 1980, p.221) that promoted the controversial
neoclassical synthesis. Moreover, the alleged lack of microfoundations in
Keynes’s theoretical construction has reinforced mainstream economists’s
arguments (Lucas and Sargent, 1979). Surely this ambiguity is also linked to
a concrete problem inside the Keynesian scheme, that is, the impossibility for
Keynes to escape from the marginalist theory of value and the Marshallian
perspectives at the base of his analysis, oriented to the short run. Even
those economists that found possible some connection between Keynes and
Sraffa have found difficult to imagine how to merge Keynes’s unstable short
run approach with the widespread vision of Sraffian schemes as long run
point of equilibrium convergence (see for example the approach of Kurz and
Salvadori, 2005).
As a consequence, instead of a merge between Keynes and Sraffa, the
final results has been an incorporation of Keynes into neoclassical theory.
A result that does not make justice, surely, of the real value of Keynes’s
contribution. As noted by Pasinetti:
It was quite natural to expect the theorists to be eager to transcribe
Keynes’s arguments into simple, possibly algebraic and diagrammatic
terms, suited for didactical purposes. [...] This situation, not surpris-
ingly, led to encouraging the use of the traditional analytical tools and
to try to insert the Keynesian innovations into the prevailing paradigm.
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The most successful of all devices in this direction was the IS-LM model
of J.R.Hicks [...]. Hicks more recently (1980-81) stated quite plainly
that there was no attempt on his part to convert himself to Keynes [...]
as he writes, “the IS-LM was in fact a translation of Keynes’ nonflex-
price model into my terms [...] the idea of the IS-LM diagram came
to me as a result of the work I had been doing on three-way exchange,
conceived in a Walrasian manner” (Pasinetti, 2007, pp.141-142).
This situation had dramatic consequences for the interpretation of Keynes’s
General Theory :
Franco Modigliani (1944), starting from Hicks’s model, proceeded to
a well-known formalization of Keynes’s theory that had the explicit
purpose as he put it of ‘digesting’ Keynes’s hard tools or ‘difficult’
concepts into traditional economic analysis. This whole process went
on, without much opposition from the ‘genuine’ Keynesians. It was
later crystallized by the expression, attributed to Paul Samuelson, of
a ‘grand neoclassical synthesis’. (Pasinetti, 2007, p.30).
In summary, Sraffian and Keynesian economics did not achieve full in-
tegration. On one side, the strictness of the Sraffian methodology, which
analysis has no money, no contracts, no debts, no dynamics, and no be-
havioural or psychological features; i.e., the typical Keynesian elements; on
the other side, the doctrinal fog (Blaug, 1980, p.221) around the Keynesian
economics that promoted the controversial neoclassical synthesis. If this is
the situation the questions is: how is it possible to reconcile Sraffa
and Keynes? The answer is, in our opinion, that the two theories are not
to be reconciled but completed through their integration. In fact there is
no evidence to say that the two approaches are incompatible or conflict-
ing, but there are elements which demonstrate their complementarity: the
Sraffian theory can represent the theory of production that is lacking in the
Keynesian theory; the Keynesian theory provides the instruments for the
investigation of the disequilibrium dynamics which is lacking in the Sraf-
fian theory. One should not forget that: “both Keynes and Sraffa rejected
Say’s Law, although for different reasons” (Kurz, 2013, p.9). In the next
section we will demonstrate the total incompatibility between the Keynesian
thought and neoclassical theory. Keynes, as Sraffa, was convinced that the
complexity of the economic phenomenon should be investigated on the basis
of robust accounting principles. This means that both the Keynesian theory
that the Sraffian theory require the use of a constructive mathematics in-
compatible with the neoclassical theory. At this point, one may be tempted
to doubt the compatibility between the Sraffian rigor and the typical Keyne-
sian approach oriented to the study of the influence of the uncertainty and
of the animal spirits. Sraffa’s unpublished manuscripts seem to show that
the rigor demonstrated by Sraffa should not be interpreted as an absolute
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refusal to consider the complexity of the economic phenomenon15. Indeed,
as it will be demonstrated in the next section, Sraffa recognized the impor-
tance of institutions, human behaviour and society for the determination of
the surplus. Moreover Sraffa never claimed that demand plays no role in his
analysis and demand is crucial for Keynes who based his General Theory
on the controversial concept of effective demand. Sraffa was hoping that his
fundamental contribution could represent the foundation for the creation of
an alternative to the marginal theory: “if the foundation holds, the critique
may be attempt later, either by the writer or by someone younger or bet-
ter equipped for the task” (Sraffa, 1960, p.vi). It is hard to believe that
this critique could be carried out regardless of the study of the dynamics
of disequilibrium. It is also hard to believe that behind Keynes’s ambigui-
ties and silences the hope that his precious and fundamental contributions
could once break free from the neoclassical theory was not concealed. Sev-
eral well-known economists who advocate an integration between Keynesian
and Sraffian economics probably share this interpretation (see for example
Roncaglia (1995, p.120) cited in the Introduction of the present thesis). It
cannot be excluded that the lack of integration has been determined mainly
by the contrasts between the successors of Keynes and Sraffa. A contrast
that certainly contributed to the solidification of the mainstream economics.
But one should not forget that:
despite claims to the contrary, there is a strong bond uniting post-
Keynesians of various brands and Sraffa: it is their opposition to the
marginalist or neoclassical theory (Kurz, 2013, p.1).
Those who seek to develop an alternative to the conventional neoclas-
sical theory are well advised to take into account both the findings of
Keynes and those of Sraffa (Kurz, 1995, p.84).
As a consequence the problem is not (or should not be) the compatibility
between the two theories, but how to integrate them. The present thesis
represents one step towards a possible answer to this question.
2.4 The reasons and conditions for a new integration
Before addressing the issue of a possible integration between Keynes and
Sraffa it is important to underline the incompatibility between Keynes and
the mainstream. Indeed, a fundamental misunderstanding of Keynes’s thought
has contributed to this development; in particular, the debatable simplifi-
cation of Keynes’s General Theory by the neoclassical synthesis (e.g., the
IS-LM model in Hicks, 1937) have reinforced the habits (inherited by most
new Keynesians) of considering Keynes’s contribution a part of macroeco-
nomics to be derived from Walrasian microeconomics.
15Although it is undeniable that it is not an easy task to combine the analysis of the
economic phenomenon in its complexity with the Sraffian rigor.
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Keynes was convinced that his theory was revolutionary with respect to
the neoclassical one and he was not oriented to find compromises through
simplifications. It appears clear in this Keynes’s oft-quoted letter to Harrod:
The general effect of your reaction [...] is to make me feel that my as-
sault on the classical school ought to be intensified rather than abated
[...]. I am frightfully afraid of the tendency, of which I see some signs
in you to appear, to accept my constructive part and to find some ac-
commodation between this and deeply cherished views which would in
fact only be possible if my constructive part has been partially misun-
derstood (Letter dated 27 August 1935 from Keynes to Harrod cited
in Pasinetti (2007, pp.31-32)).
The theoretical gaps in modern microeconomics, demonstrated by the
empirical evidence of the actual crisis, underline the impossibility to restrict
Keynes’s theoretical framework within modern microeconomics. According
to Clower the compromise between Keynes and the mainstream was implau-
sible (Clower, 1965, pp.278-279): if Keynesian economics added something
new to economics, one has to recognize its incompatibility with Walras’s
law and the mainstream theory of household behaviour. Indeed, Keynes’s
novelty could be understood only by admitting that he “made tacit use of a
more general theory” (Clower, 1965, p.279), another microfoundation never
explicitly explained by Keynes himself, but that probably was “at the back
of his mind” (Clower, 1965, p.290). Even though there is no direct evi-
dence of this inside Keynes’s writings, it is a matter of fact that the most
distinctive elements of Keynesian economics (e.g., animal spirits or beauty
contests) can hardly find a place inside neoclassical theory.
Inside Neo-Walrasian theory, there are no markets, no endogenous in-
stitutions, no announcements by agents (the only active agent is the auc-
tioneer), no competition, no money and no trading: it is concerned solely
with demands and supplies based on “trading dispositions”, as Walras called
them, that could be interpreted as hypothetical mental states (Clower, 1994,
pp.808-809). Keynes’s approach, on the other hand, has always focused on
the dynamic behaviour of monetary real-world economies, characterized by
decentralized, self-organizing and never “clear” markets, where prices are
“made” by real agents without perfect knowledge (Clower, 1994, pp.807-
808). It is worth remembering that the discontents with Neo-Walrasian the-
ory “concern not its lack of ‘realism’ but its scientific vacuousness” (Clower,
1994, p.810) in theorizing observable events. It has been already explained
the nature of this vacuousness in the previous chapter, when the importance
of the introduction of constructive mathematics inside economics has been
emphasised. Keynesian microeconomics should be not only real and close to
Keynes’s psychological economic theory but also coherent with the principle
of computable economics, i.e., “every concept must have an operationally
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relevant content so as to be understood and implemented by the virtual
economic agents” (Zambelli, 2010, p.38).
At this point a possible connection with Sraffa results fundamental. In-
deed, it is worth remembering that Sraffa’s schemes are mathematically
constructive16 and, probably, they are a good candidate to be added to the
Keynesian framework so as to develop a root to be used for the analysis of
the behaviour of the economic system as a whole.
Sraffa’s unpublished manuscripts, which have been available since the
opening in 1993 of the Sraffa Archive kept in the Wren Library at Trinity
College (Cambridge)17 seem precious for “revisiting and placing PCMC in
the wider context of ongoing debates on economic philosophy, economic
theory and economic policy” (Blankenburg et al., 2012, p.1267), especially
because “Sraffa is reported to have called his notes and papers an iceberg,
the tip of which is his published work” (Kurz, 2012, p.1539).
Thanks to the unpublished manuscripts, which have become the object
of a growing literature, it has been emphasised how Sraffa realised, at some
point of his intellectual journey (Kurz and Salvadori, 2005, p.431), that
surplus could not be explained only in terms of real costs, but depends also
on the behaviour of capitalists and institutions. Indeed, as Sraffa observes
When we have defined our “economic field”, there are still outside
causes which operate in it; and its effects go beyond the boundary [...].
The surplus may be the effect of the outside causes; and the effects
of the distribution of the surplus may lie outside (D3/12/7: 161(3-5)
cited in Davis, 2012, p.1348).
Sraffa never explored these “outside causes”, nor other potential sub-
jective factors. Nevertheless, Sraffa admitted the importance of “systemic
inducement”, a concept not far from Smithian “forces” or the Marxian “co-
ercive law of competition” (Kurz, 2012, p.1559). Moreover, Sraffa’s concern
with the consequences of the relationship between policy issues and social
conflict for distribution is confirmed by his writings on banking systems and
monetary policy (Blankenburg et al., 2012, p.1276). His relationship with
Gramsci permitted him to develop a “social point of view” that marginalism
denied. As claimed by Sraffa:
[The] chief objection to utility is that it makes of value an individual
conception: it implies that problems of Rob[inson] Crusoe and those of
an economic man living in the City are exactly the same. Now, value is
a social phenomenon: it would not exist outside society: all our utili-
ties are derived from social conventions and therefore dependent upon
social conditions and standard (D1/16: 1, Sraffa’s emphasis. Cited in
Signorino, 2001, p.758).
16See on the constructiveness of Sraffa’s schemes Velupillai (1989, 2008a) and Zambelli
(2010, p.26).
17See Smith (1998) and Kurz (1998) for a summary of the contents of the manuscripts.
37
If it can be sustained that there is no reason to conclude that Keynes’s
and Sraffa’s approaches are incompatible, some strong connections between
them should also be emphasised.
Firstly, both are based on strong bookkeeping principles, fundamental
for computation. Indeed, Sraffa’s equation systems are based on the equality
between costs and revenues, while Keynes’s General Theory “set the stage
for national income accounting...[and] his recognition of the equality of sav-
ing and investment provided the basis for an accounting approach” (Ruggles
and Ruggles, 1999, p.135).
Secondly, both of them were aware of the complexity of real economies.
Indeed, Keynes’s claim that the causal relationship runs from investment
to saving starts from the recognition that it is micro-level behaviour which
generates the non-isomorphic macro-level aggregate (i.e., the fallacy of com-
position). Each agent’s behaviour is subject to uncertainty and it is influ-
enced by other people (i.e., the beauty contest). The failure of coordination
is intrinsic in the mechanism of economic system, because different agents
take different decisions according to their social role in a highly unstable,
complex, and interconnected environment. Also Sraffa was aware, as just
previously described, of this complexity that led him to recognize that “the
surplus may be the effect of the outside causes” (D3/12/7: 161(3-5) cited in
Davis, 2012, p.1348).
It is worth remembering that for Keynes investments determine savings,
because saving is the decision to abstain from consumption an earned income
(i.e., income, saving and investment are flow and not stocks or endowments)
and income depends on the level of employment and production which de-
pend on investments. This is the core mechanism at the base of Keynes’s
definition of effective demand18.
It is well-known that the role of demand inside Sraffian Schemes is de-
bated. Anyway “Sraffa never stated that prices can be conceived indepen-
dently from demand” (Bellino, 2008, p.24) so it is not possible to declare
that demand plays no role in Sraffa’s opinion. Famous and instructive is
Sraffa’s letter to Arun Bose in which he states:
[...] Your opening sentence is for me an obstacle which I am unable to
get over. You write: ’It is a basic proposition of the Sraffa theory that
prices are determined exclusively by the physical requirements of pro-
duction and the social wage-profit division, with consumers’ demand
playing a purely passive role.’ Never have I said this: certainly not
in the two places to which you refer in your note 2. Nothing, in my
view, could be more suicidal than to make such a statement. You are
asking me to put my head on the block so that the first fool who comes
along can cut it off neatly (C32/3 the letter is reproduced integrally in
Bellino, 2008, p.39).
18In section 2.5.1, a detailed disccusion about Keynes’s principle of effective demand is
reported.
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It could be claimed that the produced surplus of the Sraffian scheme
is itself “effective demand at production prices” and the meaning of this
sentence can be understood through a simulation approach (as developed in
the present thesis) that consider out-of-equilibrium behaviour inside Sraffian
schemes, so that the role of effective demand appears clear and the nature
of the eventual convergence towards production prices can be studied.
2.5 The integration in practice: the Keynesian side of the
laboratory
In the previous sections, the reasons and conditions for a possible integra-
tion between some elements of Keynesian and Sraffian economics have been
considered. In this section, the Keynesian elements that will be effectively
integrated in the digital economic laboratory will be described. It has been
said that the present thesis is an attempt to model Keynes’s principle of
effective demand with the aid of Sraffian schemes. At this point, a care-
ful consideration of the meaning of the controversial principle of effective
demand inside the digital economic laboratory is needed. This would help
on one side to clarify our position about this important topic and on the
other side it will allow to explain in more details the elements of Keynesian
economics effectively present in the digital economic laboratory.
2.5.1 Keynes’s principle of effective demand: some notes
Keynes defines effective demand in the third chapter of his General Theory,
titled The Principle of Effective Demand. In that chapter Keynes claims:
It follows that in a given situation of technique, resources and fac-
tor cost per unit of employment, the amount of employment, both in
each individual firm and industry and in the aggregate, depends on
the amount of the proceeds which the entrepreneurs expect to receive
from the corresponding output [...]. Thus the volume of employment
is given by the point of intersection between the aggregate demand
function and the aggregate supply function; for it is at this point that
the entrepreneurs’ expectation of profits will be maximised. [...] the
point of the aggregate demand function, where it is intersected by the
aggregate supply function, will be called the effective demand [...] this
is the substance of the General Theory of Employment [...] (Keynes,
1936, pp.24-25).
The concept of effective demand and the aggregate supply and demand
functions introduced by Keynes in order to determine effective demand have
been object of debates, criticisms and different interpretations. Different
economists have given different explanations of the troubles around one of
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the most important concept introduced by Keynes in the General Theory19.
For example, Pasinetti claims that:
After appearing as the title of the chapter, the principle of effective
demand is not stated. The only time the term itself is mentioned
in the whole of Chapter 3 is on page 31, in an incidental sentence,
where it is taken for granted that the reader knows what it is. It is not
mentioned again in the whole book. It is not even mentioned anywhere
else in Keynes’s writings (as far as I have been able to discover) with
two exceptions: in a perfunctory sentence in the centenary allocution
on Malthus (C W. X: 107) and in a letter to Sraffa (to be mentioned
below, p. 100) (Pasinetti, 1997, p.93).
Other economists, such as for example Asimakopulos, underlines other
difficulties that go beyond Keynes’s silence on a clear explanation of the
principle of effective demand:
The aggregate supply and demand functions presented by Keynes in
Chapter 3 of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
in order to define effective demand, have continued to draw comment,
criticism and suggested reinterpretation. A definitive interpretation of,
and commentary on, these concepts is made difficult by inconsistencies
and errors in the way Keynes presented them. (Asimakopulos, 1982,
p.18, emphasis added).
Before of whatever interpretation of the real Keynes, the problem seems
to be related to the fact that Keynes defines but not states in an unequiv-
ocal way the principle of effective demand. Moreover, the way in which
Keynes introduces the concept of effective demand has been found, at least,
ambiguous. Keynes’s inconsistencies and silences have been probably deter-
mined also by the fact that “the principle of effective demand belongs to a
more fundamental level of investigation, towards which Keynes was able to
go only partially. Perhaps, he never had the time or the necessary calm or
the appropriate analytical tools to go back and face it explicitly” (Pasinetti,
1997, p.93). As a consequence, the commentators of Keynes have had the
hard task to fill the silences of Keynes by overcoming his ambiguities and
contradictions in order to find what really Keynes wanted to say20. The final
purpose was the construction of a solid theory of effective demand to use as
foundation for the construction of a real alternative to the neoclassical the-
ory demonstrating that Keynes’s theory was really revolutionary. A really
hard task, that led to unavoidable debates, as recognized by Clower:
The history of post-General Theory macroeconomics is a story of re-
peated attempts to extract from Keynes’s classic more than it actually
19One should not forget that, according to some researchers, effective demand has been
anticipated by Kalecki. On this point see Arestis (1996, p.112).
20In particular with the support of Keynes’s Collected Writings.
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contains: formally valid arguments that would simultaneously sub-
stantiate its disputed revolutionary claims and rationalize its undis-
puted revolutionary impact. After some sixty years of exegesis and
debate, all that appears to have been established is that Keynes’s
General Theory was ‘revolution-making’ but not ‘revolutionary’ (I am
here paraphrasing T.S. Kuhn 1953: 135). No one disputes the audac-
ity of Keynes’s aggregative approach to the economy as a whole, but
many have questioned the conventional comparative-statics method
that Keynes adopted (Clower, 1997, p.47).
Despite everything, lot of economists have tried to develop a clear the-
ory of effective demand but “the ambiguities in his exposition [of Keynes]
were to be reflected, and often magnified, in the subsequent debates” (King,
1994, pp.4-5). A detailed description of these debates are not object of
the present thesis. Despite this, a brief summary of the relevant litera-
ture and an introduction to some interesting points of discussion will be
briefly commented. Firstly, different economists have tried to summarise
the concept of effective demand in quite different ways. Garegnani defines
effective demand as “the principle that aggregate demand may be insuffi-
cient to absorb the output produced from normal use of existing capacity”
(Kregel, 1983, p.69); Amedeo, instead, enunciated Keynes’s principle of ef-
fective demand as follows: “given a change in investment demand (or any
autonomous component of aggregate demand), the level of income (that is,
the levels of price and output) will change in such a way that, in equilib-
rium, the corresponding change in saving will be equal to the initial change
in investment” (Amadeo, 1989, p.1). Beyond these different alternative def-
inition (themselves subject to dispute), a first object of debate has been the
role of aggregate demand and aggregate supply in determining employment.
Despite “not all of the original propagators of the General Theory were con-
vinced of the significance of aggregate supply and demand analysis” (King,
1994, pp.4-5), this topic started to become object of discussion. Economists
such as Dennis Robertson, Ralph Hawtrey and F.J. de Jong emphasized the
role of aggregate demand as the major innovation of Keynes, in determining
employment, considering aggregate supply function “familiar and largely un-
controversial” (King, 1994, pp.4-5). Others, such as Asimakopulos (1982),
have criticized this unilateral vision by emphasizing both the role of aggre-
gate supply and of aggregate demand in determining effective demand and
finally employment. Some economists have emphasized the importance of
considering effective demand as the fundamental feature of an entrepreneur
monetary economy. Robert W. Clower, with Axel Leijonhufvud21, has been
surely one of the most prominent economists of this strand: “Clower’s orig-
inal venture into the uncomfortable no-man’s land between Neoclassicism
21Axel Leijonhufvud, among other things, focused on effective demand failures. See for
example Leijonhufvud (1973).
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and Keynesianism sought to provide a microtheoretical foundation for the
core concept of Keynesian theory - Effective Demand” (Leijonhufvud, 1973,
p.32). Bharadwaj summarizes very well the importance of the contribution
of Clower and Leijonhufvud:
Their arguments are narrowly directed to show that Keynes’s underem-
ployment state can be explained independently of the “liquidity trap”,
“money illusion”, “wage rigidity”, “elasticity pessimism” or “imper-
fections” in the system. [...] The central question that Keynes faced
appears to be the same that troubled general equilibrium theorists.
[...] To Clower and Leijonhufvud, it is the trading that actually occurs
at non-market-clearing prices and its consequences that is at the root
of the Keynesian results. [...] Clower emphasizes the distinctive char-
acter of the money economy in the possibility it generates of violating
Walras’s Law (Bharadwaj, 1983, pp.5-7).
Despite their desire to demonstrate the true revolutionary nature of the
thought of Keynes must have seemed laudable to all supporters of Keynes22,
their interpretation of Kyenes’s thought has been object of criticism. Indeed
“while a description of the disequilibrium, non-tâtonnement process, ampli-
fying disturbances and thus leading to unemployment, emerges from these
attempts at providing microfoundations to Keynesian results, they have left
a number of “false trails” and landed the theory into a state of theoretical un-
certainty” (Bharadwaj, 1983, p.9). Brendan Sheehan claims that “Clower’s
use of the term effective demand has caused considerable pedagogic confu-
sion in Keynesian circles [because] Clower’s definition of effective demand is
very different from that of Keynes” (Sheehan, 2009, p.287). Despite these
criticisms it is undeniable that Keynes’s objective is to understand the func-
tioning of an entrepreneurial monetary economy. Therefore, monetary and
financial factors cannot be ousted from the analysis. Hyman Minsky has
been one of the most prominent economist that has considered the impor-
tance of these factors also with reference to the theory of effective demand:
Any understanding of the generation of effective demand and the pos-
sibility of effective demand failures in our economies in our time must
take the specific nature of our big government capitalism into account.
[...] Under capitalist conditions effective demand is financed demand.
[...] One great advance that I have always associated with Keynes is
that he held that we cannot dichotomize the financial and the “real”
when it comes to understanding capitalism (Minsky, 1983, pp.46-49).
If the importance of money and financial factors for Keynes is incon-
testable, their particular role inside the short-run and long-run theory of
effective demand cannot be defined trivially. The debate between Kregel
22With this term we consider those economists that actually hope to build a totally
independent theory with respect to neoclassical theory.
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and Garegnani is a good example of the importance of this issue. According
to Kregel: “in Keynes’s theory the real and monetary sectors are integrated
both in and out of equilibrium; his investigation of the transition process
led to a redefinition of the determinants of the natural position in terms of
both money and real factors. This is Keynes’s theory of effective demand”
(Kregel, 1983, p.62). Kregel conviction is that “Keynes certainly considered
the analysis of effective demand to have been an integral part of the Classical
discussion of economic problems” (Kregel, 1983, p.50). This seems coherent
with this Keynes’s observation:
To me, the most extraordinary thing regarded historically, is the disap-
pearance of the theory of demand and supply for output as a whole, i.e.
the theory of employment, after it had been for a quarter of a century
the most discussed thing in economics (Keynes, Collected Writings,
XIV, 1973, p.85; reported in Kregel (1983, p.50)).
Garegnani, instead, holds a different view: “Keynes’s liquidity preference
is not necessary to establish the principle of effective demand in the short
or in the long period” (Garegnani, 1983, p.78). Garegnani is convinced that
most problems in considering a long run theory of effective demand is related
to Keynes’s big troubles with orthodox theory, a position somehow shared
also by Pasinetti and most Sraffian economists. In details Garegnani claims
that:
Keynes also believed in the premises of orthodox theory and did not
challenge the notion of substitution between labour and capital on
which, as we saw, the orthodox theory based its conclusions concern-
ing the tendency towards the full employment of labour. The problem
therefore is: how did Keynes attempt to reconcile these two contra-
dictory strata of his thought? We know how he did it. [...] he relied
basically on the joint outcome of two elements: (i) liquidity preference,
[...] and (ii) the effect of expectations concerning the future profitabil-
ity of production making investment fluctuate. This second, Keynesian
route to effective demand, with its heavy reliance upon expectations,
was (at least until very recently) quite successful in getting the effec-
tive demand principle established for the short period policies which
were Keynes’s immediate concern. The same route has however turned
out to be much less successful in getting the principle of effective de-
mand accepted for long-run theory as Keynes clearly thought it should.
[...] Keynes’s acceptance of the traditional premises also helps to ex-
plain, a second factor which underlies his failure to get the principle
of effective demand established in long-period theory. Except for brief
unsystematic statements we do not find in his work any alternative
to the orthodox long-period theory of the level of aggregate output
(Garegnani, 1983, pp.75-76).
Keynes acceptance of some premises of the orthodox theory is surely at
the core of that doctrinal fog (Blaug, 1980, p.221) that promoted the neo-
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classical synthesis and the abandonment of the concept of effective demand
within it. Indeed, in this compromise, there was no place for a fundamental
and revolutionary concept such as the effective demand. As a consequence,
and not surprisingly, “those who have tried to re-absorb [Keynes’s] analysis
into traditional theory have been careful not to mention the principle [of
effective demand] at all”. (Pasinetti, 1997, p.93). In new Keynesian eco-
nomics effective demand disappeared. Indeed, this concept is at the end
one of the most important points of disagreement between new Keynesian
economics and post Keynesian economics. Effective demand in post Key-
nesian analysis implies that it is scarcity of demand rather than scarcity of
resources that is to be confronted in modern economics, so that output is
ordinarily limited by effective demand, although it is recognised that sup-
ply constraints are present in modern capitalist economies (Arestis, 1996,
p.112). The situation of the debate around the theory of effective demand
nowadays is well summarised by Hayes:
King (1994, p.28) notes a decline in post Keynesian interest in Keynes’s
principle of effective demand since 1989, which he attributes to its
neoclassical flavour. Consistent with this view, the recent literature
on effective demand has largely divided into two strands, one tending
to follow Kalecki rather than Keynes (see Arestis, 1996), the other ad-
dressing Keynes’s methodology (see Chick and Dow, 2001). Orthodoxy
has long discounted the suggestion that Keynes offers a serious alterna-
tive to Walrasian general equilibrium analysis, and has followed Lucas
(1981) in its negative assessment of Keynes’s theoretical contribution
(Hayes, 2007, p.56).
2.5.2 Keynes in the digital economic laboratory
The perception is that this long and important debate around the principle
of effective demand is fated to remain open. On this state of the art a
comment of Minsky (in a contribution titled Notes on effective demand)
seems particularly pertinent:
Perhaps we pay too much attention to the literature of our discipline
- not only to what our great predecessors said but also to what our
contemporaries are saying - and not enough to what happens in the
economies we study. [...] Instead of trying to say general things about
economies, we should concentrate on understanding the range of be-
haviour which economies exhibit as institutions as well as the relations
among variables change (Minsky, 1983, p.49, emphasis added).
Following the wisdom of the words of Minsky, it can be concluded that
economists should start to focalize to what really happens in the economic
system, beyond the theoretical debates. This seems to suggest, coherently
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also with Herbert Simon23, that an economist should not rely only on the
abstraction of the traditional modelling but should be also open to use in-
strument able to investigate “what happens in the economies we study”
such as a simulation approach. This type of investigation can be used as an
instrument in order to understand how effective demand emerge from the
mechanisms of entrepreneurial monetary economy. This is exactly the ap-
proach at the base of the construction of the digital economic laboratory. Its
purpose is to see how effective demand emerges and aggregate demand and
supply function behave in a dynamical framework where out-of-equilibrium
behaviour is possible thanks to the presence of some fundamental elements
typical of Keynesian economics that can be summarized as follows:
• Producers produce in order to earn profits.
• Producers produce and assume workers according to expected demand:
without a profit expectation based on expected demand producer can
also not assume workers so that unemployment can emerge.
• ARAs (workers and producers) buy their commodities according to
their preferences and income at disposal.
• Debt and credit relations can emerge in order to carry on production
and consumption. Debt and credit accumulate in time and represent
the financial wealth associated to each ARA.
• There can be cases of excess demand or excess supply. In the first
case ARAs can be rationed, in the second case some commodities are
unsold.
According to these premises the digital economic laboratory is able to
experience effective demand, and with this term we mean the phenomenon
as described by Keynes:
In a given situation of technique, resources and factor cost per unit of
employment, the amount of employment [...] depends on the amount
of the proceeds which the entrepreneurs expect to receive from the
corresponding output [...]. Thus the volume of employment is given by
the point of intersection between the aggregate demand function and
the aggregate supply function [...] called the effective demand (Keynes,
1936, pp.24-25).
Monetary and financial aspects in the digital economic laboratory:
some important remarks
It can be sustained that some fundamental elements of Keynesian economics
that characterize a monetary entrepreneurial economy are absent or, at least,
23See on this point the previous chapter section 1.4.
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not so clearly defined: monetary system, financial system and banking sys-
tem. First of all, it is important to clarify the role of money inside the digital
economic laboratory. Inside the laboratory, each exchange is associated to
the underwriting of an IOU (I owe you) denominated in a socially accepted
unit of account24. It is assumed that each ARA accepts to underwrite an
IOU when needed25. This means that a type of money is present inside
the laboratory. Indeed, this mechanism respects the modern definition of
money according to which “money today is a type of IOU, but one that is
special because everyone in the economy trusts that it will be accepted by
other people in exchange for goods and services” (McLeay et al., 2014, p.1).
Moreover, we should not forget that:
In principle, there might be no need for a special financial asset such as
money to keep track of who is owed goods and services. Everyone in the
economy could instead create their own financial assets and liabilities
by giving out IOUs every time they wanted to purchase something, and
then mark down in a ledger whether they were in debt or credit in IOUs
overall. Indeed, in medieval Europe merchants would often deal with
one another by issuing IOUs. And merchant houses would periodically
settle their claims on one another at fairs, largely by cancelling out
debts. But such systems rely on everyone being confident that everyone
else is completely trustworthy. [...] Money is a social institution that
provides a solution to the problem of a lack of trust (McLeay et al.,
2014, p.4).
The possibility inside the laboratory to experience the emergence of
credit and debt relations through the underwriting of IOUs as previously
defined; the fact that each ARA takes decisions considering the values of
the commodities with the purpose of maximizing his income (for produc-
ers expected profits); the fact that workers are hired according to expected
demand and the fact that imbalances between supply and demand are pos-
sible are sufficient elements to consider the economy simulated inside the
laboratory a monetary entrepreneurial economy in Keynesian terms. The
presence of a banking system or other complex financial institutions that
allows, for example, to exchange IOUs versus IOUs are important features
of a real economy but not necessary elements for defining an essential and
simple version of a monetary entrepreneurial economy in Keynesian terms.
Indeed, it can be sustained that the only element that is necessary to have
in order to talk about a monetary entrepreneurial economy in Keynesian
24An IOU is a contract, a deferred payment of an exchange which is taking place now.
For more details see section 3.3.4.
25In this way trust problems are not considered because it is assumed that each ARA
accepts to underwrite an IOU when needed according to a shared rule. This hypothesis
could be considered too strong. Despite this one should not forget that this hypothesis
should be considered as a first step in order to understand more clearly the role of a
successive introduction of the banking system.
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terms is effective demand. This concept, not so clear inside the General
Theory, has been considered with more care by Keynes in the attempt to
introduce a monetary theory of production (see Keynes’s Collected Writ-
ings; volume XXIX: The General Theory and After: a supplement), where
Keynes’s speaks at length also about effective demand and defines it:
Effective demand may be defined by reference to the expected excess
of sale proceeds over variable cost (what is included in variable cost
depending on the length of the period in view). Effective demand
fluctuates if this excess fluctuates, being deficient if it falls short of some
normal figure (not yet defined) and excessive if it exceeds it (Keynes,
1979, p.80).
Then Keynes explains the difference between a real-wage cooperative
economy, a neutral entrepreneur economy and a money-wage entrepreneur
economy. According to Keynes the first type of economy is a barter econ-
omy in which factors of production are “rewarded by allocating in agreed
proportions the actual outcome of their cooperative effort” (Fontana and
Realfonzo, 2005, p.2). In the neutral entrepreneur economy money is a sim-
ple mean of exchange that do not change the ‘barter nature’ of this econ-
omy in which “sale proceeds exceed variable cost by a determinate amount”
(Keynes, 1979, p.80). Finally, the money-wage entrepreneur economy is,
first of all, an economy in which, following Marx’s intuition, the purpose of
production is to obtain even more money:
The distinction between a co-operative economy and an entrepreneur
economy bears some relation to a pregnant observation made by Karl
Mark, - though the subsequent use to which he put this observation
was highly illogical. He pointed out that the nature of production in
the actual world is not, as economists seem often to suppose, a case of
C-M-C’, i.e., of exchanging commodity (or effort) for money in order
to obtain another commodity (or effort). That may be the standpoint
of the private consumer. But it is not the attitude of business, which is
a case of M-C-M’, i.e. of parting with money for commodity (or effort)
in order to obtain more money. (Keynes, 1979, p.81).
Keynes develops this point and arrives to explain clearly the differ-
ence between a real-wage or co-operative economy and a money-wage en-
trepreneur economy as follows:
The first type of society we will call a real-wage or co-operative econ-
omy. The second type, in which the factors are hired by entrepreneurs
for money but there is a mechanism of some kind to ensure that the
exchange value of the money incomes of the factors is always equal in
the aggregate to the proportion of current output which would have
been the factors’ share in a co-operative economy, we will call a neutral
entrepreneur economy, or a neutral economy for short. The third type,
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of which the second is a limiting case, in which the entrepreneurs hire
the factors for money but without such a mechanism above, we will
call a money wage or entrepreneur economy. (Keynes, 1979, pp.77-78).
The real difference between the two types of economy can be traced back,
ultimately, to the fluctuation of effective demand :
In a co-operative or in a neutral economy, in which sale proceeds exceed
variable costs by a determinate amount, effective demand cannot fluc-
tuate [...]. But in an entrepreneur economy the fluctuations of effective
demand may be the dominating factor in determining the volume of
employment. (Keynes, 1979, p.80).
It is interesting to note that Keynes asks himself explicitly “could then
such an entrepreneur economy exist without money?” (Keynes, 1979, p.85).
To this question Keynes answers as follows:
What [...] is the answer to our original question? Money is par ex-
cellence the means of remuneration in an entrepreneur economy which
lends itself to fluctuations in effective demand. But if employers were to
remunerate their workers in terms of plots of land or obsolete postage
stamps, the same difficulties could arise. Perhaps anything in terms of
which the factors of production contract to be remunerated, which is
not and cannot be a part of current output and it is capable of being
used otherwise that to purchase current output, is, in a sense, money.
If so, but not otherwise, the use of money is a necessary condition for
fluctuations in effective demand. (Keynes, 1979, p.86).
In the laboratory the fundamental elements that allow to explain the
origin of a money-wage entrepreneur economy (as described by Keynes) are
present. It would be a theoretical error to argue that other elements (such
as a banking system) have been considered necessary by Keynes for defining
a monetary entrepreneurial economy26. It is obvious that the economic
system presented in the laboratory has been created with the purpose to
be implemented by important institutions such as the banking system or a
complex financial system27. Despite this, from a methodological point of
view, it is desirable to study the dynamics of a money-wage entrepreneur
economy starting from the simplest version. This is exactly the first step
attempt by the present thesis.
26Remember that Keynes overlooks the banking system and bank money inside the
General Theory. See section 8.3 for more details on this topic.
27These points are object of further research that go beyond this thesis. See section 9.2
for more details.
48
2.6 The integration in practice: the Sraffian side of the lab-
oratory
In the previous section, the Keynesian elements that will be effectively inte-
grated in the digital economic laboratory have been described in details. It
has been said that the present thesis is an attempt to model Keynes’s prin-
ciple of effective demand with the aid of the Sraffian schemes. In this section
the Sraffian elements that will be present in the laboratory will be clearly
described. The introduction of the Sraffian elements inside the laboratory
as complement of the other Keynesian elements represents an attempt to
“take into account both the findings of Keynes and those of Sraffa” in order
“to develop an alternative to the conventional neoclassical theory” (Kurz,
1995, p.84). In the laboratory the elements and the concepts of the Sraffian
tradition can be summarised in the following list:
• Production is conceived as a circular process.
• Production is heterogeneous with methods of the fixed proportion
type.
• Production of commodities by means of commodities: in this version
of the laboratory joint production or fixed capital are excluded.
• This conception of production allows to compute the wage rate and the
profit rate, to observe how the surplus is divided between producers
and workers and to construct the wage-profit curve.
• In some thought experiments the possibility to choose the best method
of production among a set of different methods for the production of
the same commodity will be introduced. This allows to use the differ-
ent wage-profit curves for the construction of the wage-profit frontier
as a technological benchmark.
The introduction of Sraffian schemes in a dynamic environment where
the exchanges can take place at market prices by signing IOUs is one of the
key innovations of this thesis, compared to the existing literature on this
subject. The fact that production is conceived as a circular process on the
basis of the Sraffian schemes allows to analyse the pattern of distribution,
to verify the convergence towards uniform profit rates and uniform wage
rates and to use the wage-profit curves (and the frontier) as technological
benchmarks. In the next chapters, this integration between Sraffian and
Keynesian elements will be clarified through a detailed description (also
mathematical) of the laboratory. The potentialities of this first attempt
towards a Sraffian-Keynesian approach will be demonstrated through the
thought experiments.
49
3 The digital economic laboratory
3.1 Introduction
The algorithmic digital economic laboratory is characterized by the presence
of a virtual market formed by a population of algorithmic rational agents
(ARAs)28, divided between workers and producers. ARAs, located inside a
lattice, have a deterministic network of relations. ARAs are characterized
by behavioural functions describing decisions with respect to the produc-
ing, consuming, buying and selling of economic magnitudes. Exchanges
between ARAs (deterministic, bilateral and in property rights), are regis-
tered through a double-entry bookkeeping system. ARAs producers sell
their products in local markets which are connected spatially. Production
is heterogeneous and conceived as a circular process; the methods of pro-
duction available to the ARAs producers are of the fixed proportions type.
Each ARA producer will choose (if different alternative methods are present)
the method that allows him to maximize his expected revenues. Each local
market represents a local unit of the whole economy and the presence of
more interconnected local markets, with more ARAs producers producing
the same commodity in different local markets, allows to make a distinction
between local and global dynamics.
This algorithmic model has been written in the form of a coherent set
of computer codes. We aim at running simulation experiments to be used
for the clarification of theoretical as well as applied economic issues. The
algorithmic model is a digital economic laboratory, a benchmark for all the
experiments. Indeed, behavioural functions are going to be designed accord-
ing to the particular thought experiment in order to generate a high number
of virtual economies and collect statistics.
The experiments generated by this digital economic laboratory have the
properties of the digital experiments conducted on computing machines.
After Fermi-Pasta-Ulam experiment in 1955 the importance of digital ex-
periments for simulation has been recognized (Weissert, 1997). Indeed, the
experiments on computing machines present “the virtue of having the pos-
tulates clearly stated” (Fermi et al., 1955, p.977) and allows to construct
simulations able to offer unexpected results, as happened in the case of the
Fermi-Pasta-Ulam experiment. These characteristics allows to identify dig-
ital experiment as a versatile instrument useful not only in physics but also
in other research fields such as economic dynamics. For an application of
the Fermi-Pasta-Ulam method to economics see Zambelli (2015).
The chapter is organized as follows: in section 2 the research topics in
the digital economic laboratory are introduced, in section 3 the building
28The notion of an Algorithmic Rational Agent is inspired by the work of Kumaraswamy
Velupillai. The exact phrase algorithmically rational agent is to be found in Velupillai
(1991, p.32).
50
blocks of the laboratory are briefly presented; in section 4 the fundamental
equations of the digital economic laboratory are presented while in section
5 a detailed description of the mathematical structure of the laboratory is
reported.
3.2 The research topics in the laboratory
At this point it is possible to clarify what research questions can be formu-
lated in the digital economic laboratory. It is worth remembering that the
answers to these research questions through the digital economic laboratory
do not represent the final word on the problem studied, but simply a step
forward towards the clarifications of some aspects of the economic problem
studied. To repeat, we endorse here Ulam’s appreciation of digital exper-
iments where “postulates [are] clearly stated” (Fermi et al., 1955, p.977).
The “answer” to the question will be catch in terms of frequencies of the
results with respect to the changes of some details of the experiments.
3.2.1 The relevant theoretical and applied research questions
Here is a list of the possible research questions for the digital economic lab-
oratory. These research questions will be object of the thought experiments
of the present thesis, but other research questions can be considered inside
the digital economic laboratory. Please note that the tailoring of different
thought experiments and research questions may be based on the results of
the answers to other research questions.
1. Research questions without economic policy
(a) Self-adjusting economic systems
i. Production prices and uniform wage rates and profit
rates: will the variables in the experiments converge towards
production prices and uniform wages and profits? Will some
local markets exhibit local behaviours different from global
ones?
ii. Choice of methods: will the methods chosen be the ones
most efficient? Will the different producers belonging to the
same industry adopt the same method of production? Will
some local markets exhibit local behaviours different from
global ones?
iii. Financial magnitudes. Credit and debt: will emerge
persistent credit and debt relations between workers and pro-
ducers? How will evolve in time these credit and debt rela-
tions?
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iv. Distribution issues: will the system be able to ensure an
equal distribution of income between workers and producers?
(b) Introduction of innovations: study of the conditions that can
make a producer - the innovator - to introduce a new production
method (i.e., study of possible lock-in phenomena).
2. Research questions with economic policy
(a) Introduction of an interest rate: economic policy can be
introduced to check the alternative dynamics. There are different
types of economic policies, for example policies that concentrate
on the revenues and costs of the financial holdings (the IOUs)
through the introduction of an interest rate.
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3.3 The building blocks of the laboratory
The algorithmic model is a digital economic laboratory in which thought
experiments can be run in order to answer economic theoretical questions.
The model can be changed according to the experimental setting, although
some fundamental features remain fixed. These features are the building
blocks of the digital economic laboratory.
3.3.1 The algorithmic rational agent (ARA)
An ARA is a set of algorithms and a collection of property rights. They are
characterized by a determined location and have a specific network of rela-
tions. ARAs can be producers, producers and workers29 or only workers. In
any case they are consumers. Workers of the same enterprise are organized
into trade unions whose unique task is to announce the wage. ARAs are
described by behavioural functions and they buy, sell, consume, produce,
work and migrate inside the system. Each individual ARA is represented
by a combination of features in terms of preference-propensity-technical pa-
rameters. Each ARA takes decisions according to his characteristics and
on the basis of the information set at his disposal. It is worth remember-
ing that in the digital economic laboratory it is supposed that each ARA
has the capability to exploit his information set. Each ARA, according to
his characteristics, his information set, his location, his financial wealth, his
endowment and his knowledge of the production methods at disposal (in
the case of producers) is able to make decisions with respect to the produc-
ing, consuming, buying and selling of economic magnitudes. The decision
process (represented by algorithms) transforms input into output. Some
decision processes (such as demand functions, wage/price functions and er-
ror correction mechanisms) are behavioural functions designed according to
the particular thought experiment. Other decisional processes (such as the
choice of the method) are part instead of the digital economic laboratory.
It is important to emphasize that by wealth we mean only the accu-
mulation of debt and credit relations. The value of the endowment is not
wealth (despite it is for sure a source of value for the ARA) because, accord-
ing to the terminology used in the digital economic laboratory, the wealth
represents only the financial wealth as previously defined.













Figure 3.1: The ARA producer: in this picture the main characteristics of the ARA
producer are summarised. What is written on his head represents what an ARA has in
his mind, his information set (Ω), the knowledge of the methods of production (T ) and
his access to these methods for the production of his commodity (O). In the body, there
are the preference-propensity-technical parameters of the ARA that are fixed (Θ). Un-
der the feet each ARA is identified by his position (Υ). The dashed rectangle represents
the expectations of the ARA while the not-dashed rectangle represents the effective an-
nouncements of the ARA (about consumption, labour supply, prices, wages etc.). The
bag represents the financial wealth and endowment (E) the ARA has at disposal. The
letter represents the information coming from the local market (for example, the changes









Figure 3.2: The ARA worker: the main characteristics of the ARA worker have been
represented with the same logic of the producer. Workers do not organize production and
for this reason E, T and O are not present.
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3.3.2 The topology of the model
Inside the virtual market 3 different commodities are produced. Each pro-
ducer produces only one commodity and more producers can produce the
same commodity. Each producer needs the other commodities and labour
of his workers in order to produce his commodity. Considering that an al-
gorithmic model needs to register the time, price, quantities and the agents
that are engaged in the exchange, exchanges have to be deterministic be-
tween ARAs characterized by an univocal location. The environment is
represented by a set of cells positioned inside a grid. Each ARA is assigned
to a particular cell. The action of the ARA located inside a particular cell
depends on the state of the neighbouring cells. In details, the topology of
the model has been designed through the use of the cellular automaton and
in particular the ring one-dimensional cellular automata in Wolfram-von
Neumann’s terms (see Wolfram, 2002). The ring lattice is necessary in or-
der to allow each ARA producer to have as neighbours two producers of
a different commodity (see figure 3.3). Each ARA worker is hired by one
producer. Each producer interacts with the other producers (according to
the nearest neighbourhood rule), with the workers of his enterprise, and the
workers hired by the neighbouring producers. At the end of each production
period workers can decide to migrate to one of the neighbouring enterprises.
In this way the location of each worker can change in time. Each worker
interacts with the producer of the enterprise in which is working and with
the other workers of the same enterprise only for the consumer exchange












Figure 3.3: The ARAs in a ring one-dimensional lattice: in this example 3 pro-
ducers are considered: producer 1,2 and 3. The colour of the cell identifies the commodity
produced: commodity 1 is green (wheat), commodity 2 is pink (coal) commodity 3 is
yellow (iron). As a consequence, producer 1 produces wheat, producer 2 produces coal
and producer 3 produces iron. Each producer hires workers for the production of his com-
modity (cells w). In this example each producer hires 3 workers. Each producer interacts
with all the other neighbouring producers, with his group of workers (which sells labour to
him and buy commodities inside his local market) and the workers of the other enterprises
(which represent simply potential consumers of his commodity). In order to give an idea
of the ring-lattice, producer 1 and 3, present also on the extremes of the figure, have been
represented in light colours.
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3.3.3 Local markets
This fundamental structure based on 3 producers and a defined number of
enrolled workers represents a fundamental local unit that can be called local
market. It is a small, local, and interconnected economic system localized
in a specific position inside the ring-lattice and described by its map of
spatial relationships. The local market can be defined as a local system in
which each producer can reproduce his commodity through labour and the
commodities of the other neighbouring producers. It is possible to enlarge
the model by adding more local markets producing the same 3 initial com-
modities. This passage from a low to a high dimension has a fundamental
economic meaning. Indeed, it allows to study the effects of the aggregation
of interconnected local economies producing the same commodities. Con-
sider for example the case of 9 producers producing 3 commodities (see
figure 3.4). The total number of local markets is 9, with all producers of the




















































The exchanges are bilateral and deterministic. The topology of the ex-
changes inside the lattice is displayed in figure 3.5. Any exchange is asso-
ciated to the underwriting of an IOU denominated in a socially accepted
unit of account. An IOU (I owe you) is a contract, a deferred payment of
an exchange which is taking place now. In our framework only two types of
exchange are allowed30: commodities versus financial contracts (IOUs) and
labour employment contracts versus financial contracts (IOUs); exchanges
of one type of IOUs against other types of IOUs has been excluded, because
it would incorporate non-essential features of the functioning of a virtual
market. An exchange between two ARAs can take place only if one has
a commodity or labour to sell and the other has the necessary quantities
of IOUs. Obviously, in the case in which the two ARAs do not have com-
modities or labour at their disposal the exchange does not take place. If
instead one of the two does not have the necessary purchasing power, i.e.
does not have IOUs, the exchange may still take place if and only if the two
ARAs agree to underwrite a new IOU. In this case new debt and credit is
generated and the commodity or labour is exchanged. In the digital eco-
nomic laboratory it is assumed that ARAs always agree to underwrite IOUs
if needed.
k 2 ... i+ 1 ... 1
1 3 i ... k
Figure 3.5: The structure of the exchanges: each producer i (for i=1,...,k) is rep-
resented by a yellow box while the group of workers of each enterprise is represented by
a green box. Each enterprise is represented by the rectangle green/yellow. The arrows
display the structure of exchanges. The dashed arrows are exchanges between producers
while the line arrows are exchanges with workers. In order to produce, each producer
has to exchange his commodity with the commodities of the other producers of his local
market. Each producer has also to pay the workers in order to organize production. Each
producer sells his commodity to the producers and workers of his local market. Each
producer exchanges only with the ARAs of his local market.
30In this section the consumer exchange phase is not considered. For more details see
sections 3.3.7 and 3.5.10.
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3.3.5 Production, consumption and markets
When the act of consumption takes place, commodities are destroyed. When
the act of production takes place, commodities and labour are transformed
into new commodities. Producers can produce if they have at their dis-
posal the necessary means of production and the necessary labour force.
Technology consists of alternative methods of production of the fixed pro-
portions type. The production is conceived as a circular process and does
not consider the presence of capital or inventories i.e., simple production
of commodities by means of commodities. In details, each producer has
to choose the best method of production according to the prices and the
wage in his local market. The method that maximizes his expected profit
is chosen and the desired investment and labour demand can be computed.
At the same time all ARAs workers calculate their desired labour supply.
After that, the exchanges with the other producers and workers take place
(production goods market and labour force market). In this phase, ARA
can be rationed. The new level of IOUs can be computed. At this point
all ARAs know their level of income so that they can compute their desired
consumption while, and at the same time, producers transform the bought
resources into new commodities (i.e., production). At this point producers
decide how much of the new production to keep for the production of the
next period and how much to offer inside the consumption goods market of
the present production period. After the new exchanges in the consumption
goods market and the new computation of the IOUs, ARAs of the same
enterprise (workers and producers) exchange their consumption goods in or-
der to reach their desired consumption basket (if not reached before). It is
worth remembering that this phase does not imply the creation of new IOUs
(i.e., it is a barter exchange). Finally, ARA workers decide if and where to
migrate among the neighbouring enterprises.
3.3.6 Double-entry bookkeeping system and national accounting
Any exchange is associated with a registration in the economic accounts and
in the balance sheets of the two ARAs involved. The nature of the genera-
tions of IOUs allows to identify the sum of IOUs as the total aggregated debt
which is equal to the total aggregated credit. The sum of the values of the
quantities sold and of the values of the quantities bought are by definition
equal. This represents the foundations of the definition and measurement of
standard national accounting magnitudes (that in this model are generated
from the micro level data) based on double-entry accounting system. It is
worth remembering that the rules of double-entry bookkeeping system are
always followed and that actual budget constraints are never broken.
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3.3.7 Dynamics
Each production period (that we can consider as a budget or accounting
period from t to t+1) is subdivided into different logical phases (τ), in which
ARAs take a decision with respect to a particular step in the production
process. The fundamental logical steps are displayed in figure 3.6. At the
beginning of the production period t, ARAs know the history of their local
market and can compute the new levels of physical endowment and financial
wealth.
• τ1: Price and wage announcement. According to their informa-
tion sets, producers (trade unions) announce their prices (wages).
• τ2: Exchange 1: production goods and labour. After the com-
putation of the desired labour supply, labour demand, and investment
level, exchanges between ARAs take place on the production goods
market and labour force market. The exchange implies a new compu-
tation of the total amount of IOUs.
• τ3: Production. At this point ARAs produce and decide how much
of the new production to devote to the consumption goods market and
how much to keep for the production of the next period. All ARAs
know their revenues and can calculate their consumption demands.
• τ4: Exchange 2: consumption goods. ARAs announce their de-
sired level of consumption. Exchanges between ARAs take place on
the consumption goods market. The exchanges imply a new compu-
tation of the total amount of IOUs.
• τ5: Consumer exchange. Given their budget constraints, ARAs of
the same enterprise (workers and producer) can exchange their con-
sumption goods in order to reach their desired consumption basket.
This exchange does not imply a new computation of the total amount
of IOUs because it is a barter exchange at the relative prices.
• τ6: Migration. Workers decide if and in which enterprise to migrate
inside their local market.
At the end of the production period, the information set of each ARA is
updated: the investment and the new amount of IOUs become respectively
the new level of physical endowment and the new level of financial wealth


















































































































































































3.4 The structure of the digital economic laboratory: the
fundamental equations
This section presents the fundamental equations31 that characterize the dig-
ital economic laboratory and that are associated to each phase τ of the pe-
riod t. The digital economic laboratory considers the presence of producers
(i=1,...,k) and workers (j=1,...,K). Each producer produces only one com-
modity (g=1,...,n) and hires a particular number of workers. Workers can
migrate in time in the neighbouring enterprises. Each producer exchanges
his commodity with the other two neighbouring producers. This triple of
producers represents a local market (s=1,...,k). For the present section, with
local market s, we will make reference to the producer s = i and the other
two neighbouring producers i−1 and i+1 in growing order according to the
commodity produced. Inside each local market the producer is indicated
with ī (̄i=1,...,n)32. For example, with the local market s=5 we make ref-
erence to the producers 4,5,6 (in this order) and with the local market s=7
we make reference to the producers 7,8,6 (in this order).
3.4.1 Price and wage announcement
According to his information set, each producer announces his price pi and
each trade union announces his wage wi that will be uniform among all the
workers enrolled in the same enterprise. The vector of prices and wages of
each local market ps and ws compose the matrix of the prices and wages of
the whole economy Pt and Wt:
Pt = [ps]t for s = 1, ..., k (3.1)
Wt = [ws]t for s = 1, ..., k (3.2)
3.4.2 Exchange 1: production goods and labour
After the price and wage announcement each producer i exchanges his phys-
ical endowment αi,t−1bi,t−1 (αi,t−1 is the share of his commodity bi,t−1 pro-
duced in the previous production period and devoted to the exchange in
the production goods market33) in order to buy the other commodities and
labour force that allows him to organize production. In the same way each
worker j would enter the labour market at the beginning of period t en-
dowed with his labour force Lsj . During the period t each worker j will sell
31For a detailed mathematical description of these phases and all the equations see next
section. See in the Appendix section 10.6 the tables 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8 for the description
of the rules used for the matrix notation.
32For the whole system producers are, as already said, k (with i=1,...,k).
33For this section the hypothesis is that ηi,t−1=0. See for more details section 3.5.5 and
section 3.5.8 about investment decision.
62
a fraction of his endowment in terms of labour force, so as to be able to
consume during period t. The computation of the desired quantities of each
producer i34 depends on the methods of production at disposal.
Each commodity g is produced with one method of production linking
the means of production with the output. Considering that each producer
can choose among a set of possible alternative methods for the production
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where l̄i is the necessary labour, aīg is the quantity of the commodity g
means of production of the enterprise ī and bī is the the quantity produced
by the enterprise ī. Each producer ī will choose the method zg that allows
him to maximize his expected profit given the market prices and the wage
in his local market.
After the exchange in the production goods market and the labour force
market (where rationing is possible) each producer has at disposal the quan-
tities of the commodities q and the labour force qL that allows him to orga-
nize the production of his commodity g:
αi,t−1bi,t−1
exchange−−−−−−→ [qi1, qi2, . . . , qig, . . . qi,n−1, qin, qLi]t (3.4)
Obviously, the quantity qLit bought by the producer i corresponds to the sum
of the labour force sold by each workers j (qLjt) enrolled in the enterprise i.
3.4.3 Production
According to the purchased quantities, each producer can organize the pro-
duction of his commodity g. The quantities effectively used and produced
correspond to35:
[ai1, ai2, . . . , aig, . . . ai,n−1, ain, li]t
production−−−−−−→ bit (3.5)
Each producer i has to choose the share of production to devote to the
exchange in the consumption goods market βitbit.
34Demand of commodities in the production goods market and demand of labour force
in the labour force market.
35Remember that it is possible to use for production not only the purchased com-
modities, but also a share of the commodity produced in the previous production period
ηi,t−1bi,t−1, called ẽit, stored as physical endowment for production and not devoted to ex-
change in the production goods market. For more details, see equation 3.26 and subsection
3.5.8 about investment decision.
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3.4.4 Exchange 2: consumption goods
Each producer decides the share βit of the production bit to devote to ex-
change in the consumption goods market. The share of production that
will not be exchanged in the consumption goods market αit is the physical
endowment for the production in the next period t+ 1. Each ARA (worker
and producer) arrives to the consumption goods market with his demand
of consumption goods (the vector c∗=[cg]
∗). Each ARA can be rationed in
the consumption goods market so that the effective consumption is equal
to c=[cg]. Producers will consume also the part of commodities bought but
not used for production [qig − aig]t for g=1,...,n.
3.4.5 Revenues, expenditures and financial balances
The consumption vectors are updated according to the barter exchanges
in phase τ5. Workers decide to migrate and can change their location in
phase τ6. At the end of the period t the national accounting magnitudes can
be computed. The difference between the revenues and the expenditures of
each ARA represents the variation in his financial position. The local market
in which producer i is present is denoted by s(i), the local market in which
worker j is present is denoted by s(j)36.
revenuesit = αi,t−1bi,t−1pit + βitbitpit (3.6)
expendituresit = q̄itps(i)t + q
L
itwit + c̄itps(i)t (3.7)




expendituresjt = c̄jtps(j)t (3.10)
Fjt = revenuesjt − expendituresjt (3.11)
At this point the financial wealth (the sum in time of the financial positions)
is updated. Producers and workers that did not have sufficient purchasing
power have underwritten new IOUs that represent negative values of F :
wealthit = wealthi,t−1 + Fit (3.12)
36With reference to the equation of workers’s revenues, the quantity of labour sold by
worker j is multiplied for the wage of the enterprise i in which the worker j is enrolled.
Remember that it is possible to imagine that also producers work inside their enterprise.
In this case the revenues from work should be added in eq.3.6 and considered in the
computation of qLit. In these fundamental equations, unosold commodities have not been
considered. See eq.3.91 for more details.
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wealthjt = wealthj,t−1 + Fjt (3.13)
The level of profits depends on the difference between revenues and expendi-
tures of each enterprise. In the case in which expenditures have been greater
than revenues, the loss corresponds to a negative variation in the financial
position of the enterprise37.
revenuesentit = αi,t−1bi,t−1pit + βitbitpit (3.14)
expendituresentit = q̄itps(i)t + q
L
itwit (3.15)
F entit = revenues
ent
it − expendituresentit = profitit (3.16)
37For the enterprise the superscript is ent.
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3.5 A detailed description of the mathematical structure of
the laboratory
In this section, a detailed description of the mathematical structure and
of the equations that are at the basis of the digital economic laboratory is
presented38. For the comprehension of the digital economic laboratory the
equations presented in the previous section are sufficient. For those not
interested in the mathematical details it is possible to skip this section.
3.5.1 The ARAs, the lattice and the local markets
The system considers the presence of producers and workers. Both of them
must be recognized by an identification number and located on a lattice.
Each producer i (for i=1,...,k) produces only one commodity (g=1,...,n)
and represents one enterprise. Each worker j (for j=1,...,K) is hired by
one producer but can migrate to other enterprises in time. Each producer
hires a variable number of workers k̃, so that a number of hired workers k̃i is
associated to each producer i. Obviously each producer can hire a maximum
number of workers equal to K and it must be true that
∑k
i=1 k̃i = K.
3.5.2 The ARAs workers and migration inside the lattice
Consider as an example the case of 3 producers and 9 workers with 3 workers
enrolled for each enterprise at time t (k=3 and K=9). At time t it is possible
to have a particular allocation of workers among the enterprises. After one
production period, workers can migrate so that their location change as in
figure 3.7. This graphical representation can be summarised into the matrix
M where each worker j (first row of the matrix M) is associated to the
enterprise i where he is hired (second row of the matrix M). The matrix
M(1:2,1:K) corresponds39, for the example of the figure 3.7, for time t and
time t+1:
M(1 : 2, 1 : K)t =
[
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
]
M(1 : 2, 1 : K)t+1 =
[
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 1 3 2 1 1 1 3 3
]
38See in the Appendix section 10.6 the tables 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8 for the description of
the rules used for the matrix notation.
39We have followed the typical notation present in MATLAB®: M(1:2,1:K) means
that the we are considering the structure of matrix M where the rows of the matrix M
are from 1 to 2 and the columns are from 1 to K.
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For the case with 9 producers and 81 workers (k=9 and K=81, figure
3.8), with 9 workers enrolled for each enterprise at time t, the matrices are:
M t =
[
1 2 ... 9 10 ... 21 ... 45 46 ... 81




1 ... 17 18 ... 45 ... 62 63 ... 80 81
1 ... 2 3 ... 6 ... 7 6 ... 9 1
]
In general, the matrix is (denoting by i∗ the enterprise where the worker
decides to migrate):
M(1, j)t = j for j = 1, ...,K (3.17)
M(2, j)t = i
∗ for j = 1, ...,K and i∗ ∈ [1, k] (3.18)
The matrix M represents the description of the position of each worker
in each period in time. It is possible also to compute for each time t the
matrix χit of the workers hired in each enterprise i. The matrix χit(1 : k̃it, 1)
corresponds, for the case of the previous example in figure 3.7, for time t
and time t+1:
χ1t = [1 2 3]
T χ2t = [4 5 6]
T χ3t = [7 8 9]
T with k̃1t,2t,3t = 3
χ1,t+1 = [2 5 6 7]
T χ2,t+1 = [1 4]
T χ3,t+1 = [3 8 9]
T
with k̃1,t+1 = 4 k̃2,t+1 = 2 k̃3,t+1 = 3
In general the matrix is:
χit(1 : k̃it, 1) = [ j ]it ∀ j |M(2, j)t = i (3.19)
In the thought experiment it is possible to consider the case in which
workers can migrate by constructing a behavioural function that describes
how matrix Mt changes in time. It is possible also to consider the case in
which workers do not migrate simply imposing Mt+1=Mt. In each case,
matrix Mt identifies each worker’s location inside the lattice.
It is worth remembering that workers can migrate only in the neighbour-
ing enterprises. This means that in time workers can arrive to work also in
an enterprise which is located very far from the original enterprise simply





























Figure 3.7: The lattice and migration: in the figure there is an example of the
lattice and the migration of workers. The 3 coloured squares represent the producers
(k=3; producer 1 is pink, producer 2 is yellow, producer 3 is green) while the violet
squares represent the workers. Each producer can hire a maximum number of workers
equal to K (K=9). At time t each enterprise hired 3 workers. Workers 1,2,3 are hired by
producer 1, workers 4,5,6 are hired by producer 2 and workers 7,8,9 are hired by producer
3. At time t+1 workers migrate so that workers 2,5,6,7 are hired by producer 1; workers
1 and 4 are hired by producer 2 while workers 8,9,3 are hired by producer 3. Producer
1 hires 4 workers, producer 2 hires 2 workers while producer 2 hires 3 workers. Workers
can migrate in the neighbouring enterprises. Thanks to the ring structure of the lattice
workers enrolled in enterprise 1 (or 3) can migrate to the enterprise 3 (or 1).
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10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73
11 20 29 38 47 56 65 74
12 21 30 39 48 57 66 75
13 22 31 40 49 58 67 76
14 23 32 41 50 59 68 77
15 24 33 42 51 60 69 78
16 25 34 43 52 61 70 79
17 26 35 44 53 62 71 80





















10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73
11 20 29 38 47 56 65 74
12 21 30 39 48 57 66 75
13 22 31 40 49 58 67 76
14 23 32 41 50 59 68 77
15 24 33 42 51 60 69 78
16 25 34 43 52 61 70 79


















Figure 3.8: The migration for the case with 9 producers: in the figure there is
an example of the lattice and the migration of workers for the case of 9 producers and 81
workers. The rules are the same of the previous figure. Thanks to the ring structure of
the lattice workers enrolled in enterprise 1 (or 9) can migrate to the enterprise 9 (or 1).
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3.5.3 The ARAs producers and the local markets
In the digital economic laboratory it is supposed that each producer i pro-
duces only one commodity g. In order to know which commodity is produced
by each producer simply calculate ι(i)=mod(i/n), for ι(i)=1,...,n consider-
ing that if i=µn for µ ∈ N0 (natural number different from zero), ι(i)=n. For
example, producer 7 produces commodity 1 (i=7: ι(7)=mod(7/3)=1); while
producer 27 produces commodity 3 (ι(27)=3 because in this case i=µn, 27
is a multiple of 3)40.
The local market is the fundamental local unit of the digital economic
laboratory. In each local market are present n producers ī (for ī=1,...,n)
with their enrolled workers. The number of local markets is equal to the
number of producers. The local market s (for s=1,...,k) is defined as a
triple of producers where the producer i=s produces commodity ι(i) and
exchange his commodity with the other two neighbouring producers of his
local market. The local market s of producer i can be indicated also as
s(i) so that is always verified that s(i)=i41. Local markets result, as a
consequence, interconnected because each producer i is present in n local
markets. Indeed, he sells his commodity in his local market but, as buyer
of other commodities, he is present also in the local market of the other two
neighbouring producers42.
For a summary consider the figure 3.9, which represents a general graph-
ical representation of the organization of the local markets inside the ring
one-dimensional lattice and the relationships between the producers (for
i=1,...,k and g=1,...,n with n=3).
40Remember that mod is the abbreviation of modulo operation. The result of the
operation a mod b is the remainder of the Euclidean division of a by b. In other words, it
finds the remainder after division of one number a by another number b.
41For example, the local market of producer i=5 is the local market s=5 because s(5)=5.
This local market is composed by producer 5 that exchanges his commodity with the
neighbouring producers 4 and 6.
42For example, producer i=5 is also present in the local markets s=4 and s=6 where he
is a buyer of commodity 1 and commodity 3 respectively.
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Ψ̃s = [ψ̃]s = [i− 1, i, i+ 1]
Ψs = [ψ]s ψgs = ψ̃[ι(ψ̃g̃s)=g]s
for g = 1, ..., n g̃ = 1, ..., n
for i = 1, ..., k
i = k i = 1 i = 2 ... i = 1
ι(k) ι(1) ι(2) ι(...) ι(1)
for i = 1, ..., k
for g = 1, ..., n
Figure 3.9: The local markets: the general structure of local markets for ARAs posi-
tioned inside a ring one-dimensional lattice - nearest neighbour rule - for the production
of n commodities with k producers. In this figure it has been considered the case of the
production of 3 commodities (n=3), which is the case considered in the digital economic
laboratory.
According to figure 3.9, Ψ̃ is the matrix of the components of all local
markets. Ψ̃s is the vector inside the matrix Ψ̃ of the producers of the local
market s (the vector Ψs is in order according to the commodity produced).
Ψ̃ = [Ψ̃s] for s = 1, ..., k (3.20)
Ψ̃s = [ψ̃ī]s for ī = 1, ..., n (3.21)




Ψ̃1 Ψ̃2 Ψ̃3 Ψ̃4 Ψ̃5 Ψ̃6 Ψ̃7 Ψ̃8 Ψ̃9
]
Ψ̃ =
 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 81 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1

The matrix Ψ = [ψīs] corresponds to:
Ψ =
[




 1 1 4 4 4 7 7 7 12 2 2 5 5 5 8 8 8
9 3 3 3 6 6 6 9 9

Also the prices could make reference to the single producer i (pi) or to the
local market s (ps). Following the rules explained above, with the column
vector ps=[pΨs ] are considered the prices of the producers inside the local
market s. For an example of the topology structure in the case of 9 producers
(k=9), see in the Appendix section 10.1.
3.5.4 The description of the ARAs
An ARA is a set of algorithms. The ARA is the virtual agent that takes
decisions in the digital economic laboratory. Each ARA has his particular
characterization, which influences the way in which he takes decisions. This
characterization is represented by a combination of features in terms of
preference-propensity-technical parameters. These parameters are collected
in the matrix Θ, for each ARA producer i and worker j.
In the digital economic laboratory the particular thought experiment de-
termines the parameters of the matrix Θ. Each ARA takes decisions ac-
cording to his characteristics and on the basis of the information set at his
disposal. It is worth remembering that in the digital economic laboratory it
is supposed that each ARA has the capability to exploit this information.
Each ARA producer and worker has his information set, which will be
respectively Ωit and Ωjt (for i=1,...,k and j=1,...,K) in a particular period
t. These information sets are represented by the multiple dynamic array
Hs(i,1:t−1) (Hs(j,1:t−1) for workers
43): a collection of matrices with all the
past values of the variables that make reference to the local market s in
which the ARA is present.
Ωit = [Hs(i,1:t−1)]it (3.22)
Ωjt = [Hs(j,1:t−1)]jt (3.23)
Each ARA has resources at disposal: wealthit (wealthjt for workers) is
the financial wealth and eit represents the physical endowment. ARAs have
also at their disposal an endowment in terms of potential labour supply:
Lsp for producers and Lsw for workers. Υit (Υjt for workers) represents the
location of the ARA. Tit is the technological set (it is supposed in general
to be equal for all producers) while Oit is a matrix that accounts for which
43It is important to note that the information set of a particular trade union corresponds
to the information sets of all the workers enrolled in the relative enterprise in that moment.
Remember that with the notation 1:t-1 we mean from time t=1 to time t-1.
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methods of production (present inside the technological set) are accessible
to the producer iat time t44. For the producer, the matrix Υit = [Ψ,χ]s(i)t
contains two vectors: Ψs(i) is the vector of the producers present in the local
market of the producer i, the vector χs(i)t indicates the workers enrolled in
his enterprise (see section 3.5.2). For workers, Υjt contains the location of
the worker j, Υjt = [M(:, j)]jt.
Each ARA, according to his characteristics, his information set, his loca-
tion, his endowment, his financial wealth and his knowledge of the produc-
tion methods at disposal (in the case of producers) is able to make decisions
with respect to the producing, consuming, buying and selling of economic
magnitudes. These decisions have as output the updating of his information
set with the new variables that have been modified by his decisions during
the period t (Hit or Hjt):
Hit = FARAit(Ωit, Θit, wealthit, eit, L
sp, Υit, Tit, Oit) (3.24)
Hjt = FARAjt(Ωjt, Θjt, wealthjt, L
sw, Υjt) (3.25)
Hit (or Hjt for workers) is a multiple dynamic array containing all the
variables that the ARA influences with his decisions (or that influence him)
in a particular period t. These variables are the results of the decision
process. The decision process (represented by algorithms) transforms input
into output and it is represented by the function FARA. Some decisional
processes (such as demand function, wage/price function, expectations and
error correction mechanisms) are behavioural functions designed according
to the particular thought experiment. Other decisional processes (such as
the choice of methods) is part of the digital economic laboratory.
44For a detailed description of the structure of the technological set and the access to
it see section 3.5.6.
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3.5.5 The initial conditions
Endowments of ARA producers: the commodities
At the beginning of each period t, each producer i has at disposal an ini-
tial endowment eit. In the digital economic laboratory it is supposed that
each ARA producer produces only one commodity and has as endowment
only his commodity. This endowment is defined in real terms and repre-
sents the share γi,t−1 of the previous production bi,t−1 of his commodity ι(i)
devoted to the new production so that eit=γi,t−1bi,t−1. Despite all the en-
dowment is devoted to production, not all this quantity is devoted to the ex-
changes on the production goods market. Indeed, each producer keeps part
of his endowment ẽit=ηi,t−1bi,t−1 (always for production) and exchanges the
rest spgmit =αi,t−1bi,t−1 in order to have the other commodities necessary for
the reproduction of his commodity. As a consequence, the supply of the
commodity devoted to exchange in the production goods market for each
producer correspond to spgmit
45. The endowment not devoted to exchange






it = [e− ẽ]it (3.26)
Endowments of ARA workers: potential labour supply
Workers (and producers if they decide to work) have at their disposal an
endowment in terms of potential labour supply. It is possible to imagine this
endowment as a parameter, which correspond to the maximum number of
hours to devote to work each day Lsw (for workers) and Lsp (for producers).
Each ARA will be able to calculate his desired labour supply (Lsp∗it for each
producer i=1,...,k that decides to work and Lsw∗jt for each worker j=1,...,K)
that should be necessarily equal or inferior to Lsp and Lsw (respectively)46.
These quantities are considered given in the mathematical description
of the digital economic laboratory because they will be designed according
to the particular thought experiment and are determined by the behavioural
function.
45The superscript pgm stands for production goods market. It is important in order
to distinguish between production goods market and consumption goods market, whose
superscript will be cgm.
46As it is possible to note from table 10.6 the general rule used is to indicate single
values with small letters. The use of the capital letter has been preferred for the case of
aggregate labour demand and labour supply (inside the labour force market) in order to
make clear the distinction with respect to the labour used by the producers.
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Wealth of ARA producers and workers
Each producer and worker has also an initial financial wealth at his disposal:
respectively wealthit and wealthjt. Also the enterprise considers his wealth
as wealthentit . The level of wealth depends on past history
47. The total
















For the sake of accounting consistency, the sum of the total wealth of
producers48 and workers is always equal to zero. The wealth represents
the accumulation of debt and credit positions (i.e., the negative or positive
difference between revenues and expenditures for each production period).
Remember that by wealth we mean only the accumulation of debt and credit
relations. The value of the endowment is not wealth (despite it is for sure
a source of value for the ARA) because, according to the terminology used
in the digital economic laboratory, the wealth represents only the financial
wealth as previously defined.
3.5.6 The announcement of prices and wages: phase τ1
According to the information sets, each producer will announce his price pit.
This price cannot be changed after announcement and it is the same for the
whole production period49. Also wages are announced in the same way by
trade unions and cannot be changed in the production period. The wage wit
is the same for all the workers enrolled in the same enterprise. Trade unions
represent an aggregation of all the workers enrolled by the same enterprise.
This means that in the digital economic laboratory there is a number of trade
unions equal to the number of enterprises. It is worth remembering that the
only action of trade unions is the wage announcement. This decision is taken
on the basis of the aggregation of the information set Ωjt of the workers of
the same trade union. The prices and wages announced by each producer
and trade union are represented by the vectors:
pt = [pi]t and wt = [wi]t for i = 1, ..., k (3.28)
47At the beginning of the first production period the financial wealth of each ARA is
equal to zero.
48That incorporates the total wealth of enterprises.
49It is worth remembering that the price announced by each producer is unique for all
the other producers.
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The triple of prices and wages considered in each local market are repre-
sented by the vectors ps and ws while for the whole economy we have to
consider the matrix Pt and Wt:
Pt = [ps]t and Wt = [ws]t for s = 1, ..., k (3.29)
pst = [pΨs ]t and wst = [wΨs ]t for s = 1, ..., k (3.30)
These matrices Pt andWt are considered given in the mathematical descrip-
tion of the digital economic laboratory because they will be designed accord-
ing to the particular thought experiment and depend on the behavioural
function.
Computation of the desired labour supply
After the announcement of prices and wages, ARAs workers and ARAs
producers (if they decide to work) can decide their levels of labour supply
Lsw∗jt (for j=1,...,K) and L
sp∗
it (for i=1,...,k) respectively. These quantities
will be announced in the labour force market. These values are considered
given in the mathematical description of the digital economic laboratory
because they will be designed according to the particular thought experiment
and depend on the behavioural function.
Technology and the mechanism of the choice of the method
After the announcement of prices and wages ARAs producers can compute
their desired quantity of commodities and labour. The exchanges happen
inside each local market. As already said, each local market is a local
unit in which each producer ī (̄i=1,...,n)50 produces only one commodity
g (g=1,...,n) through the use of the labour force bought in the labour force
market, his endowment, and the commodities bought from the neighbour-
ing producers (i.e., production of commodities by means of commodities
without inventories or fixed capital). In each local market, the technologi-
cal input requirements in terms of commodities and labour are represented
by the matrices A and L, while the relative level of the possible output is
represented by the matrix B. In particular, consider as in Sraffa (1960)51,
A and B square matrices of order n: A=[aīg] and B=[bīg], with ī,g=1,...,n.
A=[aīg] is the matrix of the means (methods) of production (semi-positive
and indecomposable), where aīg is the quantity of the commodity g means
50It is worth remembering that the producer ī for ī=1,...,n is the producer of a particular
local market s. For the whole system producers are, as already said, k (with i=1,...,k).
See figure 3.9.
51See also Zambelli (2004) for the matrix notation.
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of production of the enterprise ī. B=[bīg] is the production matrix (diago-
nal and semipositive definite), where bīg is the quantity of the commodity
g produced by the enterprise ī. Each producer (enterprise) ī produces only
one commodity g, mean of production for the other producers. L=[l̄i] is the
labour vector and l̄i indicates the amount of labour required by the producer
ī.
A(1 : n, 1 : n) =

a11 . . . a1n













B(1 : n, 1 : n) =

b11 . . . b1n




bn1 . . . bnn
 (3.33)
It is supposed that each ARA producer produces only one commodity52
and has different alternative methods zg at his disposal for the production of
his commodity (zg=1,...,mg). This implies that the producers of each local
market will choose a particular combination of methods that will compose
their matrices A, L and B. Remember that if the number of the alternative
methods is mg, m
3
g possible alternative configurations of the matrices A, L
and B exist.
These alternative methods, for all the commodities, are organized in an
input-output multidimensional matrix T , which is supposed to be known by
all the producers of the whole virtual economy and constant in time53:
52The Sraffian case of joint production is not considered so that bīg = 0 for each g 6=ι(̄i)
and the diagonal matrix of B can be considered in the subsequent equations.
53Remember that it is possible to imagine the presence of some special methods that
allow to produce one commodity with the use of only one other commodity and labour,
only two commodities and labour or only labour (with n=3). These methods collected in
the matrix T̃ (if all combinations are considered these mew methods are in total 7 with
n=3 and are embedded in matrix T ) will be obviously more expensive than the other
methods and can became useful for the reuse of residuals from production. For more
details, see section 3.5.8 and in the Appendix figure 10.2.
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T (1 : n, 1 : (n+ 2), 1 : mg) =




























The collection of the methods of the matrix T that allows to produce
the same commodity is organized inside the input-output multidimensional
matrix Φ. For the production of his commodity, each producer i has to
choose the method φ∗i which allows him to maximize the expected profit
given the prices and the wage inside his local market. In details the structure
of the matrix Φ is the subsequent54:
Φ(1 : mg, 1 : (n+ 2), g) =








































Considering the whole economy, different producers of the same commod-
ity g can use different methods of the matrix Φ(:, :, g) or converge to the
same method between the mg at disposal for each commodity. Each pro-
ducer knows which commodity he can produce. This information is collected
inside the multidimensional55 matrix O:
O(1 : n, 1 : mg, i) = [ogzg ]it for o
it
gzg = 0, 1 and i = 1, ..., k (3.37)
Consider that ogzg=1 if g=ι(i) and ogzg=0 in the other cases
56. For the
choice of the method the producer will make reference to the prices and
the wage announced in his local market. Given this information firstly he
will calculate the matrix Σit, which represents the cost of production of
54It will be followed mainly the notation of Zambelli and Fredholm (2010).
55In this section it is hypothesised that the multidimensional matrix O is constant in
time.
56For example, in the case each producer has full access to all themg alternative methods
the matrix O would became for producer 2 which produces commodity 2 with at disposal
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the commodity g for each possible alternative method zg (for g=1,...,n and
zg=1,...,mg)
57.
Σit(1 : n, 1 : mg) = [σgzg ]it σ
it
gzg = T (g, 1 : (n+ 1), zg) ∗ [p̄s(i) wi]
T (3.38)
Secondly, the producer will calculate the matrix of the value of production
V it (for g=1,...,n and zg=1,...,mg given s=i) given the prices and the wage
inside his local market.
V it(1 : n, 1 : mg) = [vgzg ]it v
it
gzg = T (g, (n+ 2), zg) ∗ pψgs (3.39)
At this point each producer can find the method zg that maximize his ex-
pected profit as the difference between the possible value of production and
the correspondent cost of production. In order to find it, it is necessary to
consider which commodities the producer can produce58. As already said,
this information is embedded into his matrix O. Consider the matrix Πit
which has the same dimension of the matrix Vit and represents the expected
profit for each method at disposal:









Considering that each producer produces only one commodity so that, as
said, oitgzg=1 if g=ι(i) and o
it
gzg=0 in the other cases, π
it
gzg 6= 0 only if g=ι(i).
At this point the producer can select the maximum value for each row g
5 alternative methods for the production of his commodity (n=3, mg=5, ι(2)=2):
O(1 : n, 1 : mg, 2) =
 0 0 0 0 01 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0

It is important to underline that it is possible to change this hypothesis in order to test
different access to methods for different producers in time. See for example the experiment
in section 7.8 where the hypothesis of access to a new method (innovation) for a single
producer is tested.
57The cost for the production of each commodity is computed, because producers have
access to the whole input-output multidimensional matrix T , but the matrix of the access
to methods O will determine which commodity can be effectively produced. As already
explained, in the digital economic laboratory it is supposed that each producer can produce
only one commodity.
58It is worth remembering that each producer i can calculate his matrix Σ and V
because he has access to the whole matrix T but he can use effectively only the methods
coherent with his matrix O.
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inside the matrix Πit so that max(Πit(g, :))=π
∗
gz∗g
it with z∗g corresponding
to the optimal method for the production of each commodity.
[z∗g ]it = [zg]it | [πgzg ]it = max(Πit(g, :)) (3.41)
In this way, for each producer, the vector of selected methods z∗it is a column
vector in which each element is the method chosen for the production of each
commodity z∗it=[z
∗
g ]it. If each producer produces only one commodity (as
supposed in the digital economic laboratory) it will be posed [z∗g ]it=0 for
each g6=ι(i). As a consequence, the selected method for the production of



















































g , (n+ 2), g) = [b
z∗g
g ]it (3.46)
As a consequence each local market will compose his matrices A∗, L∗ and
B∗, while for the whole system, in each period, the matrix of the methods
chosen by all the producers will be:
Φ∗t = [φ
∗
i ]t for i = 1, ..., k (3.47)
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The determinants of aggregate demand and supply for the pro-
duction goods market and the labour force market
The desired quantities of commodities to be bought on the production goods
market by the producer i depend on the volume of desired production of his
commodity vpit. This quantity is determined by the particular behavioural








Remember that ãitg =0 for g=ι(i), because each producer has already at
disposal his commodity for production61. Each producer can calculate his
desired demand of commodities so that the matrix Ãit becomes for the whole
economy:
Ãt(1 : k, 1 : n, t) =

ã11 . . . ã1n








¯̃ait(i, 1 : n, t) =
[




While his desired demand of labour becomes:









59For example, producers could decide the volume of desired production according to
the expected demand deit so that vpit=d
e
it.
60In equation 3.49 it is supposed that the desired quantities are computed on the basis
of the method that maximises the expected profits. It is possible inside the thought
experiment to imagine situations in which production depends not only by the optimal
methods but depends also by the method (or combination of methods) that in the past
allowed to minimize residuals. For simplicity, in eq.3.49, it has been assumed the base
case.
61See equation 3.26 for more details on this point.
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Now it is possible to calculate the level of the desired demand for pro-
duction goods inside each local market and as a consequence in the whole
economy62 as dpgmst for s=1,...,k:
dpgmt = [d
pgm







At the same time workers (and producers if they decide to work) will
announce their desired labour supply.
Lsp∗it for i = 1, ..., k (3.54)
Lsw∗jt for j = 1, ...,K (3.55)





Lsw∗jt for i = 1, ..., k (3.56)






it = l̃it (3.57)
Ls∗t = [L
s∗







The labour demand and supply and the demand and supply of com-
modities has been computed. In the next phase, the exchanges between
producers and producers and workers in the production goods market and
in the labour force market respectively will take place.
62The superscript pgm stands for production goods market. It is important in order to
distinguish between demand in the production goods market and demand in the consump-
tion goods market, which superscript will be cgm.
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3.5.7 Exchanges, rationing and purchased quantities in the labour
force market and the production goods market: phase τ2
At the moment of exchange, in production goods and labour force market,
if the demand is greater than the supply ARAs are rationed. The levels of
rationing inside the whole virtual economy are indicated respectively for the









Each producer (worker) is potentially rationed by the suppliers of his lo-
cal market. This means that the commodities and labour effectively bought
by each producer are equal to his desired quantities corrected for the ra-
tioning computed in the matrix ratpgmt and rat
L
t . The quantities effectively
bought by each producer for production after rationing is represented for the
whole economy by the matrix Qt (commodities) and q
L
t (labour force):
Qt(1 : k, 1 : n, t) =

q11 . . . q1n




qk1 . . . qkn

t









q̄it(i, 1 : n, t) =
[




We can compute the values of the matrix as:









]Tt for ī = 1, ..., n (3.65)
63Remember that if supply is superior with respect to demand there is no rationing and
the corresponding value inside the matrix ratpgmt is posed equal to 1. As explained in
the Appendix, the symbol  is referred to the division between two matrices element by
element. It will be used also ~ as symbol for a multiplication between matrices element
by element. This operation is referred to the Hadamard product. For the normal products
and divisions between matrices we use * and /.
64Remember that we are considering this different notation: i=1,...,k for all the pro-
ducers of the system, ī=1,...,n for the restricted number of the producers inside the local
market.
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It is worth remembering that qLit corresponds to the total amount of labour
force bought by the ARA producer i under the hypothesis that the producer
produces only his commodity ι(i). By multiplication of the rows of these
matrices Q and qL for the prices and wages of the respective local markets,
it is possible to compute the values of the purchased quantities. The to-
tal amount of labour force bought by the ARA producer i corresponds to
the sum of the total amount of labour effectively sold65 by all the workers

























Lswjt for i = 1, ..., k (3.70)
It is possible to compute the level of the unsold commodities as the
difference between what has been offered in the local market s of producer








65Remember that Ls represents the quantity of labour effectively sold while Ls∗ repre-
sents the desired labour supply.
66The workers enrolled in the same enterprise i are represented by the vector χit. See
section 3.5.2 for a detailed description of migration rules and the relative notation.
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3.5.8 Production: phase τ3
Given the quantities bought in the production goods market and in the
labour force market, it is possible to compute the resources for production
at disposal of each producer. In order to obtain this, it is necessary to
add to the commodities bought also the part of endowment not exchanged
(ẽit) plus the unsold commodity in the production goods market (uns
pgm
it ).
The effective quantities at disposal of each ARA producer i for production
correspond to the vector qprod:




[qi,ι(i)]t = [ẽ+ uns
pgm]it (3.73)
These commodities are used by each producer i for the production of
the commodity ι(i)67. This value is called bit and represents the level of
real production of the commodity ι(i) of each producer i considering the
effective use of the resources devoted to production qused:
qusedit = [ai1, . . . , ain, li,n+1]t (3.74)
[ai1, . . . , ain, li,n+1]t
production−−−−−−→ bit (3.75)
The production process may generate residuals out of commodities that are
not used up. This happen frequently because the method chosen previously,
in most cases, is not able to consume all the resources with the same in-
tensity and while some commodities will be exhausted, other resources will
not. In this case the producer can try to exploit residuals for further produc-
tion through the use of the last set of methods (part of the matrix T ) that
has been called previously T̃ (they are 7 with n=3) and that allows to use
combination of commodities (or only labour) also when one, two or three
of them are missing (labour is always necessary). This set of methods is
more expensive with respect to the original one (i.e., these methods are not
efficient) but allows to reduce the volume of the residuals. The producer can
use these methods and carry on production until residuals are minimized.
It is possible that labour is missing. In this case it is possible to imagine
that the producer devotes his free time for labour in order not to waste the
67Before to start production, because now producer knows exactly the amount of re-
sources at disposal for production, the chosen method can be updated. The updating
principle is to select the method that allows to maximize production (i.e., minimize resid-
uals) given the resources at disposal. At this point it is possible, for each producer, to
correct the level of resources devoted to production for the effective use of the resources
according to the method chosen after the updating z∗∗g . This process can be introduced
in the setting of the particular thought experiment.
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purchased commodities. The final residuals arise out of this process. For
a graphical representation of this process see in the Appendix the figure
10.2. Remember that this residual mechanism process can be excluded or
modified by the thought experiment. In each case at the end of this process
it is possible to obtain the effective levels of production and the effective
amount of labour and commodities used in production. The commodities
of the other producers bought but not used (neither through this eventual
residual mechanism process) are forced consumption because commodities
are perishable and cannot be used in the next production period. Residual
of producer’s commodity become instead part of the final production.
residualit = qprodit − qusedit (3.76)
The investment decision
Once production has been completed, producers have at disposal a new
amount of their commodity. At this point they have to decide how much
of this amount to offer on the consumption goods market and how much to
keep for next production. At the same time, they have to decide how much
of this quantity to devote to the exchange in the production goods market
of next production period (spgmi,t+1) and how much to keep directly for next
production (ẽi,t+1). This decision depends on the behavioural function of
the thought experiment that will define each production period the value of
3 variables:
• ηit: percentage of production to keep for next production.
• αit: percentage of production to keep for exchange in the next pro-
duction goods market.
• βit: percentage of actual production to devote to consumption goods
market of the present production period.
The sum of these 3 percentages must sum 1 (ηit+αit+βit=1). Remem-
ber that γit=ηit+αit, where γit represents the percentage of production not
devoted to consumption so that ei,t+1=γitbit is the total endowment for
production; spgmi,t+1=αitbit is the endowment that will be exchanged in the
production goods market; ẽi,t+1=ηitbit is the endowment for production that
will not be exchanged in the production goods market and finally scgmit =βitbit
is the share of production devoted to exchange in the consumption goods
market.
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The determinants of aggregate demand and supply in the con-
sumption goods market
At this point producers know how much to offer on the consumption goods





it = βitbit (3.77)
At the same time also workers have earned their income from labour. As
a consequence, they can decide how much of their financial resources to
devote to consumption. This decision is taken according to the particular
behavioural function of the thought experiment (e.g., an utility function).
For each ARA producer and worker, the column vector of desired consump-
tion is equal to:
c∗it = [cg]
∗
it for g = 1, ..., n for i = 1, ..., k (3.78)
c∗jt = [cg]
∗
jt for g = 1, ..., n for j = 1, ...,K (3.79)
For the whole economy it is possible to obtain the matrices:
Cp∗t = [ci]
p∗
t for i = 1...k (3.80)
Cw∗t = [ci]
w∗
t for i = 1...k (3.81)




c∗jt ∀ j ∈ χit (3.82)
The aggregate demand for consumption goods inside each local market and
for the whole economy can be computed as (for g=1,...,n and s=1,...,k):
dcgmt = [d
cgm












68The superscript cgm stands for consumption goods market. It is important in order
to distinguish between demand in the production goods market and consumption goods
market. The superscript pgm stands for production goods market.
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3.5.9 Exchanges, rationing and purchased quantities in the con-
sumption goods market: phase τ4
At the moment of exchange, in consumption goods market, if the demand
is greater that the supply ARAs are rationed. The levels of rationing inside






Each producer (worker) is rationed by the suppliers of his local market.
This means that:
• cit and cjt: are the quantities effectively bought respectively by each
producer i and worker j.
• c∗it and c
∗
jt: are the quantities desired respectively by each producer i
and worker j.
The quantity effectively bought by each ARA for consumption after ra-
tioning is represented for the producers and workers by the vectors:
cit = [cg]it for g = 1, ..., n i = 1, ..., k (3.85)
cjt = [cg]jt for g = 1, ..., n j = 1, ...,K (3.86)
These vectors have the same dimensions of the vectors c∗it and c
∗
jt. Each
















]Tt for ī = 1, ..., n (3.89)
The value of each basket of commodities bought by each ARA is com-
puted through the multiplication of the quantities bought for the prices of
his local market. It is possible to compute also for this market the unsold
quantities of commodities for each producer:
69If ratcgmit ≥1, rat
cgm
it =1 is imposed. As explained in the Appendix, the symbol  is
related to the division between two matrices element by element. It will be used also ~
as symbol for a multiplication between matrices element by element. This operation is
related to the Hadamard product. For the normal products and divisions between matrices











What is not sold in the consumption goods market (but it has been
produced in the present production period) will be devoted to future pro-
duction.
3.5.10 Consumer exchange: phase τ5
After the exchanges in the consumption goods market, each ARA has at
disposal his final consumption vector. Nevertheless, it is possible that this
final vector is different with respect to his desired consumption basket. This
could happen due to rationing in the consumption goods market; indeed, if
ARA’s consumption demand has not been fully satisfied, the final consump-
tion vector c is necessarily different with respect to the desired consumption
vector c∗. In this phase the ARAs of each enterprise (producer and his work-
ers) can exchange mutually their consumption goods at the relative prices
in order to catch their desired consumption basket. Remember that in this
phase these exchanges do not imply a new computation of the total amount
of IOUs because it is a barter exchange. For this reason, in the figure 3.10





Figure 3.10: The lattice and the consumer exchange: this example follows the
structure of figure 3.3. In this case the red lines indicates the relations valid only in the
consumer exchange phase.
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3.5.11 Migration: phase τ6
At the end of the production period workers can decide to change their lo-
cation and to work for another enterprise. Each worker can move only to
a neighbouring enterprise and can move only one time each production pe-
riod. Considering several production periods, each worker can work for more
production periods for the same enterprise, return to the same enterprise or
can move along all the lattice and work inside different local markets (see
for an example of a possible path of migration of a single worker during 7
production periods the figure 3.11).
9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
Figure 3.11: The lattice and the migration: the arrows indicate the possible path
of migration of a particular worker considering 7 production periods. At the beginning
the worker is enrolled in enterprise 1. Then he moves to enterprise 2,3,4, he returns back
to 3 and then moves to 4,5 and at the end he arrives to enterprise 6.
At the end of the production period each worker decides if to move
and where to move. At this point the matrix Mt has to be updated and the
matrixMt+1 can be computed. The particular rules of migration are defined
in the experimental setting relative to the particular thought experiment70.
70See for example the rules used in the thought experiments considered in the present
thesis and explained in section 4.4.
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3.5.12 Revenues, expenditures and financial balances
At the end of the production period t it is possible to compute the rev-
enues and the expenditures of the production period. As a consequence,
it is also possible to compute the financial magnitudes. The revenues and









it )pit + L
sp
it wit (3.91)
expendituresit = q̄itps(i)t + q
L
itwit + c̄itps(i)t (3.92)
Fit = revenuesit − expendituresit (3.93)




expendituresjt = c̄jtps(j)t (3.95)
Fjt = revenuesjt − expendituresjt (3.96)










expendituresentit = q̄itps(i)t + q
L
itwit (3.98)
F entit = revenues
ent
it − expendituresentit = profitit (3.99)
The wealth can be updated:






wealthjt = wealthj,t−1 + Fjt (3.102)
71With reference to the equation of workers’s revenues, the quantity of labour sold by
worker j is multiplied for the wage of the enterprise i in which the worker j is enrolled.
The same for the producer: the quantity of labour of the producer i is multiplied for the
wage of his enterprise i.
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By construction, if the financial accounting of all producers and workers













t − expenditureswt (3.105)
F entt = revenues
ent






















It is possible also to compute other national accounting magnitudes such
as the total production of a particular commodity g or the total value of
wages and profits. All these magnitudes can be trivially computed through
aggregation of the computed variable and presented previously for the single
ARA worker, producer or enterprise.
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3.5.13 The mathematical structure of the digital economic labo-
ratory: a summary
In the previous section, the mathematical structure of the digital economic
laboratory has been described in details. The equations can be associated
to the decisional steps:
• New information set from past history: in this phase, consid-
ering the information set (eq.3.22-3.23 and eq.3.24-3.25), there is the
computation of the new levels of endowments and supply of commodi-
ties for the production goods market (eq.3.26) and financial wealth
(eq.3.27).
• Price and wage announcement: on the basis of the information
sets, there is the effective announcement of prices and wages (eq.3.28-
3.30). Considering as given (i.e., determined by the behavioural func-
tion which depends on the experimental setting) the desired labour
supply of each ARA, each producer will choose a particular method of
production (eq.3.38-3.47) from the set of available methods (eq.3.34).
At this point it is possible to compute the desired demand and supply
of commodities for the production goods market (eq.3.48-3.53) and the
labour demand and supply in the labour force market (eq.3.54-3.58).
• Exchange 1 in the production goods market: in this phase,
with exchanges, it is possible for ARAs to be rationed in labour and
production goods markets. The quantities actually bought by each
ARA can be computed (commodities eq.3.59 and eq.3.61-3.65; labour
eq.3.60 and eq.3.66-3.70). Also the unsold quantities can be computed
(eq.3.71).
• Production: after the exchanges, commodities and labour are used
for production and the quantities effectively used, produced and the
residuals can be computed (eq.3.72-3.76). After production, produc-
ers choose how much of the product to offer in the consumption goods
market. At the same time ARA workers and producers, according to
their resources (and the behavioural functions), decide their desired
consumption. In this way, aggregate demand and supply in the con-
sumption goods market are determined (eq.3.77-3.83).
• Exchange 2 in the consumption goods market: in this phase,
with exchanges, it is possible for ARAs to be rationed in the consump-
tion goods market. The quantities actually bought by each ARA can
be computed (eq.3.84-3.89). Also in this market unsold quantities can
be computed (eq.3.90).
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• Consumption: after exchanges72, commodities are consumed. The
final amount of IOUs can be computed and the level of wealth can
be updated (eq.3.91-3.109). The information set of each ARA will be
updated (eq.3.24-3.25).
It is worth remembering that the rules of double-entry bookkeeping sys-
tem are always followed and that actual budget constraints are never broken.
Any virtual bilateral exchange is associated to a registration in the economic
accounts and in the balance sheets of the two ARAs involved.
72Considering also the consumer exchange in phase τ5 without IOUs. See for more
details subsection 3.5.10.
94
4 The setting of the thought expriements
4.1 General setting of the thought experiments
The digital economic laboratory described in the previous chapter has been
transformed into a concrete set of algorithms through the computer pro-
gram MATLAB®. The use of this specific computer program is not nec-
essary because all the model is composed by mathematical equations that
are algorithmically coherent and can be computed with whatever calculator.
Indeed, there are no stochastic elements in this algorithmic model and its
dimension is parametric (a high number of ARAs and local markets can be
considered). The use of the computer is necessary only because the compu-
tational time is high and grows with the dimension of the experiment (i.e.,
with the number of production periods and ARAs)73. It is worth remem-
bering that the mathematical structure of the digital economic laboratory is
described in details in chapter 3. The digital economic laboratory has been
built with the purpose to use it to run laboratory experiments, which com-
pose the thought experiment. The laboratory experiments will be different
depending on the different functional forms of the behavioural functions and
the different values of the parameters and initial conditions. Nevertheless,
the building blocks of the digital economic laboratory remain fixed.
Having decided to study a specific theoretical economic problem (see the
list of the research topics that will be investigated in the digital economic
laboratory in section 3.2), it is necessary to prepare the thought experiment
accordingly. Whatever thought experiment has to follow a precise sequence of
steps in order to be theoretically rigorous and able to produce robust results.
These steps imply the definition of the features of the laboratory experiments:
initial conditions and parameters (that determine the structure of the virtual
market and represent its initial data set), the behavioural functions, the
particular rules of trading and the rules of migration and production. A lot
of laboratory experiments can be needed in order to collect statistics and to
have some form of generality. This allows to construct thought experiments
theoretically rigorous and able to produce robust results.
In order to compute the dynamic evolution of one laboratory experiment
inside the digital economic laboratory it is necessary to specify initial con-
ditions and parameters. Changes of initial conditions and parameters will
identify different laboratory experiments. Each laboratory experiment gen-
erates a virtual economy identified by a unique identity code. The identity
code is associated to a unique set of initial conditions and parameters, rules
and behavioural functions. In this way each laboratory experiment can be
exactly repeated. Even though some initial conditions and parameters can
73It is worth remembering that the computational time of each simulation is relevant
also for the computer. Indeed, each virtual economy imply a computation time in the
order of hours with a high performance computer and few ARAs.
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be generated randomly, they can be reproduced exactly by the identity code.
The experimental setting can be described as follows:
• Data Set: the whole data used in the laboratory experiment is col-
lected in the data set. At the beginning of the experiment some fun-
damental values (parameters and initial conditions) have to be defined
in order to start the simulation.
– Parameters and initial conditions:
∗ The structure of the lattice: it is necessary to define the
number of commodities (n), the number of the producers (k),
the number of the workers (K) and the number of workers
enrolled in each enterprise at the beginning of the experi-
ment (k̃i1). According to these parameters it is possible to
construct the ring one-dimensional lattice and the matrices
that determine the location of each ARA (Υ).
∗ Production periods: it is necessary to define the total pro-
duction periods that will be computed. This parameter t̄
represents the stopping rule.
∗ Labour market: it is necessary to define the maximum
total labour supply of workers and producers (Lsw and Lsp).
∗ Methods of production and access to methods: it is
necessary to define the technological set (T and T̃ ) and the
matrix that define the access to the methods (O). The meth-
ods of production (the matrix T ) take here the form of book
of blueprints and characterize the existing production possi-
bilities74.
∗ Characteristics of ARA: the combination of features in
terms of preference-propensity-technical parameters that char-
acterize each ARA have to be defined in matrix Θ. These
values can be fixed according to the behavioural function that
will be used.
∗ Endowments and wealth: at the beginning of the period
the wealth of each ARA and the initial endowments have to
be defined. These values (and also the other parameters and
initial conditions) can be computed with the purpose to start
from an equilibrium position.
74This set may be formed by a huge variety of alternative methods. The structure of the
set can be quite different. For example, there can be high degrees of substitutability among
the different means of production, or this substitutability may be limited or inexistent.
It is important here to stress that the number of alternative methods may be extremely
large.
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∗ Information set: the information set is represented by the
matrix Ω. The information set contains the parameters and
the initial conditions that have been previously described (see
for more details section 3.5.4) and will be updated each pro-
duction period with the relevant variables influenced or that
influence the ARA.
• Trade, migration and production settings: the trading will take
place in the general framework described for the digital economic lab-
oratory but the possibility of designing more sophisticated trading
settings is not excluded. Rules that determine the way in which mi-
gration evolves (M) have to de designed: for example the number of
workers that can migrate each production period, the rule of selection
of workers etc. Also the production sphere can be designed in order
to consider, for example, the presence of a mechanism that allows to
reuse residuals (i.e., matrix T̃ ) or to update the method.
• Algorithmic precise specification of the ARAs: the ARAs will
be characterized by behavioural equations. There are many ARAs,
but each ARA has to be specified. The decision process of the ARA
can take different forms. They can be assumed to be described with
the limited neoclassical characteristics or with solid procedural rules of
behaviour (as suggested, for example, in Simon (1997)). Clearly, this
would have to take an algorithmic form where the information and
data processing type would have to be made explicit and grounded in
cognitive science. The behavioural function determines the decision
of labour supply and demand of consumption goods. Moreover, also
the behavioural rules that determine the investment decision and the
changes in prices and wages have to be defined in this phase of the
laboratory experiment.
– ARA consumer and worker: each consumer would be de-
scribed to take decisions in accordance with his objectives. The
algorithmic specification would capture the characteristics of the
described agents. Decisions would depend on a great variety of
factors that have to be included in the algorithmic description
(the information set). Regardless of the algorithmic description
chosen for the particular laboratory experiment each ARA would
have desired quantities of commodities to be bought and desired
quantity of labour to be sold and would have actual quantities
of commodities bought and actual quantity of labour sold. Re-
member that wages are announced by trade unions and not by
the single worker.
– ARA consumer (worker) and producer: a producer is a
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consumer (and worker) that has access to production possibilities.
He will have similar characteristics with respect to the consumer,
but his principal source of income is through production, profits.
He will choose the method that allows him to maximize expected
profits, he will take investment decisions and will also announce
the price of his commodity.
• Running the experiment and collection of relevant data: pro-
duction periods are computed and data are collected until the stopping
rule is reached (t=t̄).
• Statistics and Results: attempt of conclusions with respect to the
original research question through the computation and analysis of
relevant statistics.
It is necessary to run several laboratory experiments, changing some of
the elements that are specific to the particular laboratory experiment (i.e.,
parameters, initial conditions, rule or behavioural functions) so as to be
able to have some form of generality in order to answer the initial research
questions and construct robust thought experiments.
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4.2 The definition of the data set: initial conditions and pa-
rameters
For the thought experiments considered in the present thesis, the initial con-
ditions have been designed so that to allow the virtual economy to start
from an equilibrium position (i.e., no debt or credit relations and produc-
tion prices). A point close to the wage-profit frontier has been chosen, where
distribution is egalitarian (i.e., each producer and/or worker has at disposal
the same share of the surplus). The initial production prices and wages
have been derived starting from this initial distribution. During the exper-
iments75 the numéraire to be used to measure values is adopted and the
prices computed are real prices. The shock that allows to start the dynam-
ics of the system is represented by a change in the preferences of the ARAs.
The number of production periods computed is equal to 1000 which repre-
sents the stopping rule: the virtual economy can converge before or after
this number.
For convergence, we mean a situation in which the virtual economy76 is
able to reach an equilibrium position.
We define an equilibrium position as a position in which prices and wages
announced do not change anymore; all markets are in equilibrium (demand
equal to supply in all markets; i.e., there is no more rationing), migration
stops, the system reproduce itself (i.e., same level of production and surplus
without residuals) without the creation of new IOUs (no new debt and credit
relations). This implies that the prices of convergence are production prices
with zero or positive profit rates.
If the virtual system is not able to converge before time 1000 it is con-
sidered not convergent. This does not mean that it is excluded that it can
converge in a production period bigger than 1000, but the study of this
convergence will be part of further investigation not treated in this thesis.
75For simplicity, we will use the terms experiment and laboratory experiment as syn-
onyms.
76Each virtual economy is identified by a unique identity code and represent a single
experiment. We will use the terms virtual economy and virtual system as synonyms.
99
4.3 The definition of the behavioural functions
According to the particular thought experiment, it is necessary to define the
behavioural functions able to generate the subsequent variables:
• Labour supply Ls∗
• Demand for consumption goods c∗
• Production volume vp
• Investment decision α, β, η and γ
• Prices p
• Wages w
These matrices and vectors have been considered as given in the labo-
ratory because they are determined according to the behavioural function.
The behavioural function can change according to the thought experiment
because it could be part of the research question to test a particular be-
havioural function instead of another one.
For all the thought experiments of the present thesis, each behavioural
function has been constructed equally for all the laboratory experiments.
This would allow to check how the conclusions about the research questions
will change only according to different initial conditions and parameters77.
4.3.1 Behavioural functions and learning models
The model of learning is common to all of the behavioural functions consid-
ered in the present thesis. Indeed, it is supposed that ARAs change their
decisions according to the changes in their information sets. The informa-
tion sets are updated according to the events inside each local market. This
means that each ARA is influenced by the behaviour of the other ARAs and
tries to correct past errors according to experience. This adaptive learning
principle, common to all the behavioural functions, has been translated into
specific algorithms that are described in detail in the next sections.
It is worth remembering that different learning techniques have been devel-
oped in order to be applied to different theoretical learning models inside
economic theory. Arrow has been a pioneer in recognizing the importance
of learning in the economy (see Arrow, 1962) and a large literature followed
about the relevance of learning by doing (see Thompson, 2010) and the
role of learning and training for firms in competitive markets and inside
77The influence on the results of different behavioural functions is object of further
research that goes beyond this thesis. See section 9.2 for more details.
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labour markets (from Becker (1962) to the more recent Acemoglu and Pis-
chke (1999)). Inside neoclassical theory, the idea of rational learning has
been developed in order to solve learning issues in game theory78, when dif-
ferential or incomplete information is considered, and in general equilibrium
models, when the issues of expectation formation is considered (see for more
details Blume and Easley, 1998). Learning has been often associated to typ-
ical biological phenomena such as mutation, selection and imitation (on the
theory of learning by imitation see for example Başçı (1999) and Schlag
(1998)). Artificial intelligence, psychology, artificial sciences, computer sci-
ences and neuroscience are research fields that have allowed a strong devel-
opment of our understanding of human learning capabilities. Herbert Simon
is surely one of the most important pioneers for the introduction of learning
in economics but on the basis of a difference conception of rationality of
humans with respect to neoclassical theory:
A comparative examination of the models of adaptive behaviour em-
ployed in psychology (e.g., learning theories), and of the models of
rational behaviour employed in economics, shows that in almost all
respects the latter postulate a much greater complexity in the choice
mechanisms, and a much larger capacity in the organism for obtaining
information and performing computations, than do the former. More-
over, in the limited range of situations where the predictions of the
two theories have been compared [...], the learning theories appear to
account for the observed behaviour rather better than do the theories
of rational behaviour (Simon, 1956, p.129).
For Herbert Simon “learning denotes changes in the system that are
adaptive in the sense that they enable the system to do the same task
or tasks drawn from the same population more efficiently and more effec-
tively the next time” (Simon, 1983, p.26) and he is sure that “intelligence
cannot be separated from social interactions” (Levi and Kernbach, 2010,
p.340). As a consequence, different learning algorithms should consider that
biological entities, such as human beings, don’t optimise but search satis-
faction according to the characteristics of the environment. Between 1955
and 1956 Herbert Simon, Allen Newell and Cliff Shaw have developed a
computer program, the so-called Logic Theorist, with the intent to mimic
human decision-making processes. This program has had the merit of giv-
ing a strong contribution to the development of the future artificial intel-
ligence field. This top-down approach to create intelligent machinery has
78Indeed, in the last decades, the focus has been even more about how people learn
to play games. Evolutionary game theory relaxes the assumptions of neoclassical game
theory so that to recognize that agents need not be perfectly rational and that they can
have imperfect information and can adjust their strategies myopically. In these games
imitation and mutation come into the scene in a dynamical process towards the selection
of the equilibrium.
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been flanked recently by a bottom-up approach to model intelligence and
that starts from the neuron (i.e., neural network):
A conventional computer will never operate as brain does, but it can
be used to simulate or model human thought. In 1955, Herbert Si-
mon and Allen Newell announced that they had invented a thinking
machine. Their program, the logic theorist, dealt with problems of
proving theories based on assumptions it was given. Simon and Newell
later developed the general problem solver, which served as the ba-
sis of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Simon and Newell believed
that the main task of AI was figuring out the nature of the symbols
and rules that the mind uses. For many years AI engineers have used
the “top-down” approach to create intelligent machinery. The top-
down approach starts with the highest level of complexity, in this case
thought, and breaks it down into smaller pieces to work with. A pro-
cedure is followed step by step. AI engineers write very complex com-
puter programs to solve problems. Another approach to the modelling
of brain functioning starts with the lowest level, the single neuron. This
could be referred to as a bottom-up approach to modelling intelligence
(Chaturvedi, 2008, p.23, emphasis added).
Both approaches are nowadays object of further research. Both of them
have to deal with different difficulties. New learning models surely will be
developed by considering the advantages and disadvantages from the use of
both these approaches.
Some notes on the learning models and techniques used in the
thought experiments
In the thought experiments considered in the present thesis, the behavioural
functions have been constructed considering only adaptive learning, in the
sense that each ARA is influenced by the behaviour of the other ARAs and
tries to correct past errors according to experience. The effect of imita-
tion, for example, can be object of further research, but it is surely a good
methodological habit to consider firstly the most simple case, in order to
be able to understand the influence, for example, of imitation with respect
to the base case79. It is worth remembering that in the behavioural func-
tion that describe the price and wage decisions neural networks have been
used inside a more complex decision algorithm. This could be considered in
contradiction with Herbert Simon’s approach. Indeed, “neural activities are
the basis of the bottom-up approach, while symbolic descriptions are the
basis of the top-down approach” and Herbert Simon has been one “vigorous
advocates of symbolic AI” in the debate between symbolic versus connec-
tionist approaches to AI (Copeland, 2017). The fact that nowadays both
79This point is object of further research that goes beyond this thesis. See section 9.2
for more details.
102
approaches have to cope with different problems suggests that probably the
use of one method with respect to the other will depend also on the par-
ticular task. Indeed it cannot be excluded that for the construction of a
particular behavioural function one of the two methods is not feasible.
During the 1950s and ‘60s the top-down and bottom-up approaches
were pursued simultaneously, and both achieved noteworthy, if limited,
results. During the 1970s, however, bottom-up AI was neglected, and
it was not until the 1980s that this approach again became prominent.
Nowadays both approaches are followed, and both are acknowledged
as facing difficulties. Symbolic techniques work in simplified realms but
typically break down when confronted with the real world; meanwhile,
bottom-up researchers have been unable to replicate the nervous systems
of even the simplest living things (Copeland, 2017, emphasis added).
Probably further research will require the development of hybrid mod-
els. Indeed, “the top-down/bottom-up dichotomy is somewhat simplistic”
and many researchers in the field of AI “advocate hybrid approaches that
combine the best aspects and opportunities of both” (Gunkel, 2012, p.82).
The use of neural networks in the algorithm for the announcement of prices
and wages is an answer to this need to develop hybrid approaches for solving
the problems that arise when one tries to develop an algorithm that mimics
realistic decisional processes. It is worth remembering that the announce-
ment of prices and wages is probably for the ARA a more complex task than
one can imagine. Indeed, the environment in which this decision has to be
taken is extremely complex and changes continuously in time. In order to
judge a particular algorithm suitable to fulfil this task, it must be able to
approximate the decisional process of an ARA who tries to maximize his
income by changing the price of its commodity (if producer) or the value of
the wage (if a trade union) without postulating for the ARA (trade union)
any particular knowledge about economic theory . Indeed, each ARA has
simply to learn the best price (or wage for trade unions) to announce on the
basis of the knowledge and the experience developed in the laboratory over
time. As far as I know, a similar algorithm (in a similar digital economic
laboratory) has not been developed yet and it is arguably very difficult80
to develop it with a simple top-down approach that, we know, “typically
break[s] down when confronted with the real world” (Copeland, 2017).
80But not impossible, in order to answer to this question we need further research that
go beyond the purposes of the present thesis. See section 9.2 for more details.
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4.3.2 Labour and consumption decision
ARAs have to decide, after prices and wages announcement, the amount
of labour to offer in the labour force market. After this choice, between
phase τ3 and phase τ4, when each ARA has earned his income, there is the
announcement of the desired quantities of commodities for consumption.
It is possible to interpret the behavioural function that determines these
quantities as the resolution of an utility maximization problem under budget
constraint.
Given the initial conditions, each ARA maximizes his utility and cal-
culates his optimum level of consumption and free time81 according to his
utility function U and a standard budget constraint. The level of the param-
eters inside the vectors λi and κi are given and do not change in time. x is
the vector containing the desired consumption levels of the n commodities
(g=1,...,n with n=3) and the level of free time Lf , p is the vector of the prices
in ARA’s local market, wealth is the level of financial wealth82, w is the wage
rate and finally Ls∗ is the desired labour supply while Ls is the endowment
in terms of maximum labour supply. As a consequence, the maximization
problem of each ARA i (for i=1,...,K+k)83 in time t becomes84:
maxU(x)it = λi
Txκiit i = 1, ...,K + k (4.1)
s.t. : pTitc
∗









g]it g = 1, ..., n
This utility maximization problem represents the standard model of con-
sumer behaviour inside the general equilibrium framework: the market clear-
ing condition ensures the consistency of the solutions of individual choice
problems. Indeed, given the equilibrium prices, equilibrium between demand
and supply in all markets (labour and goods) is guarantee by construction.
81In this phase the desired quantities are computed and for this reason the superscript
∗ represents the latter.
82The wealth corresponds to the accumulation of debt and credit positions in time.
83In this case all the ARAs are considered. For this reason i indicates not only ARAs
producers but also workers, from 1 to K+k (K workers plus k producers).
84The presence of IOUs implies the possibility to have negative wealth. In this case
each ARA makes his choice in order to pay off debts and at the same time to maximize
his utility function. In order to do that, he considers in the budget constraint only a
fraction of his negative wealth. This fraction will be equal to a percentage ε of his wage,
so that he will have always at disposal a positive level of resources for consumption. For
the present thesis the hypothesis is that each ARA can devote only the 50% of his wage
to the settlement of debt.
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In the digital economic laboratory consumption demand and labour sup-
ply could be rationed (i.e., the market could be unable to absorb ARA’s
labour supply and/or satisfy his demand of consumption goods). This be-
cause in the digital economic laboratory the equilibrium is a possible out-
come of the dynamics of the interaction process between ARAs and not a
construction hypothesis based on an instantaneous market clearing condi-
tion. For this reason, in order to use the utility function, it is necessary to
hypothesise that:
• Each ARA decides his labour supply and his demand of consumption
goods in order to optimize the utility function subject to the budget
constraint.
• When the production phase takes place, each ARA updates the orig-
inal desired consumption demand according to the income effectively
earned (i.e., if the ARA has been rationed in the labour force market,
his consumption decision will be updated).
The coherence between markets and individual choices can be obtained
through an error correction mechanism that prevents ARAs to do recurrent
errors and allows them to announce quantities that are consistent with the
level of rationing (i.e., with the purpose not to be rationed). Once the
labour is sold and production takes place, each ARA knows exactly his level
of income. If this income is different with respect to that considered in the
maximization problem, the desired consumption demand should be updated





κi i = 1, ...,K + k (4.2)
s.t. : pTitc
∗









g]it g = 1, ..., n
This final computation of c∗it corresponds to the final demand of consumption
goods that will be announced in the consumption goods market.
105
4.3.3 Production decision and investment decision
The production decision of producer i depends on the volume of the desired
production vpit. This value can be influenced by different factors. It is
hypothesized that the desired production depends only on expected demand.
Expected demand is computed through an error correction mechanism that
allows each ARA producer to compute an expected demand coherent with
the effective demand experimented in the past.
A correct expected demand corresponds to the quantity of the commod-
ity that will be effectively sold (for production and consumption) or used
for new production. In details, this quantity, that has to be estimated today
but that will be produced next period, is bei,t+1 (for i=1,...,k)
85. It corre-
sponds to the quantity of commodity that is expected today to be produced
and sold in the next production period (time t+1) in the consumption goods













At this point, each producer has to decide how much of the present pro-
duction bit to invest with the purpose to produce b
e
i,t+1 and how much to
devote to the consumption goods market of the present production period.
As a consequence, each producer has to calculate the percentage of actual
production to keep for next production ηit, the percentage of actual produc-
tion to keep for next exchange on production goods market αit and finally
the percentage of actual production that can be destined to the consumption
goods market of the present production period βit (is computed as residual).
Remember that αit+βit+ηit=1 with γit=αit+ηit.
If the expectation on future demand is exact, and the actual production is
enough in order to organize next production87, each producer will be able to
sell, thanks to this mechanism, all his future production bei,t+1. With correct





it , with uns
pgm
it =0 and uns
cgm
it =0. In this way
all the production is sold without residuals.
85The superscript e is the expectation.
86The superscript cgm stands for consumption goods market while the superscript pgm
stands for production goods market.
87It could be possible that the producer has not enough commodities for organizing
next production as desired. In this case ARAs producers will devote no resources to the
consumption goods market and will compute the best combination of αit and ηit according
to the resources at disposal.
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4.3.4 Price decision and wage decision
At the beginning of each production period, in phase τ1 (see figure 3.6), each
ARA producer announces the price of his commodity, while trade unions
(that represent the workers of the same enterprise) announce their wage.
This announcement is once for each production period, because prices and
wages remain the same for all the other phases of the production period.
A behavioural function determines prices and wages. At the core of
this particular behavioural function there is the fundamental idea that each
producer (trade union) should be able to exploit in the most efficient way
his information set in order to announce the price (wage) that allows him
(the trade union) to reach his objective (i.e., maximization of income). This
implies that ARA producer (trade union) should be able to learn from past
errors the best price (wage) to announce so that to develop the experience
(i.e., understand the dynamics of the environment) that allows the ARA
producer (the trade union) to reach his objective.
The complexity of the dynamics of the laboratory, the size of the in-
formation set of each ARA producer (trade union), and the requirement
of learning capabilities implies that the behavioural function that describes
price and wage decisions should be represented by an algorithm able to learn
and to take decisions. For the thought experiments within this thesis arti-
ficial neural networks have been used as part of a more general algorithm
constructed in order to describe behavioural functions for price and wage
announcement88.
Artificial neural network is a particular approach of machine learning.
Machine learning is the multidisciplinary field that studies the development
of algorithms that allow computers to develop the ability to learn89 in order
to perform tasks. According to a more precise definition “the field of machine
learning is concerned with the question of how to construct computer pro-
grams that automatically improve with experience” (Mitchell, 1997, p.xv)90.
There are different approaches to machine learning, such as decision tree
learning, deep learning, clustering, Bayesian networks etc. One particular
88See section 4.3.1 for a discussion about this topic.
89Learning is needed in cases in which it is not possible to develop a specific computer
program to solve directly the task because the task change in time, space, according to
circumstances or simply when we need the computer to simulate a human attitude that
we cannot translate in a specific computer program. Remember that Herbert Simon says
that “learning denotes changes in the system that are adaptive in the sense that they
enable the system to do the same task or tasks drawn from the same population more
efficiently and more effectively the next time” (Simon, 1983, p.26).
90Equivalently machine learning could be defined as “programming computers to op-
timize a performance criterion using example data or past experience” (Alpaydin, 2010,
p. xxxi). More formally, “a computer program is said to learn from experience E with
respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in
T, as measured by P, improves with experience E” (Mitchell, 1997, p.2, emphasis added).
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approach of machine learning that seems suitable to our task is artificial
neural network. Indeed, the idea to construct a behavioural functions able
to mimic the behaviour of producers (trade unions) when they decide the
price (wage) to announce imply the construction of an algorithm able to
recognize the environment, learn from errors and develop a decision. Neural
network is probably the most suitable approach of machine learning for this
task because other approaches such as decision trees are more suitable for
classification and regressions while clustering is more suitable for statistical
data analysis (see appendix 10.3 for a detailed discussion of this topic).
In details, the idea is to create an algorithm able to select the relevant
information, understand the behaviour of the economic system through the
analysis of past experience and take a decision that should allow to reach
the final objective (i.e., maximization of income). The sequential order of
the algorithm can be summarised as follows:
• Update the information set: the information set of the ARA pro-
ducer91 is updated with the new information collected between the
beginning of the production period and the moment in which ARA
producer takes the decision.
• Select relevant information: not all information is relevant in order
to take the decision. The ARA uses a subset of his information set
composed by the relevant information.
• Create, train and test the neural network: using relevant infor-
mation a neural network is created, trained, validated and tested. It is
a layer recurrent network with 2 layers and 10 neurons for the hidden
layer (see for a detailed description section 10.3.5).
• Use the neural network for simulation: once the neural network
is validated and tested, it can be used for simulation. In other words,
in order to take a decision with respect to the price (wage) to an-
nounce, the ARA producer selects a range of possible prices (wages)
to announce according to past experience and uses the neural network
in order to evaluate which price (wage) should ensure the highest in-
come.
• Final announcement: at the end of this process the ARA producer
(trade union) evaluates the coherence of the output of the neural net-
work with his experience and announces the final price (wage).














Figure 4.1: The behavioural function for prices and wages announcement:
in this figure, the logical steps that characterize the decision process for the price and
wage announcement are represented. It is based on an efficient use of information and
the creation of an artificial neural network for the simulation of the best price/wage to
announce according to the final objective of ARAs (maximization of income).
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4.4 Definition of trade, migration and production settings
The trading will take place in the general framework described for the dig-
ital economic laboratory. Rules that determine the way in which migration
evolves (M) have been determined. For the present thought experiments, it
is supposed that workers migrate where there is the highest income inside
their local market. A maximum number of workers equal to 5 can migrate
to each enterprise each production period. Workers are chosen according
to their preference for working, their income and the number of times they
have tried to migrate in the desired location. Each contract last 3 years, so
each worker can migrate only at the end of the contract. The production
sphere has been designed in order to consider the updating of the method
of production after that commodities have been bought. The presence of a
mechanism that allows to reuse residuals (i.e., matrix T̃ ) has been considered
only inside the last thought experiment (chapter 8).
4.5 The thought experiments: a summary
In this section, the thought experiments that will be considered in the next
chapters are summarised:
• Experiment 1: simulation of a virtual market economy with the set
of methods used by Sraffa in his example given at page 19 of PCMC.
Two cases are considered: case 1 is characterized by the presence 3
producers and 48 workers (the cases of homogeneous and heteroge-
neous ARAs will be considered); case 2 is characterized by the pres-
ence 9 producers and 144 workers (will be considered both cases with
homogeneous or heterogeneous ARAs). This last case implies the pres-
ence of 9 local markets as in figure 3.4 with 3 producers producing the
same commodity. A study of the convergence properties follows. In
particular, the convergence towards uniform profit rates, uniform wage
rates and equal distribution of the surplus will be checked. Finally,
the relationships between surplus, prices and preferences has been in-
vestigated.
• Experiment 2: simulation of different virtual market economies with
a set of methods generated under the condition of vitality92. As in
Sraffa, each producer has a unique method for the production of his
commodity at disposal. Two cases are considered: case 1 is character-
ized by the presence 3 producers and 54 workers (will be considered
both cases with homogeneous or heterogeneous ARAs); case 2 is char-
acterized by the presence 9 producers and 162 workers (will be consid-
ered both cases with homogeneous or heterogeneous ARAs). This last
92The methods allow the system to reproduce itself with a positive surplus.
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case implies the presence of 9 local markets as in figure 3.4 with 3 pro-
ducers producing the same commodity. 20 virtual economies have been
generated for case 1 and 20 virtual economies for case 2. A study of
the frequency of convergence93 follows. Among all virtual economies,
10 of them (for each case) will be selected in order to analyse their con-
vergence properties. In particular, the convergence towards uniform
profit rates, uniform wage rates and equal distribution of the surplus
will be checked.
• Experiment 3: the organization and structure of the experiment is
the same of experiment 2 with the difference that, with respect to ex-
periment 2, this experiment considers the possibility for producers to
choose the best method among a set of different methods (10 methods)
for the production of their commodity. Beyond the convergence prop-
erties also the convergence towards the wage-profit frontier has been
examined and other efficiency indexes have been generated. Moreover,
the role of innovation has been investigated.
• Experiment 4: in this chapter the effect of the introduction of an
exogenous and endogenous interest rate has been considered. For this
experiment the production capabilities of the virtual economies have
been strengthened through the introduction of the residual mechanism
(see figure 10.2 and chapter 3.5.8). 3 different virtual economies have
been considered, with 3 producers and 54 workers for the heteroge-
neous case94. The 3 economies have been tested for a range of possible
interest rates (from -5% to 5% step 1%). The relevant case has been
analysed and tested also under the case of endogenous interest rate.
The characteristics of convergence have been analysed and the Pareto
improvements with respect to the base case with interest rate equal to
zero have been computed.
93This number of virtual economies should be considered significant and sufficient for
drawing conclusions with respect to the frequency of converge. Indeed, firstly it should
be considered that the generation of each virtual economy implies a computation time in
the order of hours with a high performance computer; secondly it has been preferred to
generate a lower number of virtual economies with a significant value of the stopping rule
t̄=1000 instead of too many virtual economies with a lower stopping rule not necessary
neither significant in order to investigate convergence properties. As a consequence, 20
economies have been considered respectively for the generation of figure 6.1, 6.2, 7.2 and
7.3.
94For the purposes of this experiment, 3 producers and 54 workers (heterogeneous case)
have been considered sufficient in order to investigate the relative research question about
the role of an economic policy.
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5 Experiment 1: convergence towards uniform wage
rates and non-uniform profit rates for the Sraf-
fian case
5.1 Introduction to experiment 1
Sraffa begins Chapter 1 in Production of Commodities by Means of Com-
modities (PCMC ) with the following statement:
Let us consider an extremely simple society which produces [...] to
maintain itself. Commodities are produced by separate industries
and are exchanged for one another at a market held after the harvest
(Sraffa, 1960, p.3).
There are many ways that one can read or interpret PCMC. Here we
endorse a particular interpretation that sees PCMC as the study of the
virtual prices that would or could allow the economic system to replicate.
As explained by Sraffa, his major concern is not on how trade takes place
“at a market held after the harvest” but the ex-ante study of the prices that
could allow the system to replicate itself. In PCMC Sraffa shows what are
the conditions for the determination of these virtual prices are. He is very
careful in pointing out, that these prices are not market prices:
Such classical terms as ‘necessary price’, ‘natural price’, or ‘price of
production’ would meet the case, but value and price have been pre-
ferred as being shorter and in the present context (which contains no
reference to market prices) no more ambiguous (Sraffa, 1960, p.9, em-
phasis added).
What would actually happen during the market days is not discussed.
As it is well known, Sraffa makes the further assumption that these prices
should be such that the profit rates are uniform. Zambelli (2016) has relaxed
this assumption; he concludes that the uniform rate of profit case is a very
special one: there are price vectors that would allow the system to replicate,
but would imply a vector of profit rates that are not necessarily uniform.
Furthermore, the case in which there is just a uniform rate of profits is,
according to Zambelli (2016), a very special one.
In this chapter we make assumptions with respect to the functioning of
the market by using the digital economic laboratory as described in chapter
3 and the behavioural functions and the setting of the thought experiments
described in chapter 4. The process going from production, exchange and
production is clearly dynamic in the sense that quantities and prices do
change in time, from one period to the other. Zambelli (2016), coherently
with a Sraffian approach, has shown that the prices that would allow the
system to reproduce itself are not unique and profit rates may not be uni-
form. Hence there is a huge variety of distributions of the generated surplus
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among producers and workers, that would allow the economic system to re-
produce. The reproduction of the system can take place also thanks to the
emergence of credit and debt relations. Zambelli (2016) studies, following
the Sraffian method outlined in PCMC, the possibility that the system may
reproduce itself exactly in time in the same proportions and with the gener-
ation of the same surplus as occurred in the previous production period95.
In Sraffa (1960) and in Zambelli (2016) behavioural and trading rules are
not specified. This is also true for the great number of contributions that
may be considered to follow the Sraffian tradition.
Here we will not discuss this tradition, but through the use of the digital
economic laboratory, where virtual agents (the ARAs) trade, produce and
consume, and where from one production period to the other quantities
and prices do change in accordance with agents behavioural description and
location, we investigate whether there would be convergence towards the
production or natural prices computed in Sraffa (1960) or Zambelli (2016).
Clearly the prices observed in the digital economic laboratory are not
necessarily the prices that would allow the system to replicate. These prices
will be called market prices in contrast with Sraffa’s prices or values. Indeed,
Sraffian prices are the virtual prices computed ex ante before the market
days begins, while market prices are the prices computed as the result of
agents interactions and market structure. It is only when the two set of
prices are the same that one can say that the system has converged towards
Sraffian prices (natural or production).
In this chapter the set of methods used by Sraffa in the example given
at page 19 of PCMC has been considered. In the next chapter more general
cases have been considered. Here our main objective has been the study
of whether the economic system having the same production methods as in
PCMC, page 19, once ARAs are specified and trading rules are given, will
converge towards Sraffian production prices. Given these prices we can check
whether there is convergence towards the uniform wage rates and uniform
profit rates.
In the subsequent sections of this chapter the fundamental equations in-
troduced in chapter 3 have been developed according to Sraffa’s periodiza-
tion. Then the experimental setting has been described in details. Finally,
the results have been reported and commented.
95Clearly, this is a theoretical starting point. In the thought experiments of the present
thesis the assumption is that methods of production do not change in time.
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5.2 The market after the harvest
5.2.1 Methods of production and divisibility
Sraffa’s main goal in PCMC is to determine the:
Set of exchange-values which if adopted by the market restores the
original distribution of the products and makes it possible for the pro-
cess to be repeated ; such values spring directly from the methods of
production (Sraffa, 1960, p.3, emphasis added).
Here the focus will not be on the determination of the prices and wages that,
“if adopted”, will “restore the original distribution of the product”, but on
the sequence going from a period t to the other96.
We assume that there are k producers producing n commodities97. Each
commodity g is produced with one method of production linking the means
of production with the output. Considering that each producer i (i=1,...,k)98
can choose among a set of possible alternative methods for the production
of his commodity g (g=1,...,n), the method zg (for zg=1,...,mg) for the pro-
duction of commodity g is given by:
azgi1 , a
zg
i2 , . . . , a
zg








where li is the necessary labour, aig is the amount of commodity g used
as physical mean of production by the producer i for the production of
the quantity bi. We assume that production (or method of production)
is divisible. This means that given any positive value xi, also defined as





i2 , . . . , xia
zg










96In a way we follow a similar method as suggested by Hicks (1939, Ch.10, pp. 121-29)
in Value and Capital. But, as it will be clarified, accounting disequilibrium and credit and
debt relations are allowed to emerge.
97The notation is coherent with that used in chapter 3.
98It has been explained in chapter 3 that the total number of producers in the whole
economy is equal to k for i=1,...,k but that inside the local market the total number of
producers is equal to n for ī=1,...,n. In this chapter we are dealing with Sraffa’s case of
page 19 in PCMC with only 3 producers. In order to make the notation easier to follow,
in this chapter we will denote with i a producer inside the local market (for i=1,...,k with
k=n).
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5.2.2 Periodization: exchanges, production and consumption
If we try to design one possible dynamics of this simple society as defined
by Sraffa (1960, p.3) we can imagine that at the beginning of the market
day, producers enter the market endowed with the commodities produced
during the previous production and harvest period and previously accumu-
lated financial means of exchange. Producers’s purpose is to exchange their
endowments in order to organize next production that will be partly ex-
changed in the consumption goods market of the present time t and partly
devoted to the restoration of production and exchanged in the production
goods market during period t+ 199.
Our aim is to study the dynamics, period after period, of prices and
quantities produced and exchanged. Here we will consider the period t
composed of three moments or time intervals:
• Exchange 1 : exchange of the endowments (labour force and previous
production) in the production goods market (pgm) and the labour
force market (lm).
• Production: production and decision of the quantities to devote to the
consumption goods market (cgm).
• Exchange 2 : exchange in the consumption goods market (cgm). The
other production is endowment for the next production period t+ 1.
If the prices are market prices (that is not necessarily natural prices or
production prices) it may not be the case that the purchasing power of the
individual agents will be sufficient to buy the quantities which they desire
or need to buy. In other words, there might be situations where some agents
do not have enough purchasing power to buy what they would and others
cannot sell what they would precisely because the potential buyers do not
have the necessary purchasing power. This situation would not emerge if (ex-
post) market prices happened to be equal to (ex-ante) natural or production
prices. Clearly in this type of situation where market prices are not the
same as natural prices the sellers could extend credit (as deferred forms of
payments, such as IOUs) to the buyers, so that the desired exchanges can
take place. The existence and determination of these financial means of
exchange would have a significant impact on the decisions of the ARAs and
hence on market prices, exchanges, consumption and production.
99This is exactly the dynamics considered in the laboratory. The purpose of the present
section is to explain the coherence between Sraffian analysis and the laboratory.
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Producers
In our virtual economy the producers would enter the market at the begin-
ning of period t endowed with part of the quantities100 produced during the
period t− 1 and their stocks of financial assets or liabilities accumulated up
to period t− 1101.
During each period t each producer i (for i=1,...,k) producing commod-
ity g (for g=1,...,n) will sell his physical endowment represented by the share
αi,t−1 of the previous production devoted to the new production [αb]i,t−1 in
the production goods market102 and will aim at buying the necessary means
of production (in terms of commodities ag and labour force q
L) so as being
able to produce during the time t the quantity bit that will be partly (the
share βit) exchanged in the consumption goods market and partly (the share
αit) devoted to the exchange in period t + 1 in the production goods mar-
ket. Pay attention that in the same period t we are considering quantities
produced in different production periods: indeed, the commodities sold in
the production goods market have been produced in the previous produc-
tion period while the commodities sold in the consumption goods market
have been produced during the present period t. It is always true that
bit = [αb]it+ [βb]it, but the actual quantities would obviously be determined
by the prices and market conditions103.
exchange 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
[αb]i,t−1
exchange pgm lm−−−−−−−−−−−→ [qi1, ..., qin, qLi ]t
production︷ ︸︸ ︷
production−−−−−−→ [ai1, ..., ain, li]t → bit ...
exchange 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
...
exchange cgm−−−−−−−−−→ [βb]it
consumption and new endowment︷ ︸︸ ︷
consumption−−−−−−−−→ cit
new endowment−−−−−−−−−−→ [αb]it
The quantities [qi1, ..., qin, q
L]t represent what each producer i has at dis-
posal for production after the exchange in the production goods market pgm
and the labour force market lm. The part of production devoted to con-
sumption ([βb]it) corresponds to the quantities effectively sold to producers
and workers. The vector of consumption of each producer (for i = 1, ..., k)
corresponds to cit.
100The part of the previous production devoted to the next production.
101In the laboratory this stock of financial assets is called financial wealth.
102In order to be as close as possible to Sraffa’s case it has been assumed in this section
that ηi,t−1=0. For more details, see equation 3.26 and subsection 3.5.8 about investment
decision.




In the same way each worker j (for j=1,...,K) would enter the market at
the beginning of period t endowed with its labour force Lswj and his stocks
of financial assets or liabilities accumulated up to period t− 1.
During the period t each worker j will sell a fraction of what he owns (his
labour force), so as to be able to consume during next period t. There could
be a difference between his desired labour supply Lsw∗j and what effectively
he will be able to sold in the labour market qLj
104. Indeed, prices and wages
can determine a potential rationing in the labour market. Each worker j




5.2.3 Economic accounts: revenues and expenditures
Each producer i exchanges his commodity with the other two neighbouring
producers. This triple of producers represent a local market. By local market
s, the producer s = i and the other two neighbouring producers i − 1 and
i+1 in growing order according to the commodity produced will be denoted.
The local market in which producer i is present will be denoted by s(i), the
local market in which worker j is present will be denoted by s(j). In Sraffa’s
example page 19 in PCMC there are only 3 producers but with this notation
it is possible to imagine also to enlarge the number of producer in order to
have many local markets. This hypothesis has been tested in the section
5.3.4 and the following equations can refer to whatever local market105.
The economic accounts of the producers
The difference between the revenues and the expenditures of each producer
i represents the variation in his financial position106.
104Obviously, the quantity qLi bought by the producer i correspond to the sum of the
labour force sold by each worker j (qLj ) enrolled in the enterprise i.
105In the digital economic laboratory, as explained in chapter 3, a lot of local markets and
different producers producing the same commodity can be considered. For example, with
the local market s=5 we make reference to the producers 4,5,6 (in this order) and with the
local market s=7 we make reference to the producers 7,8,6 (in this order). Remember that
in the case of 9 producers, producers 1,4,7 produce the first commodity, producers 2,5,8,
produce the second commodity while producers 3,6,9 produce the third one. Remember
that with ps(i) and i=7 we are making reference to s=7 and the prices of producers 7,8,6
in this order.
106In the digital economic laboratory and in the thought experiments it is hypothesized
that also producers can work in their enterprise. In order to reconstruct these equations
as close as possible to Sraffa’s framework, this hypothesis has not been considered in this
section.
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revenuesit = αi,t−1bi,t−1pit + βitbitpit (5.3)
expendituresit = q̄itps(i)t + q
L
itwit + c̄itps(i)t (5.4)
Fit = revenuesit − expendituresit (5.5)
The economic accounts of the local markets
A different accounting becomes useful or even necessary when we consider
the productive units (enterprises107) with the aim of computing the profit
rates. We have to consider what happens inside each local market s. The
total level of profits depends on the difference between revenues and ex-
penditures of each enterprise. In the case in which expenditures have been
bigger with respect to revenues, the loss corresponds to a negative variation
in the financial position of the enterprise.
revenuesentit = αi,t−1bi,t−1pit + βitbitpit (5.6)
expendituresentit = q̄itps(i)t + q
L
itwit (5.7)
F entit = revenues
ent
it − expendituresentit (5.8)
The above equations imply that with market prices it is possible to have
inside each local market s (where are present k producers producing the n
commodities with k=n)108:
a11p1t + a12p2t + ...+ a1npnt + l1w1t ≥ b1p̃1,t+1
a21p1t + a22p2t + ...+ a2npnt + l2w2t ≤ b2p̃2,t+1
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
an1p1t + an2p2t + ...+ annpnt + lnwnt ≥ bnp̃n,t+1
(5.9)
which in matrix notation could be written as:
Astpst + diag(wst)Lst S Bstp̃s,t+1 (5.10)
Remember that here the wage rate can be heterogeneous among enterprises
and for this reason is no more a single value as in Sraffa. The presence of
p̃ is necessary because part of this production has been sold at the current
107When we make reference to the enterprises we use ent as superscript.
108For example, for the case of k=3, we consider the producers 1,2,3 inside local market
s. They can correspond, for example, to producers 7,8,6 in the local market s=7.
118
prices in the consumption goods market. p̃i,t+1 is the price that allows to
have109:
bitp̃i,t+1 = [βb]itpit + [αb]itpi,t+1 (5.11)
The profit rate can be interpreted as:
(a11p1t + a12p2t + ...+ a1npnt + l1w1t)(1 + r1) = b1p̃1,t+1
(a21p1t + a22p2t + ...+ a2npnt + l2w2t)(1 + r2) = b2p̃2,t+1
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
(an1p1t + an2p2t + ...+ annpnt + lnwnt)(1 + rn) = bnp̃n,t+1
(5.12)
Which is equivalent to:
a11p1t + a12p2t + ...+ a1npnt + l1w1t + F
ent
1t = b1p̃1,t+1
a21p1t + a22p2t + ...+ a2npnt + l2w2t + F
ent
2t = b2p̃2,t+1
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...





(I +Rst)Astpst + diag(wst)Lst = Bstp̃s,t+1 (5.14)
Astpst + diag(wst)Lst + F
ent
st = Bstp̃s,t+1 (5.15)
where Bst is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the single pro-
ducers’ quantity produced bit while Rst is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal
elements are the single producers’ profit rates, r1t, r2t, r3t (vector rst) at
time t in the local market s. When revenuesentit − expenditures
ent
it ≤ 0 this
implies that rit ≤ 0 and also F entit ≤ 0. The equation can be rewritten as:
Bstp̃s,t+1 = (I +Rst)Astpst + diag(wst)Lst (5.16)
The above equations correspond to the Sraffian schemes for the non-uniform
rate of profits (Zambelli, 2016) when Rst ≥ 0 and p̃s,t+1 = pst.
109It is important to pay attention to the periodization. In the digital economic labora-
tory, explained in chapter 3, the production bit is partly sold in the consumption goods
market at time t and partly devoted to the production goods market at time t + 1. In
Sraffa, bit represents the quantities sold in the production goods market and the consump-
tion goods market of the production period t. In order to compute profit rates coherently
with Sraffa’s equation, the presence of p̃ is necessary. Remember that despite w is a
matrix and L is a vector, they have been written in this way in order to be as close as
possible to Sraffa’s notation.
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The economic accounts of the workers





The expenditures during the period t are given by the quantity of commodi-
ties that the worker j is able to buy c̄jt. The worker’s expenditures would
be given by:
expendituresjt = c̄jtps(j)t (5.18)
The variation in the financial position of the individual workers j is given
by:
Fjt = revenuesjt − expendituresjt (5.19)
5.2.4 Financial Balances
Clearly those industries that are in the condition for which the expenditures
would be higher than the revenues would not have the purchasing power to
buy the means of production necessary to replicate the production of the
previous period. These enterprises are in a condition of potential financial
deficit. They would be able to purchase the necessary means of production
only by agreeing to a deferred payment to take place during the years to
follow in favour of the enterprises in potential surplus. If the quantities have
to be restored independently from any given price we must have that in
general the inequalities of eq.5.10 may be eliminated if we allow for deferred
payments which might take the form of IOUs (i.e., I owe you: selling of real
quantities or labour now with the promise of paying back sometimes in the
future). The accounting balances would require, if we accept the existence




















Fjt = 0 (5.21)
These equations mean that, for accounting consistency, the sum of all the
debts and credits has to be always equal to zero.
110The quantity of labour sold by worker j is multiplied for the wage of the enterprise i
in which the worker j is enrolled.
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5.3 The thought experiment 1
The experimental setting common to all the thought experiments of the
present thesis has been already described in chapter 4. Here are reported
only the particular features that characterize the present thought experiment.
5.3.1 Experimental setting
The experimental setting considered in the present chapter is subdivided in
two main cases:
• Case 1 : is characterized by the presence 3 producers and 48 workers
(two cases, with homogeneous or heterogeneous ARAs, will be consid-
ered)111.
• Case 2 : is characterized by the presence 9 producers and 144 workers
(two cases, with homogeneous or heterogeneous ARAs, will be con-
sidered). This last case implies the presence of 9 local markets as in
figure 3.4 with 3 producers producing the same commodity.
Each producer has at disposal, at the beginning of the production peri-
ods, 16 workers, that can migrate112. There is only one method of production
at disposal and it is exactly the one present in Sraffa’s PCMC page 19.
5.3.2 The research questions
The first purpose of the present chapter is to verify if Sraffa’s example of
a three sector economy enriched with behavioural functions in a dynamical
framework is able to converge towards an equilibrium position.
We define an equilibrium position as a position in which prices and wages
announced do not change anymore; all markets are in equilibrium (demand
equal to supply in all markets; i.e., there is no more rationing), migration
stops, the system reproduces itself (i.e., same level of production and surplus
without residuals) without the creation of new IOUs (no new debt and credit
relations). This implies that the prices of convergence are production prices
with zero or positive profit rates. In particular, these characteristic of the
eventual equilibrium have been analysed:
111Homogenous ARAs imply that the matrices Θ and Ω are equal for all the ARAs. In
other words, the ARA have the same characteristics and the same initial information set.
112The total number of worker is higher with respect to the original Sraffa’s example
because in the present experiments migration is allowed and in order to test convergence
towards uniform wage rates it is necessary to consider a higher number of workers. Despite
this, the method at disposal of each ARA producer is the same as in Sraffa’s PCMC page
19.
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• Convergence towards uniform profit rates. Given the conver-
gence towards production prices it is possible to check convergence
towards uniform profit rates.
• Convergence towards uniform wage rates. Given the possibility
for workers to migrate where the income is higher, if the system con-
verges towards a position of equilibrium, the wage rates should become
uniform among all enterprises and the migration should stop.
• Convergence towards an equal distribution of the surplus.
Given the initial condition of equal distribution of the physical surplus
(94% of the surplus has been associated to workers given that they
are 48, with respect to the 3 producers, for a total population of 51
ARAs)113 it is interesting to test the type of distribution of the surplus
associated with the convergence position.
These characteristics of the equilibrium position will be investigated also
for the cases with 9 producers and 144 workers in order to test the role of
local markets for the problem of convergence. Both cases with homogeneous
and heterogeneous ARAs will be tested.
113The same proportions also for the case with local markets where workers are 144 and
producers 9. Also in this case 94% of the surplus has been associated to workers. It
is worth remembering that the initial production prices and wage have been computed
starting from this distribution.
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5.3.3 Results for the case 1
In the subsequent table the results for the case 1 with 3 producers and 48
workers, with homogeneous and heterogeneous ARAs are reported.
Research questions Homogeneous case Heterogeneous case
Convergence towards production prices yes yes
Convergence towards uniform profit rates no no
Convergence towards uniform wage rates yes yes
Percentage of surplus to producers 98 98
Percentage of surplus to workers 2 2
Table 5.1: Results of the experiments: using the numbers of Sraffa’s example of a
three sector economy of PCMC page 19 and a total population of 51 ARAs (48 workers
and 3 producers) for the two cases with homogeneous or heterogeneous ARAs. Remember
that at the beginning of the production periods the 94% of the surplus was associated to
workers.
According to the results of the experiments, the following answers to the
initial research questions have been obtained:
• The system converges towards production prices. The produc-
tion system is able to converge towards an equilibrium position stable
in time characterized by the presence of production prices, no creation
of new IOUs and positive profit rates.
• The system DOES NOT converge towards uniform profit rates.
This could be surprising for those that interpret the convergence to-
wards an uniform profit rate as the natural outcome of the competition
process between producers in time. This result should be interpreted
instead in the light of the results presented in Zambelli (2016). If the
objective of the agents is to maximize their surplus shares, there is no
reason to consider an uniform profit rate as a natural outcome of the
competition process.
• The system converges towards uniform wage rates. This im-
plies that migration stops at an equilibrium level in which there is
no more incentive to migrate. This enforces the stability of the equi-
librium position and the idea that migration is a competitive process
between workers able to bring to convergence towards the same wage
rate.
• The system DOES NOT converge towards an equal distribu-
tion. Despite a starting position characterized by an equal distribu-
tion (94% of the surplus was associated to workers) at the end of the
production periods the situation is completely reversed: 98% of the
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surplus goes to producers and only 2% to workers, who represent the
94% of the population.
5.3.4 Results for the case 2 : the influence of the local markets
In these further experiments, the role of local markets has been tested. 9
producers and 144 workers have been considered. In the following table the
results are summarised:
Research questions Homogeneous case Heterogeneous case
Convergence towards production prices yes yes
Convergence towards uniform profit rates no no
Convergence towards uniform wage rates yes yes
Percentage of surplus to producers 98 98
Percentage of surplus to workers 2 2
Table 5.2: Results of the experiments: considering local markets and a total pop-
ulation of 153 ARAs (144 workers and 9 producers) for the two cases with homogeneous
or heterogeneous ARAs. Remember that at the beginning of the production periods the
94% of the surplus was associated to workers.
The presence of local markets does not change the conclusions reached
in the previous case. Producers of the same commodity converge towards
the same prices and the same profit rates only in the homogeneous case.
The values reached in each local market in the homogeneous case are the
same with respect to the homogeneous case with only 3 producers. Indeed,
all producers of the same commodity converge towards the same profit rate
while workers converge towards an uniform wage rate. This is not surprising
because the initial conditions and parameters are the same and ARAs are
all homogeneous. The heterogeneous case is instead different with respect to
the case with only 3 producers. This because now ARAs are heterogeneous
and different workers can migrate in the neighbouring enterprises in time
along all the lattice. Moreover, producers of the same commodity are now
different and can take different decisions. This competition process in the
labour market is the mechanism that allows to reach an uniform wage rate
also in the heterogeneous case but the profit rates are now different among
producers of the same commodity (i.e., inside the same industry). Also
in this experiment workers represent the 94% of the population and it is
interesting to note that also in these experiments the competition process
brings to an unequal distribution.
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5.3.5 The dynamics towards convergence
It has been said previously that when the economy converges towards an
equilibrium position, this implies that debt and credit positions tend to
zero and market prices are equal to production prices. This implies that
profit rates converge towards positive values (or values equal to zero). This
convergence is clear in the figure 5.2, where the dynamics of financial wealth
positions of all ARAs and the dynamics of the profit rates in the last 200
periods have been reported. The convergence towards positive profit rates
implies that ARA producers need no more to underwrite IOUs and the
financial wealth accumulated can converge towards zero in time. Despite
this convergence, it is interesting to note how profit rates are non-uniform.
In the figure 5.1 the wage-profit curves that correspond to all the com-
bination of the profit rate and the wage rate for which the profit rate is
maximum for each enterprise are reported. Because the unique method at
disposal is the same of Sraffa’s page 19 of PCMC the curves are equal to the
ones reported in Zambelli (2016, p.20), but here we are able to add also the
profit rates and wages rates of convergence. The profit rates of convergence
are the same reported in figure 5.2 where instead also the path of convergence
for the last 200 periods is reported. Obviously these profit rates of conver-
gence are lower than their wage-profit curves (see figure 5.1). As already
noted, profit rates are non-uniform as in the case with only 3 producers (see
table 5.1). In this case, with 9 local markets and heterogeneous ARAs, it
is possible to note that neither the producers of the same commodity have
converged towards the same profit rate despite the wage rates are uniform
for all the 9 enterprises. Wage rates are uniform thanks to the competition
process promoted by the migration of workers but a similar process has not
been able to bring profit rates to uniformity (neither for the case of homoge-
nous ARA). This seems to sustain the proposition of Zambelli (2016) who
has questioned the relevance of the assumption that sees the uniform profit
rate as a natural long run point of convergence determined by market forces
in a free competition environment. Remember that the idea according to
which the uniform profit rate is a natural long run point of convergence has
been developed after Sraffa (see Kurz and Salvadori, 2005) and it is ques-
tionable the idea that Sraffa considered the uniform profit rate something
more that an assumption (see on this point Zambelli, 2016, pp.3-4). Finally,
it is interesting to note how different is the distribution of convergence with
respect to the initial equilibrium position where distribution was equal (see
also the results from the table 5.2).
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Figure 5.1: Maximum enterprise profit rate as a function of the share of the
surplus to workers. Heterogeneous ARAs case with 9 local markets: in the
figure, the wage-profit curves (in colour red (coal), green (wheat) and blue (iron)) that
correspond to all the combination of the profit rate and the wage rate for which the profit
rate is maximum for each enterprise are reported. When, for example, a share of the
surplus equal to zero is associated to the workers of the iron enterprise, so that the profit
rate of the iron enterprise is maximum, the profit rates of the wheat and coal industry
are equal to zero. The other points of the curve can be uniquely determined. The lowest
curve is the wage-profit curve with uniform profit rates. The points are the profit rates
and the wage rates of convergence. The point on the uniform wage-profit curve is the
initial equilibrium. It is interesting to note how the system converges towards uniform
wage rates but non-uniform profit rates.
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Figure 5.2: The dynamics of wealth of each ARA and the dynamics of the
profit rate for the case of heterogeneous ARAs and 9 local markets: in the first
figure the dynamics of wealth in the last 200 periods are reported. Each line represents
the wealth of a single ARA (worker or producer, in total 153 ARAs). When convergence
is reached wealth approaches to zero for all ARAs. This because prices and wages reach
particular levels that allow all ARAs to earn a positive income. In the figure at the
bottom the dynamics of the profit rates in the last 200 periods are represented. Before
convergence, profit rates can be negative. The accumulation of losses explains the negative
wealth of the upper figure. If convergence prices and wages do not change anymore and
also profit rates converge towards positive values, market prices correspond to production
prices. The colour of the line that corresponds to the profit rate of a particular producer
allows to make a comparison with figure 5.1. Indeed, in the figure the profit rates of all
producers of coal in red, of wheat in green and of iron in blue are reported. It can be
noted that the converge points are the same of figure 5.1.
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5.4 Relationship between preferences, prices, demand, sup-
ply and distribution
The construction of the digital economic laboratory and the subsequent
thought experiments allow to create virtual economies in which only the
characteristics of ARAs, the connected network, the trading rules and the
behavioural functions have been exogenously constructed. This means that
the relationship between demand, supply, prices and distributional variables
have not been postulated but are endogenously determined by the dynamics
of the systems. At the end of the experiment, the total quantities demanded,
the total quantities supplied, the prices and the distribution among ARAs
can be observed, so that the relationships between economic magnitudes can
be investigated.
5.4.1 The experimental setting
These relationships have been investigated considering a further generaliza-
tion of the previous experiments. Indeed, the first experiment of the case 1
(with 3 producers and homogeneous ARAs) has been identically repeated
changing only the preferences of each commodity. This means that each
parameter of the utility function has been progressively augmented on a
scale of 4 steps114 given the other parameters (that remain fixed) for a total
number of 15 experiments (3 commodities for 4 growing steps plus the initial
states). In order to generalize the results, the experiment has been repeated
4 times for 4 different initial conditions (i.e., different initial combination of
the parameters for a total number of virtual economies equal to 60).
5.4.2 The research questions
This new set of virtual economies has been analysed in order to:
• Investigate the influence of preferences on prices and surplus.
• Verify the well-known inverse relationship between prices and demand
(the negative slope of the demand function) and the direct relationship
between prices and supply (the positive slope of the supply function).
• Investigate the relationship between preferences and distribution.
114Between a minimum equal to the initial value of the parameter and a maximum close
to 1.
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5.4.3 Relationship between prices and quantities demanded and
supplied
The well-known inverse relationship between prices and demand and the di-
rect relationship between prices and supply have been investigated through
the computation of the frequencies (i.e., percentage of the times in which
the expected relation has been verified; for example, the case of the relation
between prices and demand corresponds to the percentage of the times in
which demand grows (declines) while price declines (grows)) and the esti-
mation of demand and supply elasticity using Ordinary Least Squares. In
particular, the subsequent regression model (respectively for demand dgt and
supply qgt of each good g=1,...,n n=3 at time t) has been considered:
ln(dgt) = β0 + β1ln(pgt) + vgt g = 1, ..., n (5.22)
ln(qgt) = β0 + β1ln(pgt) + ugt g = 1, ..., n (5.23)
In the subsequent table the results are reported: the frequencies, the
estimates (beta), the t Statistics and the values of R2 (all average values for
all commodities and all experiments of the cases in which the t Statistic was
significant).
Relationship frequency β1 tStat R
2
demand and prices 60 −0.26 −8.77 0.14
production and prices 50 −0.24 −8.03 0.13
Table 5.3: Results of the experiment: computation of the frequencies (i.e., percent-
age of the times in which the expected relation has been verified; for example, the case
of the relation between prices and demand corresponds to the percentage of the times in
which demand grows (declines) while price declines (grows)) and the estimation of demand
and supply elasticity using Ordinary Least Squares: in particular the average values of
the β1, the t-Statistics and the R
2 of the cases in which the β1 was significant have been
reported.
The fundamental conclusion is that:
• The inverse relation between prices and demand is verified for the
60% of the virtual economies.
• The direct relation between prices and supply is verified for the
50% of the virtual economies.
These results suggest a weak relation between prices and demand and in
particular between prices and supply. The OLS estimation, by measuring
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the intensity of these relations, seems to confirm this impression. Despite
the sign of the beta confirms a negative relation between prices and demand,
the absolute value of the elasticity of demand is less than 1 thus indicating
that demand is inelastic. Moreover, it is worth remembering that the sign
of beta was negative in the 70% of the cases while in the 15% it was not and
finally in the 15% of the cases the beta was not significant. If we consider
the case of the relation between prices and supply, the results of the OLS
estimation are surprising. Indeed, the sign of the beta is negative. This could
be justified by the fact that a rise in the price of a particularly commodity
implies that the other producers that use that commodity in their production
processes will decrease their production with probably negative effects for
the production of the commodity which price initially was grown. Despite
this, the absolute value of beta is less than 1 indicating that the supply is
substantially inelastic to price. Moreover, it is worth remembering that for
this regression the sign of beta was positive (but on average low) in the 64%
of the cases while in the 18% it was negative (and on average not so low) and
finally in the 18% of the cases the beta was not significant. R2 is very low in
both cases suggesting that prices cannot be considered the only determinant
of demand and supply.
5.4.4 The influence of preferences on prices and surplus
It has been possible to test the influence of preferences (i.e., demand) on
prices and surplus. According to a well-known economic hypothesis the
price of the preferred commodity should grow as its demand grows and also
the production of that commodity is expected to grow. According to the
results:
• The growing preference for a particular commodity implies a growing
share of the surplus composed by that commodity in the 97% of the
cases.
• The growing preference for a particular commodity implies a growing
price of that commodity in the 51% of the cases.
This seems to suggest that the composition of the social surplus is a
function of effective demand but the relation between the converged prices
and the effective demand is not so evident.
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5.4.5 The influence of preferences on distribution
A further elaboration on what determines a particular distribution, as the
one reported in the figure 5.1 needs to be considered. It could be possible
that the particular distribution reported in the figure 5.1 is determined by
the particular preference parameters associated to each ARA. In order to
verify this hypothesis, the relationship between preferences (which deter-
mines the pattern of demand) and distribution has been investigated using
the new set of experiments. In detail, all the distributional patterns as-
sociated with each combination of the preference parameters considered in
all the new 60 virtual economies have been considered. It is interesting to
note how only a small proportion of these new virtual economies has gen-
erated a pattern of distribution that is closer to the egalitarian (less than
10%). Despite this, it is worth remembering that all these particular virtual
economies, whose distributions are closer to the egalitarian, are associated
to levels of production very closed to zero. Moreover, more than 90% of
the virtual economies converge to a situation in which the share of surplus
to workers is lower than 10%. These results suggest that distribution could
be influenced not only by preferences (demand). Probably also other fac-
tors, such as the methods, can influence the distributional pattern. In this
chapter, only the methods reported by Sraffa at page 19 of PCMC have
been considered. This implies that it is better to reconsider this research
question in the next chapter, where the determinants of distribution will be
investigated considering also different methods of production.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have used digital economic laboratory in order to inves-
tigate whether a simple three sector economy with the characteristics of
Sraffa’s example in PCMC page 19 would be able to converge towards pro-
duction prices. According to the results, this Sraffian economic system is
able to converge towards production prices and uniform wage rates but this
equilibrium does not imply convergence towards uniform profit rates neither
an equal distribution of the surplus. In order to generalize the results, the
cases with homogeneous and heterogeneous ARAs and also the case with
more local markets (i.e., more producers producing the same commodity in
a ring one-dimensional lattice) have been considered. All experiments share
the same conclusions described previously.
These results sustain the proposition of Zambelli (2016) who has ques-
tioned the relevance of the assumption that sees the uniform profit rates as a
natural long run point of convergence determined by market forces in a free
competition environment. Indeed, the maximization of the surplus shares
and not the profit rate may be seen as the final object of the producers.
It is also interesting to note how a free competition environment, such as
the framework of the present experiments, has as final outcome an unequal
distribution.
The further experiments aimed to investigate the relation between prices
and quantities seems to underline how well-known economic relations (such
as the negative slope of demand function and the positive slope of supply
function) represents postulate that have not been clearly confirmed by our
experiments. In particular, the experiments seem to demonstrate that the
composition of the social surplus is a function of effective demand while the
dependence of prices on effective demand is more questionable.
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6 Experiment 2: convergence towards uniform wage
rates and non-uniform profit rates for general
cases
6.1 Introduction to experiment 2
Sraffa’s purpose in his book Production of Commodities by Means of Com-
modities (PCMC ) was primarily the determination of the prices that allow
the system to reproduce itself under the hypothesis of uniform profit rates.
What would actually happen during the market day is not discussed and
how trade takes place remains an open question.
In chapter 5 the main objective was to study whether a virtual economy
having the same production methods as in PCMC, page 19, once ARAs are
specified and trading rules are given, will converge towards Sraffian produc-
tion prices, uniform wage rates, uniform profit rates and equal distribution.
The fundamental conclusion was that the virtual system converge towards
production prices, uniform wage rate but non-uniform profit rates with an
unequal distribution.
In this chapter we check whether these results apply to a general case
without the number of Sraffa’s PCMC page 19. 10 different economies for
the case of homogeneous and heterogeneous ARAs will be considered, given
the same behavioural functions introduced in chapter 4 and used also in
chapter 5.
6.2 The experimental setting
The experimental setting considered in the present chapter is the same with
respect to the previous one. Each virtual economy, identified by its identity
code, is associated with different characteristics of the ARAs. Moreover,
one fundamental change is represented by the fact that the method is not
that used by Sraffa, but different virtual economies with different sets of
methods at disposal for the production of the 3 commodities have been
generated (but each producer has, as in Sraffa, only one method at disposal
for the production of his commodity). Moreover each producer hires at the
beginning of the first production period 18 workers that can migrate. This
would allow us to generalize the results obtained in the previous chapter.
The experimental setting considered in the present chapter is subdivided in
two main cases:
• Case 1 : is characterized by the presence of 3 producers and 54 work-
ers (both cases, with homogeneous or heterogeneous ARAs, will be
considered).
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• Case 2 : is characterized by the presence of 9 producers and 162 work-
ers (both cases, with homogeneous or heterogeneous ARAs, will be
considered). This last case implies the presence of 9 local markets as
in figure 3.4 with 3 producers producing the same commodity.
6.3 The research questions
The purpose of the present chapter is to verify if a generalization of Sraffa’s
example of a three sector economy enriched with behavioural functions in a
dynamic framework is able to converge towards an equilibrium position.
As in the previous chapter, we define an equilibrium position as a position
in which prices and wages announced do not change anymore; all markets
are in equilibrium (demand equal to supply in all markets; i.e., there is no
more rationing), migration stops, the system reproduces itself (i.e., same
level of production and surplus without residuals) without the creation of
new IOUs (no new debt and credit relations). This implies that the prices
of convergence are production prices with zero or positive profit rates.
In particular, these characteristic of the eventual equilibrium have been
analysed:
• Convergence towards uniform profit rates. Given the conver-
gence towards production prices it is possible to check convergence
towards uniform profit rates.
• Convergence towards uniform wage rates. Given the possibility
for workers to migrate where the income is the highest, if the system
converges towards a position of equilibrium, wage rates should become
uniform among all enterprises and the migration should stop.
• Convergence towards an equal distribution of the surplus.
Given the initial condition of equal distribution (95% of the surplus has
been associated to workers given that they are 54 with respect to the 3
producers for a total population of 57 ARAs)115 it is interesting to test
the type of distribution of the surplus associated with the convergence
position.
A high number of different virtual economies with homogenous (i.e.,
all ARAs producers and workers are equal) or heterogeneous ARAs (each
ARA is different with respect to the others) has been generated, in the
case with 3 and 9 local markets, in order to study the relation between
the time of convergence and the experimental setting. This allowed us to
115The same proportions also for the case with local markets. It is worth remember-
ing that the initial production prices and wages have been computed starting from this
distribution.
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collect statistics about the time of convergence and the frequency of the
eventual convergence116. Among the virtual economies able to converge, we
have selected 10 virtual economies for each experimental setting in order to
study the characteristics of convergence.
6.4 Results for the case 1
6.4.1 Convergence and time of convergence
A high number of virtual economies has been generated (i.e., with different
characteristics of the ARAs and different methods at disposal) with homoge-
nous or heterogeneous ARAs for this case 1 with only 3 producers. The time
of convergence and the percentage of virtual economies that converged are
reported in the figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Time of convergence and percentage of economies able to con-
verge before time t=1000: in the figure, in colour red (case homogeneous ARAs) and
blue (case heterogeneous ARAs), the percentages of experiments able to converge to an
equilibrium position for each point in time are reported. The total number of virtual
economies considered for each experimental setting is equal to 20. For more details see
sections 4.2 and 4.5.
116The study of the convergence has been conducted considering 20 virtual economies
for each particular experimental setting. For more details on this point see sections 4.2
and 4.5.
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As appears clear from the figure, for the case with homogenous ARAs
all experiments converge towards an equilibrium position at time 400 or
before. The presence of heterogeneous ARAs implies that 90% of the virtual
economies are able to converge before time 1000. Probably heterogeneity
represents an improvement in the complexity of the dynamics of the system.
These virtual economies that do not converge before time 1000 will be part
of further investigation (beyond this thesis) aimed at understanding whether
convergence can be achieved for more than 1000 periods or not. In the latter
case, the causes for lack of convergence should be further analysed.
6.4.2 Characteristics of the convergence
Among the experiments of the previous section, 10 virtual economies able
to converge towards production prices have been selected and analysed. In
the subsequent table are reported the results of the 10 virtual economies
(E) with 3 producers and 54 workers, with homogeneous and heterogeneous
ARAs.
Homogeneous ARAs E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
production prices yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
uniform profit rates no no no no no no no no no no
uniform wage rates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
% surplus to producers 27 39 42 47 22 55 30 23 58 26
% surplus to workers 73 61 58 53 78 45 70 77 42 74
Table 6.1: Results of the experiments: considering 10 different virtual economies
E and a total population of 57 ARAs (54 workers and 3 producers) for the case with
homogeneous ARAs.
Heterogeneous ARAs E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
production prices yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
uniform profit rates no no no no no no no no no no
uniform wage rates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
% surplus to producers 32 49 28 47 50 45 40 46 25 16
% surplus to workers 68 51 72 53 50 55 60 54 75 84
Table 6.2: Results of the experiments: considering 10 different virtual economies
E and a total population of 57 ARAs (54 workers and 3 producers) for the case with
heterogeneous ARAs.
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According to the results, the following answers to the initial research
questions have been obtained:
• The systems converge towards production prices. The virtual
systems are able to converge towards an equilibrium position stable in
time characterized by the presence of production prices, no creation
of new IOUs and positive profit rates.
• The systems DO NOT converge towards uniform profit rates.
This could be surprising for those that interpret the convergence to-
wards an uniform profit rate as the natural outcome of the competition
process between producers in time. This result should be interpreted
instead in the light of the result presented in Zambelli (2016). If the
objective of the agents is to maximize their surplus shares, there is
no reason to consider uniform profit rates as a natural outcome of the
competition process.
• The systems converge towards uniform wage rates. This im-
plies that migration stops at an equilibrium level in which there is
no more incentive to migrate. This enforces the stability of the equi-
librium position and the idea that migration is a competitive process
between workers able to bring to convergence towards the same wage
rate.
• The systems DO NOT converge towards an egalitarian dis-
tribution. Despite a starting position characterized by an equal dis-
tribution (95% of the surplus was associated to workers) at the end
of the production periods the situation is sharply different. Despite
it is true that the distributional pattern is not completely reversed as
in the previous chapter where were used Sraffa’s numbers, we observe
anyway a departure from the equal distribution.
It is interesting to note how the difference between homogenous or het-
erogeneous ARAs does not change the conclusions that are common to both
cases.
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6.5 Results for the case 2 : the influence of the local markets
6.5.1 Convergence and time of convergence
In these further experiments, the role of local markets has been tested. 9
producers and 162 total workers have been considered. We have generated
a high number of virtual economies (i.e., with different characteristics of the
ARAs and different methods at disposal) with homogenous or heterogeneous
ARAs. The time of convergence and the percentage of virtual economies that
converged are reported in the figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Time of convergence and percentage of economies able to con-
verge before time t=1000: in the figure, in colour red (case homogeneous ARAs) and
blue (case heterogeneous ARAs), the percentages of experiments able to converge to an
equilibrium position for each point in time are reported. The total number of virtual
economies considered for each experimental setting is equal to 20. For more details on
this point see sections 4.2 and 4.5.
As the figure clearly shows, for the case with homogenous ARAs all
virtual economies converge towards an equilibrium position at time 400 or
before. The presence of heterogeneous ARAs implies that 90% of the exper-
iments are able to converge before period 1000 and time of converge is even
closer to 1000. These virtual economies will be part of further investigation
(beyond this thesis) aimed at understanding whether convergence can be
achieved for more than 1000 periods or not. In the latter case, the causes
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for lack of convergence should be further analysed.
6.5.2 Characteristics of the convergence
Among the experiments of the previous section, 10 virtual economies able
to converge towards production prices have been selected and analysed. In
the subsequent table, the results of the 10 virtual economies (E) with 9 pro-
ducers and 162 workers are reported, with homogeneous and heterogeneous
ARAs.
Homogeneous ARAs E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
production prices yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
uniform profit rates no no no no no no no no no no
uniform wage rates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
% surplus to producers 27 39 23 13 26 27 26 37 47 19
% surplus to workers 73 61 77 87 74 73 74 63 53 81
Table 6.3: Results of the experiments: considering 10 different virtual economies
E and a total population of 171 ARAs (162 workers and 9 producers) for the case with
homogeneous ARAs.
Heterogeneous ARAs E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
production prices yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
uniform profit rates no no no no no no no no no no
uniform wage rates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
% surplus to producers 37 33 21 35 32 48 36 21 39 37
% surplus to workers 63 67 79 65 68 52 64 79 61 63
Table 6.4: Results of the experiments: considering 10 different virtual economies
E and a total population of 171 ARAs (162 workers and 9 producers) for the case with
heterogeneous ARAs.
According to the results, the presence of local markets does not change
the conclusions reached in the previous case. Producers of the same com-
modity converge towards the same prices and the same profit rates only in
the homogeneous case. In particular, experiments E1 and E2 have also the
same initial conditions and parameters with respect to experiments E1 and
E2 with only 3 producers. It is interesting to note that they reach exactly
the same results, so that the global dynamics is equal to the local dynamics
in these virtual economies. For the case of heterogeneous ARAs the global
and the local dynamics change. Indeed, only wages converge towards the
same value in all local markets. This is because ARAs are heterogeneous and
producers of the same commodity can take different decisions while workers
can migrate in the neighbouring enterprises and in time this implies that
workers can migrate along all the network. This competition process in the
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labour market is the mechanism that allows to reach a uniform wage rate
while profit rates are non-uniform.
6.5.3 The dynamics towards convergence
It has been said previously that when the virtual economy converges towards
an equilibrium position, this implies that debt and credit positions tends to
zero and market prices are equal to production prices. This implies that
profit rates converge towards positive values (or values equal to zero). This
convergence is clear in the figure 6.4, where the dynamics of financial wealth
positions of all ARAs and the dynamics of the profit rates in the last 200
periods have been reported. The convergence towards positive profit rates
implies that ARA producers need no more to underwrite IOUs and the
financial wealth accumulated can converge towards zero in time. Despite
this convergence, it is interesting to note how profit rates are non-uniform.
In the figure 6.3 the wage-profit curves that correspond to all the com-
bination of the profit rate and the wage rate for which the profit rate is
maximum for each enterprise are reported. We have added also the profit
rates and wages rates of convergence. The profit rates of convergence are
the same reported in figure 6.4 where instead also the path of convergence
for the last 200 periods is reported. Obviously these profit rates of conver-
gence are lower than their wage-profit curves (see figure 6.3). As already
noted, profit rates are non-uniform as in the case with only 3 producers (see
table 6.2). In this case, with 9 local markets and heterogeneous ARAs, it
is possible to note that neither the producers of the same commodity have
converged towards the same profit rates despite the wage rates are uniform
for all the 9 enterprises. Wage rates are uniform thanks to the competition
process promoted by the migration of workers but a similar process has not
been able to bring profit rates to uniformity (neither for the case of ho-
mogenous ARA). This seems to sustain the proposition of Zambelli (2016)
who has questioned the relevance of the assumption that sees the uniform
profit rate as a natural long run point of convergence determined by market
forces in a free competition environment. Finally, it is interesting to note
that the distribution of convergence is unequal (see also the results from the
table 6.4). Remember that in the initial equilibrium position distribution
was equal. These results confirm those obtained in the previous chapter
where the methods of Sraffa’s example at page 19 of PCMC were consid-
ered. This seems to indicate that these properties of the convergence (i.e.,
convergence towards uniform wage rates but non-uniform profit rates with
unequal distribution) do not depend on the particular method considered
(e.g., the methods used by Sraffa at page 19 of PCMC ) but, probably, they
reveal some fundamental properties of our virtual economies.
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Figure 6.3: Maximum enterprise profit rate as a function of the share of the
surplus to workers. Virtual economy E10 with heterogeneous ARAs and 9
local markets: in the figure, the wage-profit curves (in colour red (coal), green (wheat)
and blue (iron)) that correspond to all the combination of the profit rate and the wage rate
for which the profit rate is maximum for each enterprise are reported. When, for example,
a share of the surplus equal to zero is associated to the workers of the iron enterprise, so
that the profit rate of the iron enterprise is maximum, the profit rates of the wheat and
coal industry are equal to zero. The other points of the curve can be uniquely determined.
The lowest curve is the wage-profit curve with uniform profit rates. The points are the
profit rates and the wage rates of convergence. The point on the uniform wage-profit
curve is the initial equilibrium. It is interesting to note how the system converges towards
uniform wage rates but non-uniform profit rates.
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Figure 6.4: The dynamics of wealth of each ARA and the dynamics of the
profit rate for the virtual economy E10 with heterogeneous ARAs and 9 local
markets: in the first figure, the dynamics of wealth in the last 200 periods are reported.
Each line represents the wealth of a single ARA (worker or producer, in total 171 ARAs).
When convergence is reached wealth approaches to zero for all ARAs. This because prices
and wages reach particular levels that allow all ARAs to earn a positive income. In the
figure at the bottom, the dynamics of the profit rates in the last 200 periods is represented.
Before convergence, profit rates can be negative. The accumulation of losses is at the base
of the negative wealth of the upper figure. If convergence prices and wages do not change
anymore and also profit rates converge towards positive values, market prices correspond
to production prices. The color of the line that corresponds to the profit rate of a particular
producer allows to make a comparison with figure 6.3. Indeed, in the figure the profit rates
of all producers of coal in red, of wheat in green and of iron in blue are reported. It can
be noted that the converge points are the same of figure 6.3.
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6.6 Robustness checks: some notes
All the different virtual economies considered in this chapter are identified by
an unique identity code. Each identity code is associated to different charac-
teristics of the ARAs and a different technological sets, so that each virtual
economy is associated to an unique set of initial conditions and parameters.
This heterogeneity in the initial conditions and parameters represents the
principal attempt to provide a robustness check to our thought experiment.
Despite this, it is interesting to test also the effect of a particular type of
perturbation, i.e., a number of workers and producers which is not a power
of 3. One single experimental setting for this robustness check was consid-
ered sufficient: with 6 producers and 11 workers (that can migrate) for each
enterprise at the beginning of the production periods. The experiment has
been repeated for the case with homogenous and heterogeneous ARAs. The
results do not change at all the answers to our initial research questions.
6.7 The role of the methods and the pattern of distribution
With the purpose to develop the interesting results obtained in the section
5.4.5 of the present thesis, here the effect of a variation in the preference
parameters for two particular types of virtual economies characterized by
extremely different technological sets is tested. It is worth remembering
that all the virtual economies generated in these chapters have different
technological sets but in this section we consider only extreme methods, i.e.,
very labour-intensive or capital-intensive methods. The different methods
used in the previous experiments considered, instead, balanced combinations
of labour and commodities for production.
6.7.1 Experimental setting
The experimental setting of this section is the same for both the types of
virtual economies: heterogeneous ARAs with 3 producers and 54 workers.
In detail, the two types of virtual economies can be described in the following
way:
• Economy1 : uses labour-intensive methods (high use of labour with
respect to commodities).
• Economy2 : uses capital-intensive methods (low use of labour with
respect to commodities).
For each type of virtual economy (Economy1 and Economy2 ), the effect
on distribution of a variation in the preference parameters has been tested.
Each parameter of the utility function has been progressively augmented
on a scale of 4 steps: between a minimum equal to the initial value of the
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parameter and a maximum close to 1 (given the other parameters, that
remain fixed) for a total number of 15 different experiments (3 commodities
for 4 growing steps plus the initial states) for each type of economy (in total
30 different virtual economies).
6.7.2 The results
In the figures 6.5 and 6.6 all the wage-profit curves that correspond to all
the combination of the profit rate and the wage rate for which the profit
rate is maximum for each enterprise are plotted. We have added also the
profit rates and wages rates of convergence of all the experiments (15 for
each type of virtual economy). The results seem to suggest that the type of
method is extremely important for the determination of the distributional
pattern. Indeed, only with labour-intensive methods a change in preferences
can play a role in the determination of the distributional pattern, while
with capital-intensive methods seem to prevent the distribution to become
equal, despite the changes in the preference parameters (demand). This
is an interesting result because it seems to suggest that capital-intensive
methods (that typically are driven by technological progress) can have very
dramatic effects on distribution equality. Despite this, this conclusion and
its theoretical implications have to be taken with extreme care. Indeed,
further research, able to consider different behavioural functions, needs to
be conducted in order to understand the dynamics and the causes of this
phenomenon117.
117See section 9.2 for more details on this point.
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Figure 6.5: Economy1 : labour-intensive methods. Maximum enterprise profit rate
as a function of the share of the surplus to workers. How distribution changes according
to preferences.
Figure 6.6: Economy2 : capital-intensive methods. Maximum enterprise profit rate




The purpose of the present chapter was to generalize the conclusion of exper-
iment 1 by considering the presence of 10 different virtual economies with
different methods with respect to Sraffa’s example in PCMC page 19.
The fundamental conclusion of the present chapter is that the most im-
portant findings of experiment 1 have been confirmed also in the general
case characterized by the presence of 10 different virtual economies with
different characteristics of the ARA and different methods.
Indeed, according to the results, despite all the virtual economies se-
lected are able to converge towards production prices and uniform wage
rates, these equilibrium positions do not imply convergence towards uni-
form profit rates neither a convergence towards an equal distribution of the
surplus. Moreover, the cases with homogeneous, heterogeneous ARAs and
also the case with 9 local markets (i.e., more producers producing the same
commodity in a ring one-dimensional lattice) have been considered. These
further experiments have not changed the conclusions.
This seems to indicate that these properties of the convergence (i.e.,
convergence towards uniform wage rate but non uniform profit rate with
unequal distribution) do not depend on the particular method considered
(e.g., the methods used by Sraffa at page 19 of PCMC ) but, probably, they
reveal some fundamental properties of our virtual economies.
Other interesting results, that deserve further research, have emerged.
In general not all virtual economies are able to converge before time t=1000.
For the case with heterogeneous ARA (with 3 or 9 producers) only 90% of
the virtual economies are able to converge. Moreover, the distributional
pattern seems to be influenced by the technology (labour-intensive methods
or capital-intensive methods).
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7 Experiment 3: convergence towards the wage-
profit frontier and the role of technological in-
novation
7.1 Introduction to experiment 3
The digital economic laboratory introduced in chapter 3 represents an at-
tempt to consider the functioning of the market inside Sraffian schemes. In
the experiments of the previous chapters were considered the set of methods
used by Sraffa in the example given at page 19 of PCMC (chapter 5), then
the result has been generalized considering 10 different virtual economies
with different methods with respect to those of Sraffa’s example (chapter
6). The cases with homogeneous, heterogeneous ARAs and also the case
with 9 local markets have been considered in both previous chapters.
The fundamental conclusion was that the virtual economies converge
towards production prices, uniform wage rates but non-uniform profit rates
with an unequal distribution of the surplus.
In this chapter we check whether these results are confirmed in virtual
economies where producers have the possibility to choose among a set of al-
ternative methods for the production of their commodity. 10 different virtual
economies for the case of homogeneous and heterogeneous ARAs and with 3
or 9 local markets will be considered, given the same behavioural functions
of chapter 4. In addition, the efficiency of the virtual economies will also
be studied; i.e., if the ARA producers are able to adopt the most efficient
method. The indexes that allows to measure efficiency will be computed
starting from the construction of the wage-profit frontier.
Moreover, the role of innovation will be considered. For the case with 9
local markets and homogeneous ARAs, once convergence has been reached,
one producer posed in the centre of the lattice (producer 5 will be chosen)
will start to have access to a new and more efficient production method
with respect to the others. This means that the new frontier that can be
computed with the new method dominates (in one interval or on the whole
domain, both cases will be considered) the initial one. The purpose of the
experiment is to check whether producer 5 will be able to adopt or not the
new method (i.e., lock-in phenomena). Before to introduce the experimental
setting of the present chapter, a brief introduction about the role of the
wage-profit frontier is needed.
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7.2 The wage-profit frontier
The presence of more methods of production allows each producer to choose
the method that allows him to maximize the expected profit. The con-
vergence towards technological efficiency (i.e., the convergence towards the
most efficient method of production) is a possible outcome of the simula-
tion. Indeed, the dynamics of prices, wages and the consumers’ choices can
prevent from adopting the best method at disposal. The presence of lo-
cal markets, with more producers producing the same commodity, allows
to make a comparison between the technological efficiency of different local
markets. If the global behaviour is equal to the local behaviour, the meth-
ods adopted should be the same for all the producers producing the same
commodity (i.e., all the producers of the same industry).
In order to check whether in our virtual economies the convergence to-
wards the same method of production is realized and the chosen methods
are the most efficient (in the sense of being methods belonging to the wage-
profit frontier), some measures of technological efficiency are needed. These
measures are based on the construction of the wage-profit frontier.
Consider for example the case of 9 producers organized in 9 different
local markets (as in figure 3.4). Each producer i (i=1,...,k in this case k=9)
produces only one commodity g (for g=1,...,n with n=3) through the use of
the labour force and the commodities offered inside his local market (with
inside each local market n producers ī for ī=1,...,n). In each local market,
the technological input requirements in terms of commodities and labour are
represented by the matrices A and L, while the relative level of the possible
output is represented by the matrix B. In particular118 consider A and B
square matrices of order n: A=[aīg] and B=[bīg], with ī,g=1,...,n. A=[aīg]
is the matrix of the means of production (semi-positive and indecompos-
able), where aīg is the quantity of the commodity g means of production of
the producer (enterprise) ī. B=[bīg] is the production matrix (diagonal and
semipositive definite), where bīg is the quantity of the commodity g pro-
duced by the producer ī. Each producer ī produces only one commodity g,
which is means of production for the other neighbouring producers. L=[l̄i]
is the labour vector and l̄i indicates the amount of labour required by the
producer ī. It is supposed that each producer has at disposal mg different
alternative methods zg for the production of his commodity g (zg=1,...,mg).
These alternative methods, for all the commodities, are organized in an
input-output multidimensional matrix T , which is supposed to be known by
all the producers of the whole virtual economy and equal for each production
period t:
118See chapter 3 for the matrix notation and for more details about technology and the
mechanism of the choice of the techniques.
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T (1 : n, 1 : (n+ 2), 1 : mg) =




























The collection of the methods of the matrix T that allows to product the
same commodity are organized inside the matrix Φ119. For the production
of his commodity, each producer has to choose the method φ∗ which allows
him to maximize the expected profit given the market prices and the wage
inside his local market. Each production period, the producers of each local
market will choose a particular combination of methods that will compose
the matrix A∗, L∗ and B∗ of their local market. The production of each local
market can be described with the simultaneous equation system (considering
also the equation of the numéraire nTp=1).
A∗p(1 + r) + L∗w = B∗p (7.4)
Denoting by p the production prices that can be computed with the hy-
pothesis of uniform profit rate r and uniform wage rate w, it is possible to
exploit the information embedded into the input-output matrices through
the computation of the wage-profit curve (i.e., all the possible combination
of the distributional parameters which generates the production prices).
w = (n(B∗ − A∗(1 + r)))−1L∗))−1 (7.5)
Remember that the production prices are here considered exclusively in or-
der to construct the wage-profit curve. In the virtual economy, market prices
can be different from production prices and the objective of the construc-
tion of the wage-profit curve is exactly the comparison between the actual
119In detail the structure of the matrix Φ is the following:
Φ(1 : mg, 1 : (n+ 2), g) =











































market prices and the production prices that are associated to the methods
of production chosen by the producers in each local market at the end of
the production periods and that compose the final matrices A∗, L∗ and B∗.
It is worth remembering that the number of the wage-profit curves must be
equal to the number of local markets (see for example the blue lines of figure
7.1). Obviously, if all the local markets converge to the same methods of
production, all the wage-profit curves will be the same.
Considering that each producer has at disposal mg different alternative
methods for the production of his commodity, there are m3g possible al-
ternative configurations of the matrix A∗, L∗ and B∗. In the experiments
considered in this chapter, each producer has at disposal mg=10 different
technological combinations for the production of his commodity (in other
words, each row of the matrix A∗, L∗ and B∗ can be substituted with other 9
alternatives), so that the total number of possible wage profit curves is equal
to 103, which is exactly the number of possible combinations of the methods.
Considering the whole economy, different producers of the same commodity
g can use different methods of the matrix Φ(1 : mg, 1 : (n+2), g) or converge
to the same method between the mg at disposal for each commodity.
Each wage-profit curve represents all the possible combination of the
profit rate and the wage rate given a particular combination of the methods.
If another combination implies for the same value of the wage rate a higher
level of the profit rate (or the contrary), this combination is considered
more efficient. As a consequence, if we consider all the different wage-profit
curves relative to all the possible combinations of the methods, the outer
envelope computed from all the possible wage-profit curves is a piecewise-
nonlinear function representing the wage-profit frontier : the most productive
and efficient system of methods (see for an example figure 7.1)120.
The wage-profit frontier represents the potential technological efficiency
of a particular virtual economy and it has been used as a robust benchmark
against which to compare each wage-profit curve generated by the single lo-
cal market. A brute force algorithm exists and it allows the computation of
the wage-profit frontier but it becames computationally intractable for sets
of methods with high cardinality. In this case, a more efficient algorithm can
be applied, the FVZ-algorithm (presented by Zambelli et al. (2014)), which
allows to reduce drastically the computational time for the exploitation of
the wage-profit frontier. The wage-profit frontier and the wage-profit curves
calculated for each local market (with k=9 the wage-profit curves are equal
to 9 as in the figure 7.1) represent a benchmark that allows not only to check
120It is worth remembering that different wage-profit curves can be compared indepen-
dently of the cardinality of their productive systems. Moreover the wage rate and the
production prices are not dependent on the activity level thanks to the non-substitution
theorem. Always thanks to this theorem wage-profit curves and wage-profit frontiers are
scale independent. More details on these aspects are present in Zambelli et al. (2014). In
the same paper, there is an example of a frontier computed starting from empirical data.
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Figure 7.1: The wage-profit frontier and the wage-profit curves: The wage profit
frontier (red line) as the envelope of all the wage-profit curves (green lines). The total
number of the wage profit curves of the virtual economy considered in this example is
53 (125 wage-profit curves). The blue lines represent the wage-profit curves to which the
9 local markets converge at the end of the production periods. It is possible to note
that in this case there is no convergence towards the same method of production (there
are 9 different blue lines) and only 1 local market has been able to choose an efficient
combination of the methods of production (i.e., only one blue line is on the wage-profit
frontier).
whether the convergence towards the same method of production is realized
(this is obtained if all the wage-profit curves of the local markets are the
same121) or whether the chosen methods are the most efficient (this is ob-
tained if the wage-profit curves of the local markets touch the frontier), but
allows also to check whether for each local market, the market prices have
121Remember that if each producer of the same commodity chooses a different method
for the production of his commodity, there will be (in the case of k=9 producers) 9
different wage-profit curves. If all the producers of only one commodity (for example
iron) in all local markets converge towards the same method of production there will be 6
different wage-profit curves. If all the producers of two different commodities (for example
iron and wheat) in all local markets converge respectively towards the same method of
production there will be 3 different wage-profit curves. Finally, if all the producers of
all the commodities, for each commodity (for example coal, wheat and iron) in all local
markets converge respectively towards the same method of production there will be one
single wage-profit curve.
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converged towards the production prices associated to the methods chosen
by the producers and that compose the wage-profit curve. It is worth remem-
bering that in the previous chapter, with one single method, the wage-profit
curve coincided with the wage-profit frontier. The wage-profit curve has
been used in the previous experiments in order to check if the virtual econ-
omy converged towards uniform profit rates and wage rates. Obviously, with
one single method, it was not possible to investigate technological efficiency.
7.3 The experimental setting
The experimental setting considered in the present chapter coincides with
the experiments of the previous chapter. Each virtual economy, identified
by its identity code, is associated to different characteristics of the ARAs.
The fundamental change is represented by the fact that now each producer
has at disposal 10 methods for the production of his commodity. This would
allow us to generalize the results obtained in the previous chapters and to
investigate technological efficiency. The experimental setting considered in
the present chapter is subdivided in two main cases:
• Case 1 : is characterized by the presence of 3 producers and 54 work-
ers (both cases, with homogeneous or heterogeneous ARAs, will be
considered).
• Case 2 : is characterized by the presence of 9 producers and 162 work-
ers (both cases, with homogeneous or heterogeneous ARAs, will be
considered). This last case implies the presence of 9 local markets as
in figure 3.4 with 3 producers producing the same commodity.
7.4 Research questions
The purpose of the present chapter is to verify if a generalization of the
Sraffa’s example of a three sector economy enriched with behavioural func-
tions in a dynamical framework with the possibility to choose among a set
of methods is able to converge towards an equilibrium position, and if this
equilibrium is efficient from a technological point of view.
We define an equilibrium position as a position in which prices and wages
announced do not change anymore; all markets are in equilibrium (demand
equal to supply in all markets; i.e., there is no more rationing), migration
stops, the system reproduce itself (i.e., same level of production and surplus
without residuals) without the creation of new IOUs (no new debt and credit
relations). This implies that the prices of convergence are production prices
with zero or positive profit rates.
In particular, these characteristic of the eventual equilibrium have been
analysed:
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• Convergence towards uniform profit rates. Given the conver-
gence towards production prices it is possible to check convergence
towards uniform profit rates.
• Convergence towards uniform wage rates. Given the possibility
for workers to migrate where the income is the highest, if the system
converges towards a position of equilibrium, wage rates should become
uniform among all enterprises and the migration should stop.
• Convergence towards an equal distribution. Given the initial
condition of equal distribution (95% of the surplus has been associated
to workers given that they are 54 with respect to the 3 producers for
a total population of 57 ARAs)122 it is interesting to test the type of
distribution of the surplus associated with the convergence position.
The convergence towards an equilibrium position does not imply the
convergence towards the technological efficiency. With respect to the
previous experiments, it will be considered also:
• Convergence in methods. This type of efficiency refers to the vir-
tual economies with more local markets. The convergence in methods
is measured by the index CONV and indicates whether the producers
of the same commodity have chosen the same method of production.
• Convergence towards the wage-profit frontier . The convergence
towards the wage-profit frontier corresponds to the case in which all
the producers of the same local market have chosen the most efficient
method of production so that their wage-profit curve is part of the
wage-profit frontier. It is measured by the index EFF.
• Stability of the methods chosen. The technological efficiency
should be stable in time in order to talk about convergence towards
the technological efficiency. Indeed, there could be cases in which the
virtual economy is on the frontier cyclically or occasionally. These
cases do not represent a convergence towards the technological effi-
ciency. The convergence towards technological efficiency is measured
by the index TechStab.
The meaning of these indexes has been described in details in the table
7.1.
122The same proportions also for the case with 9 local markets. It is worth remember-
ing that the initial production prices and wages have been computed starting from this
distribution.
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CONV This index measures for how many commodities it is ver-
ified the convergence towards the same method of pro-
duction, i.e., producers of different local markets produc-
ing the same commodity converge to the same method
of production. If all producers of the same commodity
use different methods CONV=0. If all the producers of
one commodity in all local markets converge to the same
method CONV=1, if all the producers of two commodi-
ties converge respectively to the same method CONV=2.
Finally, if all the producers of the 3 commodities converge
respectively to the same method CONV=3.
EFF This index measures the number of the wage-profit curves
of the local markets on the frontier. This index can as-
sume values from 0 (no one local market catchs up the
frontier) to k (all the local markets catch up the fron-
tier).
TechStab This index measures the number of producers who have
never changed the method of production in the last 10
production periods. This index indicates the stability of
the choice of the methods. It can assume values from 0
(all the producer have changed their method of produc-
tion at least one time in the last 10 production periods)
to k (no one producer has changed his method of produc-
tion in the last 10 production periods). A value of the
index equal to k indicates a perfect stability in the choice
of the methods.
Table 7.1: Description of the efficiency indexes: in the present chapter the exper-
iments consider the presence of 3 and 9 ARA producers so that k=3 and k=9.
.
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7.5 Results for the case 1
7.5.1 Convergence and time of convergence
A high number of virtual economies has been generated (i.e., with different
characteristics of the ARAs and different methods at disposal) with homoge-
nous or heterogeneous ARAs for this case 1 with only 3 producers. The time
of convergence and the percentage of virtual economies that converged are
reported in figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Time of convergence and percentage of economies able to con-
verge before time t=1000: in colour red (case homogeneous ARAs) and blue (case
heterogeneous ARAs), the percentages of experiments able to converge to an equilibrium
position for each point in time are reported in the figure. The total number of virtual
economies considered for each experimental setting is equal to 20. For more details on
this point see sections 4.2 and 4.5.
As it clearly appears from the figure, for the case with homogenous ARAs
all experiments converge towards an equilibrium position before time 400.
The presence of heterogeneous ARAs implies that only 90% of the experi-
ments are able to converge before time 1000. These virtual economies will
be part of further investigations (beyond this thesis) aimed at understanding
whether convergence can be achieved for more than 1000 periods or not. In
the latter case, the causes for lack of convergence should be further analysed.
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7.5.2 Characteristics of the convergence
Among the experiments of the previous section, 10 virtual economies able to
converge towards production prices have been selected and analysed. In the
following tables, the results of the 10 virtual economies (E) with 3 producers
and 54 workers are reported, with homogeneous and heterogeneous ARAs.
Homogeneous ARAs E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
production prices yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
uniform profit rates no no no no no no no no no no
uniform wage rates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
% surplus to producers 35 39 22 39 56 19 30 33 21 33
% surplus to workers 65 61 78 61 44 81 70 67 79 67
EFF 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
TechStab 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table 7.2: Results of the experiments: considering 10 different virtual economies
E and a total population of 57 ARAs (54 workers and 3 producers) for the case with
homogeneous ARAs.
Heterogeneous ARAs E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
production prices yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
uniform profit rates no no no no no no no no no no
uniform wage rates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
% surplus to producers 29 21 30 42 37 43 28 35 26 31
% surplus to workers 71 79 70 58 63 57 72 65 74 69
EFF 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
TechStab 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table 7.3: Results of the experiments: considering 10 different virtual economies
E and a total population of 57 ARAs (54 workers and 3 producers) for the case with
heterogeneous ARAs.
According to the results of the experiments it has been obtained these
answers to the initial research questions:
• The systems converge towards production prices. The virtual
systems are able to converge towards an equilibrium position stable in
time characterized by the presence of production prices, no creation
of new IOUs and positive profit rates.
• The systems DO NOT converge towards uniform profit rates.
This could be surprising for those that interpret the convergence to-
wards an uniform profit rate as the natural outcome of the competition
process between producers in time. This result should be interpreted
instead in the light of the results presented in Zambelli (2016). If the
objective of economic agents is to maximize their surplus share there
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is no reason to consider the uniform profit rate as a natural outcome
of the competition process.
• The systems converge towards uniform wage rates. This im-
plies that migration stops at an equilibrium level in which there is
no more incentive to migrate. This enforces the stability of the equi-
librium position and the idea that migration is a competitive process
between workers able to bring to convergence towards the same wage
rate.
• The systems DO NOT converge towards an equal distribu-
tion. Despite a starting position characterized by an equal distribu-
tion (95% of the surplus was associated to workers) at the end of the
production periods the convergence is towards an unequal distribution.
• The systems ARE EFFICIENT. According to the efficiency in-
dexes the virtual systems converge towards the wage-profit frontier.
This convergence is stable.
It is interesting to note how the difference between homogenous or het-
erogeneous ARAs does not change the conclusions that are common to both
cases.
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7.6 Results for the case 2 : the influence of the local markets
7.6.1 Convergence and time of convergence
In these further experiments, the role of local markets has been tested. 9
producers and 162 workers have been considered. A high number of vir-
tual economies (i.e., with different characteristics of the ARAs and different
methods at disposal) with homogenous or heterogeneous ARAs (i.e., 9 local
markets) has been generated. The time of convergence and the percentages
of virtual economies that converged are reported in the figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: Time of convergence and percentage of economies able to con-
verge before time t=1000: in the figure, in colour red (case homogeneous ARAs) and
blue (case heterogeneous ARAs), the percentages of experiments able to converge to an
equilibrium position for each point in time are reported. The total number of virtual
economies considered for each experimental setting is equal to 20. For more details on
this point see sections 4.2 and 4.5.
As the figure clearly shows, for the case with homogenous ARAs all
experiments converge towards an equilibrium at time 400 or before. The
presence of heterogeneous ARAs implies that less than 90% of the exper-
iments are able to converge before time 1000. These experiments will be
part of further investigations (beyond this thesis) aimed at understanding
whether convergence can be achieved for more than 1000 periods or not. In
the latter case, the causes for lack of convergence should be further analysed.
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7.6.2 Characteristics of the convergence
Among the experiments of the previous section, 10 virtual economies able to
converge towards production prices have been selected and analysed. The
results of the 10 virtual economies with 9 producers and 162 workers, with
homogeneous and heterogeneous ARAs, are reported in the following tables.
Homogeneous ARAs E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
production prices yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
uniform profit rates no no no no no no no no no no
uniform wage rates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
% surplus to producers 35 39 40 24 40 23 24 26 29 21
% surplus to workers 65 61 60 76 60 77 76 74 71 79
CONV 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
EFF 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
TechStab 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Table 7.4: Results of the experiments: considering 10 different virtual economies
E and a total population of 171 ARAs (162 workers and 9 producers) for the case with
homogeneous ARAs.
Heterogeneous ARAs E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
production prices yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
uniform profit rates no no no no no no no no no no
uniform wage rates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
% surplus to producers 33 21 33 32 50 29 30 28 40 32
% surplus to workers 67 79 67 68 50 71 70 72 60 68
CONV 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
EFF 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
TechStab 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Table 7.5: Results of the experiments: considering 10 different virtual economies
E and a total population of 171 ARAs (162 workers and 9 producers) for the case with
heterogeneous ARAs.
The presence of 9 local markets does not change the conclusions reached
in previous experiments. It is interesting to note that for homogeneous
ARAs all local markets are equal. In particular, experiments E1 and E2
have also the same intial condition and parameters with respect to experi-
ments E1 and E2 with only 3 producers. It is interesting to note that they
reach exactly the same results, so that the global dynamics is equal to the
local dynamics. For the case of heterogeneous ARAs the global and the local
dynamics change. Indeed, only wage rates converge towards the same value
in all local markets. This because workers can migrate in the neighbouring
enterprises and in time this implies that workers can migrate along all the
network. This competition process in the labour market is the mechanism
that allows to reach an uniform wage rate.
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7.7 Robustness checks: some notes
All the different virtual economies considered in this chapter are identified by
an unique identity code. Each identity code is associated to different char-
acteristics of the ARAs and a different technological set, so that each virtual
economy is associated to an unique set of initial conditions and parameters.
This heterogeneity in the initial conditions and parameters represents the
principal attempt to provide a robustness check to our thought experiment.
Despite this, it is interesting to test the effect of a particular type of per-
turbation, i.e., a number of workers and producers which is not a power of
3. This robustness check has been considered also in the previous chapter
in the section 6.6. It has been considered sufficient one single experimental
setting for this robustness check: 6 producers and 11 workers for each en-
terprise at the beginning of the period. The experiment has been repeated
for the case with homogenous and heterogeneous ARAs. The results do not
change at all the answers to our initial research questions.
7.8 The role of innovation and the possibility of lock-in phe-
nomena
The results of the previous experiments indicate that all virtual economies
that converge towards equilibrium are able to reach technological efficiency
(as defined according to the efficiency indexes). At this point it is interesting
to verify if innovation, represented by the introduction of a more efficient
method of production at disposal of a particular producer, would be able to
be adopted or would be victim of lock in phenomena. Lock in phenomena
can be defined as situations in which, despite a particular method is more
efficient, some circumstances and factors inside the economic system pre-
vent it to be adopted. So the interesting point is to investigate, as Brian
Arthur claims, the “circumstances under which the economy might become
locked-in by ‘historical events’ to the monopoly of an inferior technology”
(Arthur, 1989, p.117). In order to test this, the case with 9 producers and
homogeneous ARAs in which producer 5 (a producer in the centre of the
lattice) has access to a method more efficient with respect to the other pro-
ducers (that have access only to the old methods) has been considered. The
innovation could be of different types:
• Innovation type 1 : the new method (the innovation) allows to compute
a new wage-profit frontier that dominates the old one on the whole
domain.
• Innovation type 2 : the new method (the innovation) allows to compute
a new wage-profit frontier that dominates the old one only on a part
of the domain (low).
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• Innovation type 3 : the new method (the innovation) allows to compute
a new wage-profit frontier that dominates the old one only on a part
of the domain (high).
The comparison between the wage-profit frontier before and after the
innovation is displayed in the figures 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6. The presence of a
more efficient method implies that the new wage-profit frontier dominates
(on the whole domain or simply on a part of it, it depends on the method)
the old wage-profit frontier.
Figure 7.4: Innovation type 1: the new method (the innovation) allows to compute
a new wage-profit frontier that dominates the old one on the whole domain.
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Figure 7.5: Innovation type 2: the new method (the innovation) allows to compute a
new wage-profit frontier that dominates the old one only on a part of the domain (low).
Figure 7.6: Innovation type 3: the new method (the innovation) allows to compute a
new wage-profit frontier that dominates the old one only on a part of the domain (high).
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7.8.1 The experimental setting
In order to test the effect of the introduction of the new method (the inno-
vation), the case with 9 producers and 162 workers (9 local markets) with
homogeneous ARAs has been considered. After convergence towards an
equilibrium position, only ARA producer i=5 starts to have access to a new
method for the production of his commodity. The other ARA producers
have no access to this new method. ARA producer i=5 has been chosen
because he is at the centre of the lattice and this allows to test the effect of
this perturbation of the equilibrium on the lattice (indeed, the innovation
represents a sort of shock for the equilibrium reached). The experiment has
been repeated for each type of innovation considering the same experiment
(i.e., the same identity code).
7.8.2 Results: the role of innovation
The profit rates and wage rates associated to the new equilibrium are dis-
played in the figure 7.7 where it has been also reported the new and the
old wage-profit frontier. A first interesting fact is that the introduction of
an innovation at disposal of a single producer implies that, despite ARAs
are homogeneous, the dynamics of local markets become different. Indeed,
as appears clear from figure 7.7, despite the ARAs are homogeneous, the
producers of the same commodity converge towards different profit rates so
that, instead of converging towards 3 different123 profit rates, the virtual
economy converges towards 9 different rates of profit. This means that the
local and the global dynamics can diverge persistently in presence of asym-
metric shocks (i.e., shocks - as in the present case - where only one producer
has access to a new method of production).
According to the results of the 3 experiments ARA producer 5 is able to
converge towards the new method for innovation of type 1 and 3 but not
2. This because the new method will be adopted only if market prices and
wages make its adoption convenient. For innovation of type 1 and 3 market
prices and wages converge towards levels that make convenient for producer
5 to adopt the new method, for innovation type 2 this is not the case. This
is evident if one compares the area in which the profit rates and wage rates
converge for each experiment and the area in which the new frontier domi-
nates the old one. But this result does not represent an example of lock-in
phenomena. Indeed, the experiments results demonstrate that some types
of innovation (i.e., some new methods that are not able to generate a new
wage-profit frontier that dominates the old one on the whole domain) are
not adopted simply because they are not coherent with the characteristics
and the distributional-technological pattern of the virtual economy. In order
123According to the results of the previous experiments, by now we should expect to
converge towards non-uniform profit rates.
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to have a real lock-in phenomena, we should observe a situation in which
the profit rates and wage rates converge towards the region in which the
new frontier dominates the old one and despite this the new method is not
adopted. In our case this does not happen. One explanation of this phenom-
ena could be that innovation type 2 was not suitable for the distributional
and technological pattern of the virtual economy. The virtual economy is
not characterized by capital intensive methods. An innovation that allows to
produce more with a lower use of labour is a real innovation for the economy
(as innovation type 1 and 3), but an innovation that allows to produce more
using less capital (as innovation type 2) is not an useful innovation for a
virtual economy not characterized by capital-intensive methods. Moreover,
the virtual system is efficient and it is able to adopt an innovation (i.e.,
whatever new method able to improve the old wage-profit frontier) if the
innovation is coherent with the characteristics of the virtual economy. This
allows to observe an interesting point. Indeed, usually it is common to talk
about innovation as an a priori improvement for the economy. The experi-
ment demonstrates that a new method is a real innovation if and only if it
is coherent with the features of that particular economy.
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Figure 7.7: Results of the experiments: the figures represent the tests of innovations
type 1,2 and 3 respectively. The old frontier (magenta), the new frontier (green) after the
introduction of the new method and the wage-profit curves towards which each local mar-
ket converges after the introduction of the new method (blue lines) have been reported. In
particular, the wage-profit curves of the local markets in which producer 5 (the innovator)
is present are reported in red. Indeed, only these local markets can converge towards
the new wage-profit frontier. The profit rates and the wage rates associated to the new
equilibrium have been reported. It is possible to note that in the new equilibrium wage
rates are uniform. Only in the first and in the third figure local markets where producer
5 is present are able to converge towards the new frontier.
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7.9 Conclusion
The fundamental conclusion of the present chapter is that the most impor-
tant findings of the previous experiments have been confirmed also in the
general case characterized by the presence of 10 different virtual economies
with the possibility to choose the best method among a set of alternatives.
Indeed, according to the results, all the Sraffian virtual economies are
able to converge towards production prices and uniform wage rates but these
equilibrium positions do not imply convergence towards uniform profit rates
and neither an equal distribution of the surplus. Another time, the cases
with homogeneous, heterogeneous ARAs and also the case with more lo-
cal markets (i.e., more producers producing the same commodity in a ring
one-dimensional lattice) have been considered. These further experiments
have not changed the conclusions. It is interesting to note how the proba-
bility of convergence in reasonable time (before the stopping rule t̄=1000)
declines with the complexity of the experimental setting (i.e., heterogeneous
ARAs, more local markets and the possibility to choose the best method of
production).
The possibility for ARA producers to choose the best method for the
production of their commodity allowed to check if the virtual economies
were efficient; i.e., if the ARA producers were able to adopt the most ef-
ficient method. The indexes that allowed to measure efficiency have been
computed starting from the construction of the wage-profit frontier. Accord-
ing to the results, all virtual economies can be considered efficient: we have
obtained convergence in methods inside each industry (i.e., all producers
of the same commodity converge towards the same method) and a stable
converge towards the wage-profit frontier.
But efficiency does not imply that an innovation would be not victim
of lock-in phenomena (i.e., situations in which, despite a new method more
efficient that the others is at disposal, some factors prevents its adoption). It
has been considered 3 types of innovation. These further experiments have
demonstrated that an innovation can be adopted only if the new method is
coherent with the distributional-technological pattern (unless the innovation
interests the whole domain of the wage-profit frontier ; i.e., the new frontier
dominates the old one on the whole domain). This does not represent an
example of lock-in phenomena but anyway it is an interesting result because
indicates how a new method can be considered an innovation if and only if
it is coherent with the characteristics of the economy.
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8 Experiment 4: the role of the rate of interest
8.1 Introduction to experiment 4
The most important findings revealed by the previous experiments are that
the virtual systems converge towards production prices, uniform wage rates
but non-uniform profit rates with an unequal distribution. The probability
of convergence in reasonable time (i.e., before the stopping rule fixed to time
t̄=1000) declines with the growing of the complexity of the experimental set-
ting, which is maximum with heterogeneous producers, 9 local markets and
multiple methods of production at disposal. The virtual systems result to be
stable and efficient from a technological point of view (i.e., all local markets
reach the wage-profit frontier and all producers of the same industry adopt
the same method of production) is adopted if coherent with the features of
the economy.
In this chapter the purpose is to check whether these findings can be
influenced by the presence of an authority which is able to put an interest
rate on the debt and credit accumulated (the financial wealth). The interest
rate can be exogenous or endogenous. Both experimental settings will be
considered. The presence of an interest rate allows to make a comparison
between the position of each ARA in time and subject to different levels
of the interest rate. This allows to check if, for each single ARA, an in-
terest rate is able to introduce Pareto improvements with respect to other
scenarios. The introduction of experiments aimed at understanding the role
of the interest rate for the credit and debt relations and its effects on dis-
tribution and production allows to analyse a topic that is crucial within
Keynesian economics. A comparison between the role of the interest rate
inside the digital economic laboratory and the role of the interest rates inside
the Keynesian tradition will be considered.
8.2 The role of the interest rate for the debt and credit re-
lations
In the previous experiments, in the convergence position, debt and credit
relations disappear and also the financial wealth accumulated by each ARA
tends towards the zero. This because after the convergence towards the pro-
duction prices (that imply profit rates bigger or equal to zero) the virtual
system is able to reproduce itself without any need to create new IOUs.
For all the experiments it has been supposed that the IOUs are automat-
ically underwritten when needed, without any restriction or any cost. We
recall the fundamental equations related to the financial positions that are
reported also in chapter 3. Consider with F a negative financial position
(if F < 0) or a positive financial position (if F > 0), that is the difference
between revenues and costs for each producer i (for i=1,...k) and worker j
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(for j=1,...,K):
Fit = revenuesit − expendituresit (8.1)
Fjt = revenuesjt − expendituresjt (8.2)
The debt and credit accumulation in time represents the level of wealth








Fjt wealthjt = wealthj,t−1 + Fjt (8.4)
The accumulation of wealth does not imply restrictions, costs or revenues
for each ARA. Moreover, wealth growth has no limit. Despite this, most
virtual economies tend to converge towards production prices so that the
level of wealth of each ARA tends to zero and the creation of new IOUs
is no more needed. At this point it would be interesting to investigate
how the existence of an external authority (e.g., a central bank) that does
not impose limits on the creation of IOUs and accumulation of wealth but
fixes an interest rate that has to be computed on the wealth at the end
of each production period t can influence the dynamics of the system. As
it will clearly appear, the introduction of the interest rate represents an
investigation of the role of political economy inside our virtual systems.
The interest rate can be positive or negative.
• Positive interest rate: a positive interest rate represents a revenue
for those who have a positive wealth (i.e., credits that have been accu-
mulated) and a cost for those who have a negative wealth (i.e., debts
that have been accumulated). Indeed, a positive interest rate com-
puted on the level of wealth at the end of each production period
corresponds to revenues to be added to the financial holdings if wealth
is positive and corresponds to a cost that decreases even more the
financial holdings if wealth is negative.
• Negative interest rate: a negative interest rate is instead a sort of
taxation, a redistribution of the wealth. It represents a revenue for
those with negative wealth and a cost for those with positive wealth.
Indeed, a negative interest rate computed on the level of wealth at the
end of each production period corresponds to a cost that decreases the
value of the financial holdings if wealth is positive and corresponds to
a revenue that increases the financial holdings if wealth is negative.
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The interest rate can be fixed exogenously by the monetary authority
and remain fixed for all the duration of the experiment or can be endogenous
and change according to the behaviour of the system. Both alternatives will









Fjt wealthjt = wealthj,t−1(1 + δ) + Fjt (8.6)



























wealthjt = 0 (8.9)
A comparison between an experiment with interest rate equal to zero
and the same experiment simulated with positive or negative interest rates
allows to investigate the effect of an economic policy that concentrates on the
revenues and costs of the financial holdings. The effect can be measured in
terms of Pareto improvements. Indeed, in each experiment characterized
by a different level of the interest rate, each ARA will arrive at the end of
the periods with a particular level of his utility function. It is possible to in-
vestigate which level of the interest rate is able to bring each ARA (or social
classes, i.e., workers and producers) to the higher level of his utility function.
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8.3 The role of the interest rate: a comparison with the
Keynesian tradition
The interpretation of the nature and the role of the interest rate in Keynes
is completely different with respect to the marginalist approach. Keynes
introduces his conception of the interest rate in chapter 17 of his General
Theory. For Keynes interest rate is a “monetary phenomenon [...], i.e. that
it equalises the advantages of holding actual cash and a deferred claim on
cash” (Keynes, 1937, p.245). This is in contrast with the classical theory
according to which the interest rate depends on “the interaction of the sched-
ule of the marginal efficiency of capital with the psychological propensity to
save” (Keynes, 1936, p.165). According to Keynes the theory of interest
is fundamental for a clear understanding of the determinants of effective
demand and employment:
There is, I am convinced, a fatal flaw in that part of the orthodox
reasoning which deals with the theory of what determines the level of
effective demand and the volume of aggregate employment; the flaw
being largely due to the failure of the classical doctrine to develop a
satisfactory theory of the rate of interest (Keynes, 1973b, p.489).
In Keynes the monetary nature of the interest rate is explained through
the liquidity preference theory. This aspect has been criticized by the sup-
porters of the loanable funds theory such as Bertil Ohlin, Dennis H. Robert-
son and John R. Hicks. According to Ohlin: “the rate of interest is simply
the price of credit, and is therefore governed by the supply of and demand
for credit. The banking system - through its ability to give credit - can
influence, and to some extent does affect, the interest level” (Ohlin, 1937,
p.221). It is well known that Keynes, in his General Theory, explicitly as-
sumes that the money supply is fully controlled by the central bank and it is
a matter of fact that the liquidity preference theory “overlooks the presence
of banks and bank money” (Bertocco, 2011, p.8). Keynes was convinced
that there was no compatibility between his liquidity preference theory and
the loanable funds theory :
The liquidity-preference theory of the rate of interest which I have set
forth in my General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money makes
the rate of interest to depend on the present supply of money and the
demand schedule for a present claim on money in terms of a deferred
claim on money. This can be put briefly by saying that the rate of
interest depends on the demand and supply of money; though this may
be misleading, because it obscures the answer to the question, Demand
for money in terms of what? The alternative theory held, I gather, by
Prof. Ohlin and his group of Swedish economists, by Mr. Robertson
and Mr. Hicks, and probably by many others, makes it to depend, put
briefly, on the demand and supply of credit or, alternatively (meaning
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the same thing), of loans, at different rates of interest. Some of the
writers (as will be seen from the quotations given below) believe that
my theory is on the whole the same as theirs and mainly amounts to
expressing it in a somewhat different way. Nevertheless the theories
are, I believe, radically opposed to one another. (Keynes, 1937, p.241)
It is well know that Kaldor (starting from Kaldor (1939)) was critical of
some aspects of Keynes’s theory of money and interest rate (see also Sar-
doni, 2007). Also Sraffa underlined his perplexities about Keynes’s liquidity
preference theory, that he called ‘Keynes’s system’, and Keynes’s use of the
concept of commodity rate of interest:
In his debate with Hayek Sraffa introduced the concept of commodity
rate of interest. This concept Keynes was eager to pick up in the Gen-
eral Theory (Keynes [1936] 1973, chap. 17, especially 223n), because
he thought that it would provide him with the long-sought choice- and
capital-theoretic foundation of his theory of investment behavior, both
real and financial. The lack of such a foundation was a major objec-
tion Hayek had put forward against the Treatise. The new concept
allowed Keynes, or so he thought, to drive home the main message of
the General Theory, that it is the downward rigidity of the money rate
of interest that is the source of all the trouble. This downward rigidity
is in turn explained in terms of the liquidity preference of wealth own-
ers. [...] Sraffa was not at all happy with Keynes’s use of the concept
of commodity rates of interest, and he was critical of his explanation
of why liquidity preference was to prevent the [...] money rate of in-
terest from falling sufficiently not only in the short run, but also in
the long (see Kurz, 2010). In Sraffa’s view, as it is expressed both in
his annotations of his personal copy of the General Theory and in two
manuscript fragments, Keynes’s argument was a mess, confused and
confusing. He argued, among other things, that the concept of liquid-
ity that Keynes uses is vague and ambiguous (Kurz, 2013, pp.11-12,
emphasis added).
Despite this, some Keynesians are convinced that one should make ref-
erence to Keynes’s Treatise on Money in order to find a richer treatment of
how money is created through the interaction of banks and central banks
(de Carvalho, 2013, p.432). As a consequence, the importance of the endo-
geneity of money has been widely recognized and accepted: “many strands
of Keynesian macroeconomics agree that money supply is endogenous in
some sense. More particularly, practically all post-Keynesian varieties of
macroeconomic theory explicitly reject the so-called ‘verticalist’ assumption
that central banks can fully determine the money supply” (de Carvalho,
2013, p.431).
What emerges from this brief summary about the Keynesian tradition
on money and interest rate, is that the original contribution of Keynes has
been object of debate and different interpretations despite nowadays most
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Keynesians recognize the importance of endogenous money, an aspect that
has not been clearly developed by Keynes. The purpose of the present chap-
ter is not to enter into the details of this debate. In the digital economic
laboratory, as already explained in chapters 1 and 2, the integration be-
tween Sraffian schemes and Keynes’s effective demand has been constructed
considering the most simple type of society: without monetary or financial
institutions with ARAs that always underwrite IOUs when needed. This
simple type of society encapsulates some fundamental characteristics of a
monetary entrepreneurial economy in Keynesian terms. In this framework
a monetary interest rate is simply the cost (if negative) or the revenues (if
positive) of the financial wealth (if positive, the contrary in the other case).
This allows to understand the influence of this monetary phenomenon on
real magnitudes such as demand, production and distribution in the most
simple framework124.
8.4 The experimental setting
The mathematical structure of the laboratory is described in details in chap-
ter 3. The behavioural functions are the same of the previous chapters. A
detailed description of the behavioural functions is present in chapter 4.
The experimental setting of the present chapter considers the simple
case with 3 producers and 54 workers. The ARAs are heterogeneous. The
methods at disposal of each producer are 10. In order to make the virtual
economies as much productive as possible in this set of new experiments
each ARA producer has the possibility to produce new commodities with
the residuals from production through the use of a particular set of methods
that allows him to use not all the commodities for the production of his
commodity (see in the Appendix section 10.2 and section 4.5). 3 different
virtual economies (identified by 3 different identity codes) will be tested
under two different types of scenarios:
• Scenario 1 : an external authority fixes an interest rate. The interest
rate is fixed at the beginning of the experiment and does not change in
time. The interest rate can be positive or negative. A grid of interest
rates (from -5% to 5% step 1%) has been considered.
• Scenario 2 : an external authority imposes an interest rate which
level changes in time according to a trivial rule of thumb: if the maxi-
mum wealth is higher with respect to the value of the total production
the interest rate will be decreased of the 0.5% and vice versa. At the
beginning the level of the interest rate is equal to zero.
124Financial and monetary markets will be added in a second moment as further research
beyond this thesis, see section 9.2.
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8.5 The research questions
The two different scenarios are suitable to answer different research ques-
tions. Scenario 1 and scenario 2 will check if the virtual economy is able
to:
• Convergence towards production prices: despite the presence of
the interest rate, it is important to check whether the system is able to
converge towards production prices. The production prices identify the
equilibrium position. Remember that we define an equilibrium position
as a position in which prices and wages announced do not change
anymore; all markets are in equilibrium (demand equal to supply in all
markets; i.e., there is no more rationing), migration stops, the system
reproduces itself (i.e., same level of production and surplus without
residuals) without the creation of new IOUs (no new debt and credit
relations). This implies that the prices of convergence are production
prices with zero or positive profit rates.
• Convergence towards an equal distribution. Given the initial
condition of equal distribution (95% of the surplus has been associated
to workers given that they are 54 with respect to the 3 producers for
a total population of 57 ARAs)125 it is interesting to test the type of
distribution of the surplus associated with the convergence position.
• Pareto improvements with respect to the base case with in-
terest rate equal to zero. For each experiment each ARA will arrive
at the end of the periods with a particular level of his utility function,
according to his consumption and labour supply. It is possible to check
for each social class (i.e., producers and workers) which level of the in-
terest rate is able to bring to a final solution that represents a Pareto
improvement with respect to the base case with interest rate equal to
zero.
• Pareto improvements in time with respect to the base case
with interest rate equal to zero. It is possible to compute for
each social class (i.e., producers and workers) the number of times in
which all producers or all workers obtained Pareto improvements with
respect to the base case with interest rate equal to zero.
• Production. It has been measured how production is changed for
each commodity in percentage with respect to the base case with in-
terest rate equal to zero.
125It is worth remembering that the initial production prices and wages have been com-
puted starting from this distribution.
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8.6 Results: scenario 1
In table 8.1, the results relative to the virtual economy tested with the
scenario 1 are reported. It has been considered the most representative
case among 3 different virtual economies tested for all the values of the
grid for the interest rate (from -5% to 5% step 1%). As appears clear only
some levels of the interest rate are able to bring the virtual economy to
convergence. Indeed, when the interest rate is negative it represents a form
of taxation that facilitates the convergence. When interest rate is positive
and high, this means that ARAs with a positive wealth will increase their
credit positions while ARAs with negative wealth will increase their level of
debt in time, thus preventing convergence.
When interest rate is negative, it represents a form of taxation of wealth
able to redistribute resources among ARAs (in particular producers); this
allows to improve the level of production of all commodities. Also when
the interest rate is positive production increase considerably. This because
workers are the ARAs that most of the times have positive wealth and for
this reason they are the most favoured by the increase in the interest rate.
With a growing wealth, ARA sharply increase their demand of commodities
and this stimulates production. Remember that, despite ARAs (in partic-
ular producers) with a negative level of wealth will see an increase in their
level of indebtedness in the presence of a positive interest rate, this has
no effect on their decisions of production because they know that there is
not a limit to the level of debt. Despite this, the level of indebtedness can
have effects on their price decisions, consumption decisions, on their Pareto
improvements and on the final distribution.
The increase in production allows some ARAs to consume more with
respect to the base case with interest rate equal to zero and for this reason
in each experiment some ARAs experience Pareto improvements. Which
ARAs will experience these Pareto improvements (i.e., workers or produc-
ers) depends on the dynamics of prices, wages and the final distribution
associated to each experiment. In general, workers benefit the most by the
presence of the interest rate while producers are penalized in particular by
the positive interest rate for the reasons explained before.
The fundamental message that can be derived by the experiments of this
scenario 1 is that the interest rate has the potentiality to improve produc-
tion, bring to convergence and Pareto Improvements for all ARAs. This
particular combination of effects has been obtained only with an interest
rate equal to -5% (it is interesting to observe that with this level of the
interest rate for most of the periods the majority of the ARAs improves his
utility). Despite this, it is true that a positive interest rate has the poten-
tiality to improve sharply production even more that with negative interest
rates. This result is extremely interesting, because it shows that production
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can greatly improve without convergence. This result calls into question the
idea that convergence towards a point of equilibrium where debt and credit
relations disappear is a necessary requirement to obtain a better economic
performance. In fact, it seems that high and increasing values of debt and
credit can have a positive effect on production. This counterintuitive result
certainly deserves further investigation beyond the present thesis. In order
to test the potentialities of a combination of positive and negative interest
rates have been tested the idea of an endogenous interest rate with scenario









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8.7 Results: scenario 2
The results relative to the virtual economy tested with the scenario 2 are
reported in the following table. It is the same experimental setting of the
previous scenario (and the same identity code). In order to make the role
of the endogenous interest rate clear, the results related to the experiment
tested with zero interest rates have also been reported.
Rate of interest δ 0 endo
production prices yes yes
% surplus to producers 20 22
% surplus to workers 80 78
∆% commodity 1 w.r.t δ=0 0 154
∆% commodity 2 w.r.t δ=0 0 139
∆% commodity 3 w.r.t δ=0 0 162
% producers that improve utility w.r.t δ=0 0 100
% times that all producers improve utility w.r.t δ=0 0 64
% workers that improve utility w.r.t δ=0 0 100
% times that all workers improve utility w.r.t δ=0 0 70
Table 8.2: Results of the experiments: considering the same representative virtual
economy of the previous table, a comparison has been made, between the case with interest
rate equal to zero and the case with endogenous interest rate.
An endogenous interest rate is able to exploit the positive effects of
a negative interest rate (i.e., convergence towards equilibrium and Pareto
improvements for all the ARAs) and those of a positive interest rate (i.e.,
sharp increase in production). This experiment underlines clearly how the
presence of an authority able to impose a variable interest rate (i.e., the
introduction of an economic policy) can redistribute resources in such a way
to improve sharply the performance of the whole economy and to bring to a
final equilibrium position that represents a Pareto improvement with respect
to the case of a virtual economy where prices, wages and distribution are
determined only by the free interaction between agents. This interesting
result certainly deserves further investigations (together with the results
of the scenario 1 ) in order to draw more general conclusions about the
role of the interest rate. This analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter
and represents one of the most important and interesting points for further
research. Indeed, a deeper understanding of the implications of these results
requires the testing of alternative behavioural functions and a shift to more




The purpose of the present chapter was to investigate the effect of the in-
troduction of an interest rate on the financial holdings (the accumulation of
the IOUs called financial wealth) on the dynamics of the virtual system.
In particular, the influence of the interest rate on convergence, produc-
tion levels, distribution and the utilities of the ARAs has been investigated
through the computation of the Pareto improvements with respect to the
base case with interest rate equal to zero.
Two different types of interest rate have been considered. In scenario
1 an external authority fixes an interest rate. The interest rate is fixed at
the beginning of the experiment and does not change in time. The interest
rate can be positive or negative. A grid of interest rates (from -5% to 5%
step 1%) has been considered. In scenario 2 an external authority impose
an interest rate whose level changes in time according to a trivial rule of
thumb: if the maximum wealth is higher with respect to the value of the
total production the interest rate will be decreased. The contrary in the
other case. At the beginning the level of the interest rate is equal to zero.
The most important findings from scenario 1 are that only a negative
level of the interest rate is able to bring the virtual system towards equi-
librium with Pareto improvements for all the ARAs; on the other hand, a
positive interest rate is able to stimulate production and distributional equal-
ity. In scenario 2 the introduction of an interest rate which level changes
endogenously according to the relationship between the level of production
and wealth has been considered. The most important findings from this sce-
nario 2 is that an endogenous interest rate is able to bring to convergence,
Pareto improvements for all ARAs with very high level of production with
respect to the base case. This experiment demonstrates how an endogenous
interest rate is able to exploit the positive effects of a negative interest rate
and those of a positive interest rate. This experiment underlines clearly how
the presence of an authority (i.e., the introduction of an economic policy)
able to impose a variable interest rate can redistribute resources such a way
to improve sharply the performance of the whole virtual economy and to
bring to a final equilibrium position that represents a Pareto improvement
with respect to the case of an economy where prices, wages and distribution
are determined only by the free interaction between agents.
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9 Conclusions
Despite the wide recognition of the relevance of Keynes’s and Sraffa’s contri-
butions, as a matter of fact, an integration between Keynesian and Sraffian
economics has not been reached yet. Nevertheless, the integration of Sraffa’s
and Keynes’s analyses could constitute the core of non-neoclassical eco-
nomics (Roncaglia, 1995, p.120). In the literature review of the present the-
sis (chapter 2), the reasons and the conditions for an integration of Sraffa’s
and Keynes’s investigations have been discussed.
The purpose of the present thesis was to contribute to fill this gap
by merging Keynes’s effective demand with Sraffa’s production schemes
through the construction of a digital economic laboratory where to run
thought experiments aimed at answering different research questions about
equilibrium, distribution, technological efficiency and economic policy. One
of the novelty of the digital economic laboratory of the present thesis is its
coherence with the mathematics of the digital computers. Following com-
putable methods, the laboratory has been constructed in order to be algo-
rithmically grounded. It is based on bookkeeping principles and it is able
to consider market out-of-equilibrium behaviours.
The digital economic laboratory has been described in details in chapter
3 where the mathematical reconstruction of the model has been reported.
This digital economic laboratory has been written in the form of a coherent
set of computer codes so as to allow for the construction of a virtual market
(labour and goods market), in which decisions of production and consump-
tion are made by a population of algorithmic rational agents (producers
and workers) which interact exchanging quantities and property rights co-
herently with double-entry bookkeeping principles. Exchanges are made
by signing virtual contracts that involve the use of financial means. The
creation of new financial means of exchange, credit and debt, is endoge-
nous. Production is heterogeneous and conceived as a circular process. The
ARAs are characterized by behavioural functions and specific trading rules.
ARAs, located inside a lattice, have a deterministic network of relations.
ARAs producers sell their products in local markets. The local markets are
connected spatially. Each local market represents a local unit of the whole
economy and the presence of more interconnected local markets, with more
ARAs producers producing the same commodity in different local markets,
allows to make comparisons between the local and the global dynamics. The
digital economic laboratory is a benchmark for all the thought experiments.
Indeed, behavioural functions have to be designed according to the particu-
lar thought experiment in order to generate different virtual economies and
collect statistics.
In chapter 4 the experimental setting and particular behavioural func-
tions have been designed and detailed described. In particular, the algorithm
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that described the announcement of prices and wages has been constructed
using machine learning and in particular artificial neural network. This
approach represents an interesting application of machine learning inside
economics and a powerful tool for describing agent capabilities to learn and
to develop decisions coherently with their environment.
9.1 The results
From chapter 5 to chapter 8 four different experiments have been tested.
The results have been detailed described and commented. In the following
list the main findings have been summarised:
• The probability for a virtual economy to convergence in reasonable
time (i.e., before the stopping rule fixed to time t̄=1000) declines with
the growing of the complexity of the experimental setting, which is
maximum with heterogeneous producers, 9 local markets and multiple
methods of production at disposal.
• The virtual economies (i.e., not only the case reported by Sraffa at
page 19 of PCMC ) tend to converge towards production prices, uni-
form wage rates but non-uniform profit rates with an unequal distri-
bution. The further experiments, aimed to investigate the relationship
between prices and quantities, seem to underline how well-known eco-
nomic relations (such as the negative slope of demand function and the
positive slope of supply function) represent postulates that have not
been clearly confirmed by our experiments. In particular, the experi-
ments seem to demonstrate that the composition of the social surplus
is a function of effective demand while the dependence of prices on
effective demand is more questionable.
• The virtual systems result to be stable and efficient from a technolog-
ical point of view (i.e., all local markets reach the wage-profit frontier
and all producers of the same industry adopt the same method of
production).
• Innovation (represented by a new method of production at disposal of
a single producer) is not subject to technological lock-in phenomena:
innovation is adopted if it is coherent with the features of the virtual
economy. It is interesting to note how innovation is a shock capable of
provoking a persistent divergence between local and global behaviour.
• The presence of an authority able to impose a variable interest rate
(i.e., an economic policy) can redistribute resources in order to im-
prove sharply the performance of the whole economy towards a final
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equilibrium position that represents a Pareto improvement with re-
spect to the case of an economy where prices, wages and distribution
are determined only by the free interaction between agents.
9.2 Further research
Throughout the thesis, we have been referring often to theoretical issues and
controversial results that would have been developed in further research,
beyond the present thesis. In this section we present a summary of these
topics. First of all, the digital economic laboratory can be improved through
the introduction of:
• Different behavioural functions and learning methods: for example
learning methods that consider the role of imitation, algorithmic meth-
ods that use only top-down approaches, and behavioural functions dif-
ferent with respect to the utility function for the determination of the
consumption demand and the labour supply.
• Financial system and banking system: more complex institutions can
be added in order to verify their influence on production and distribu-
tion.
• Different out-of-equilibrium starting points: in all the experiments of
the present thesis, the initial condition was an equilibrium point with
production prices and equal distribution. The role of different initial
conditions (e.g., non-equilibrium points) can be tested.
Some interesting results that emerged in the present thesis needs to be
further developed:
• Time of convergence: in the previous chapters, we have seen that some
virtual economies have not been able to converge before time t̄=1000.
The dynamics of these virtual economies will be part of further investi-
gations aimed at understanding whether convergence can be achieved
for more than 1000 periods or not. In the latter case, the causes for
lack of convergence should be further analysed.
• Unemployment : unemployment phenomena can emerge in the labo-
ratory. In the thought experiments considered in the present the-
sis, unemployment phenomena were on the background of the out-of-
equilibrium dynamics. Despite this, in the present thesis, unemploy-
ment phenomena have not been analysed because the primary focus
was the analysis of the convergence properties. Specific indexes will
be developed in further investigations in order to study properly this
phenomenon.
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• The determinants of distribution: it seems that distribution is influ-
enced by preferences (i.e., the demand) if the technological set of the
virtual economy is not composed by capital-intensive methods. In-
deed, with emphcapital-intensive methods, distribution is extremely
unequal regardless of the preference parameters. The causes of this
phenomenon should be carefully analysed considering also other be-
havioural functions and more experiments.
• The role of the interest rate: the presence of more complex institutions,
such as banking system and financial system, allows to investigate in
a more realistic framework the influence of a monetary interest rate
on the economic magnitudes.
9.3 Last considerations
Obviously all these results have not to be interpreted as final answers to
the initial research questions but as first steps towards a new way to face
them for the development of further research questions and intuitions. In
the previous section, a first list of further research topics has been presented,
but the list can be enlarged with other interesting thought experiments and
theoretical issues. Indeed, the real purpose of the present thesis was the
introduction of a powerful instrument, i.e., the digital economic laboratory,
as an answer to the need to develop models able to explore the complexity of
the out-of-equilibrium behaviours, grounded on bookkeeping principles and
computable methods and, mostly, coherent with the spirit and the method




Consider the topology of a virtual economy with 9 producers and 81 workers,
which produces 3 commodities. Consider the following graphical represen-
tation of the ring one-dimensional lattice.
































9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 for i = 1, ..., k
3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 for g = 1, ..., n
Figure 10.1: The local markets: case k=9












And for the each local market:
s=1 ι(1)=1 s(1)=1 Ψ̃1=[9 1 2] Ψ1=[1 2 9]
s=2 ι(2)=2 s(2)=2 Ψ̃2=[1 2 3] Ψ2=[1 2 3]
s=3 ι(3)=3 s(3)=3 Ψ̃3=[2 3 4] Ψ3=[4 2 3]
s=4 ι(4)=1 s(4)=4 Ψ̃4=[3 4 5] Ψ4=[4 5 3]
s=5 ι(5)=2 s(5)=5 Ψ̃5=[4 5 6] Ψ5=[4 5 6]
s=6 ι(6)=3 s(6)=6 Ψ̃6=[5 6 7] Ψ6=[7 5 6]
s=7 ι(7)=1 s(7)=7 Ψ̃7=[6 7 8] Ψ7=[7 8 6]
s=8 ι(8)=2 s(8)=8 Ψ̃8=[7 8 9] Ψ8=[7 8 9]
s=9 ι(9)=3 s(9)=9 Ψ̃9=[8 9 1] Ψ9=[1 8 9]
The whole matrix Ψ̃ = [ψ̃īs] corresponds to:
Ψ̃ =
[
Ψ̃1 Ψ̃2 Ψ̃3 Ψ̃4 Ψ̃5 Ψ̃6 Ψ̃7 Ψ̃8 Ψ̃9
]
Ψ̃ =
 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 81 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1

The whole matrix Ψ = [ψīs] corresponds to:
Ψ =
[
Ψ1 Ψ2 Ψ3 Ψ4 Ψ5 Ψ6 Ψ7 Ψ8 Ψ9
]
Ψ =
 1 1 4 4 4 7 7 7 12 2 2 5 5 5 8 8 8
9 3 3 3 6 6 6 9 9

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a1 = 0, a2 = 0,
a3 = 0, L > 0
a1 > 0, a2 = 0,
a3 = 0, L > 0
a1 = 0, a2 > 0,
a3 = 0, L > 0
a1 = 0, a2 = 0,
a3 > 0, L > 0
a1 > 0, a2 > 0,
a3 = 0, L > 0
a1 > 0, a2 = 0,
a3 > 0, L > 0
a1 = 0, a2 > 0,








Figure 10.2: The residual mechanism: each ARA producer uses the residuals from
production through the use of a particular set of techniques which allows him to use not
all the commodities for the production of his commodity. In the figure, with T̃1, the first
method among those of the matrix T̃ should be considered.
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10.3 Notes on machine learning in the thought experiments:
the construction of the artificial neural network
Machine learning is the multidisciplinary field that studies the development
of algorithms that allow computers to develop the ability to learn126 in
order to perform tasks. According to a more precise definition, “the field
of machine learning is concerned with the question of how to construct
computer programs that automatically improve with experience” (Mitchell,
1997, p.xv)127.
10.3.1 A particular approach: artificial neural networks
There are different approaches to machine learning, such as decision tree
learning, deep learning, clustering, Bayesian networks etc. One particular
approach that seems suitable to our task is artificial neural network. Indeed,
the idea to construct a behavioural function, able to mimic the behaviour of
producers (trade unions) when they decide the prices (wages) to announce,
implies the construction of an algorithm able to recognize the environment,
learn from errors and develop a decision. Neural network is probably the
most suitable approach of machine learning for this task because other ap-
proaches, such as decision trees, are more suitable for classification and
regressions while clustering is more suitable for statistical data analysis.
Intuitively, the role of neural network in our case is to find an algorithm
able to mimic the mechanism inside the brain of the ARAs when they take
decisions. Indeed, neural network syntax is inspired by neurobiology and
tries to reconstruct mechanisms that refer to some fundamental features of
real brains (such as, neurons and their interrelations). A system of artificial
and interconnected neurons is called neural network and can be defined as:
An interconnected assembly of simple processing elements, units or
nodes, whose functionality is loosely based on the animal neuron. The
processing ability of the network is stored in the interunit connection
strengths, or weights, obtained by a process of adaption to, or learning
from, a set of training patterns (Gurney, 1997, p.1).
126Learning is needed in cases in which it is not possible to develop a specific computer
program to solve directly the task because the task changes in time, space, according to
circumstances or simply when we need the computer to simulate a human attitude that
we cannot translate in a computer program. Herbert Simon says that “learning denotes
changes in the system that are adaptive in the sense that they enable the system to do the
same task or tasks drawn from the same population more efficiently and more effectively
the next time” (Simon, 1983, p. 26).
127Equivalently machine learning could be defined as “programming computers to opti-
mize a performance criterion using example data or past experience” (Alpaydin, 2010, p.
xxxi). In particular, “a computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect
to some class of tasks T and performance measure P, if its performance at tasks in T, as
measured by P, improves with experience E” (Mitchell, 1997, p.2, emphasis added).
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10.3.2 Artificial neural networks in economics
The idea to model the economic agents in such a way that they behave
as real agents is not new in the field of economics. For example, Simon
(1983) compared what is involved in human learning with respect to machine
learning and said that:
Anybody who is interested in machine learning because he wants to
simulate human learning - because he wants to understand human
learning and thinking, and perhaps improve it - it can pursue his in-
terest in good conscience (Simon, 1983, p.26).
It is claimed that the economic agents’s learning capabilities and decision
processes can be modelled through 3 basic techniques inspired by biology:
artificial neural networks, evolutionary algorithms and artificial economies
related to artificial life (Marks and Schnabl, 1999, p.197). The purpose of
artificial economics is to use computer simulation approach in order to un-
derstand socioeconomic process and how economic macro phenomena can
emerge from the interaction of single economic agents (Marks and Schnabl,
1999, p.198). Evolutionary algorithms are inspired by biological evolution
and processes. Genetic algorithms are surely the most popular type of evo-
lutionary algorithms and they are used in order to solve optimization and
search problem through mechanism inspired by natural selection principles
such as recombination and mutation (see Mitchell (1998) for an interesting
introduction to genetic algorithms). Artificial neural network is an approach
of machine learning and its purpose is to develop a mechanism able to mimic
the ability of real brains in learning how to solve a variety of tasks.
The 3 basic techniques inspired by biology, and in particular genetic
algorithms and artificial neural networks, are sometimes considered both
suitable (or used together128) to solve a wide variety of optimization prob-
lems also inside the economic field. Even though it is not object of the
present chapter to make a detailed distinction between the two approaches,
it is important to emphasize how genetic algorithms are suitable for the
search of an exact solution to a well-defined optimization or search problem
while artificial neural network emphasises the desire to mimic the learning
capabilities of real brains in order to solve task or to recognise new patterns.
The idea of neural networks to construct models able to mimic the fun-
damental mechanism at the base of the functioning of real brains is fasci-
nating and distinguishes this method from the other algorithms inspired by
biology. The literature on application of artificial neural networks in eco-
nomics shows how artificial neural network has been used for classification of
economic agents and prediction of time series (Herbrich et al., 1999, pp.178-
179). Despite this, probably a more interesting but less common application
128For example, genetic algorithms can be used to train a neural network.
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is that related to the model of bounded rational economic agents. In this
last contest:
Neurons are interpreted as agents who update their perception of the
environment according to the information they receive. Their decisions
(the output of the neuron) then exert an influence on the environment
which might be fed back to the agent (Herbrich et al., 1999, p.181).
Another application could be oriented to use neural network in order to
mimic the learning capabilities of a single agent. In this perspective, neurons
are not agents but the basic elements of the artificial brain of the economic
agent. This particular application, uncommon in the existing literature, has
been followed in the construction of the behavioural function for the wage
and price announcement in present thesis (see chapter 4.3.4).
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10.3.3 Artificial neural network: historical notes
From biological neural network to artificial neural network
An artificial neural network is based on the operation of biological neural
networks. In human brains billions of neurons (i.e., nerve cells) communi-
cate via electrical signals (i.e., spikes in the voltage of the cell wall called
membrane). Each neuron receives thousands of incoming signals from other
neurons (i.e., neurons are connected through electrochemical junctions called
synapses, located on branches called dentries). These signals can be in-
hibitory (i.e., prevent firing) or excitory (i.e., promote firing). All these
signals are summed together (i.e., in the cell body) and if this final signal
exceeds some threshold the neuron will generate a response signal (i.e., firing
or not firing), that is transmitted to the other neurons (the transmission is
possible through a branching fibre called axon). This fundamental archi-
tecture based on the interconnection and processing abilities of neurons is
at the base of artificial neural network constructions. This simple artificial
neuron is called threshold logical unit (TLU)129. The dynamics of the neural
network stands in the learning process. In real neurons, the learning capa-
bility is determined by the possibility to change the synaptic strengths of
neurons according to inputs so that neurons adapt themselves according to
circumstances. In artificial neural network this capability is stored in the
weight values. The learning rule determines the way in which weight up-
dates. For each pattern presented (i.e., input) the output is compared with
the target and the weights update accordingly through an iterative process
which stops (hopefully) when the output (i.e., the responds to each pat-
tern) converges to the target (this process is based on the dynamics of the
postsynaptic potential PSP). This process is part of the training algorithm.
The convergence to the output means that the neural network has learnt
the underlying structure and so it should be able to generalize and interpret
correctly patterns never seen before.
The intuitive and informal description of neurons and networks proposed
previously should now be reformulated in details through a mathematical
description of the fundamental elements cited:
• input signals: x1,x2,x3,...,xn
• potential action: α,β
• weights: w1,w2,w3,...,wn
• signal production (PSP): γ
• activation: a = γ(x,w)
129Make reference to Gurney (1997, pp.1-2) for a more detailed introduction to biological
and artificial neural networks.
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• threshold value: θ
• transfer function: Φ(a, θ)
• output: z
Briefly, neurons receive input signals that can be inhibitory (value α)
or excitory (value β). All these signals are combined together through γ
so that to obtain the activation term a. The net input pass through the
transfer function so that to obtain the output z. In this phase the threshold
value considered inside the transfer function determines the final output z.
There are 3 functional process that take place in this TLU:
• weight function: the inputs are multiplied for the respective weights.
• net input function: the weighted input can be added to a scalar bias
b to form the net input a.
• transfer function: the net input passes through the transfer function
so that to obtain the output z.
The biological neural network and the general structure of the artificial
















Figure 10.3: The biological and the artificial neural network: the general struc-
ture of the artificial neural network (on the left) and the biological neural network repre-
sented in a stylized style (on the right).
.
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The artificial neuron of McCulloch and Pitts
Consider now a more detailed specification of the artificial neural network
in which there are:
• input signals: x1,x2,x3,...,xn
• potential action: 0,1 (binary or Boolean signal)
• weights: w1,w2,w3,...,wn
• signal production (PSP): w1x1,w2x2,w3x3,...,wnxn
• activation: a = w1x1 + w2x2 + w3x3 + ...+ wnxn
• threshold value: θ
• transfer function: Φ=hard-limit type (Heaviside step function)
• output: z
Briefly, neurons receive input signals that can be inhibitory (value 0) or
excitory (value 1). All these signals are summed together so that to obtain





If this activation term a exceeds or is equal to the threshold θ the final




1 if a ≥ 0
0 if a < 0
(10.2)
In this case, we have considered as the weight function the simple mul-
tiplication of weights for inputs. For the net input function, the bias b has
not been considered. The Heaviside step function has been considered as
the transfer function. The threshold value can be considered as a particu-
lar weight and implemented inside the network. Other alternatives for the
transfer function are possible such as the linear transfer function or the
sigmoid transfer function. They allow to have different range of outputs
(for example not only value 0 or 1 but also any other value between them).
This particular artificial neural network in which are used 0 and 1 as poten-
tial actions and the hard-limit transfer function is the basic example of the
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McCulloch and Pitts artificial neuron (1943). Despite it represents a funda-
mental prototype, the limitation of this artificial neuron is that this network
has a fixed set of weights. If weights are known, the artificial neuron can
solve some Boolean logical problems, such as the AND function.
The perceptron of Rosenblatt
The fundamental limitation of the mathematical model of neuron of McCul-
loch and Pitts is that the weights are given. A fundamental characteristic
of a biological neural network is the possibility to modify the strength of
the connections between neuron through learning process. This feature has
been introduced inside the neural network world by Hebb in 1949 with the
concept of synaptic plasticity. This concept known also as hebbian plasticity
opened a season of neural network models able to learn. A fundamental
neural network able to learn is the perceptron, introduced by Rosenblatt in
1957: a model of neural network able to solve some problems of pattern
recognition. The elements of the perceptron are very similar to the McCul-
loch and Pitts neuron model. The fundamental difference is that the values
of the weights has to be computed through a learning process.
The behaviour of a neural network able to learn is characterized by two
phases:
• training: in this phase the network is trained with example and
weight are computed given the input and output values of the ex-
amples.
• work: the network gives output for input never seen before, given the
weights computed in the training phase.
This learning process is called supervised learning, because the network is
trained starting from examples. There is also another type of learning called
unsupervised learning where example are not associated to an output.
In the case of supervised learning the computation of weights is described
by an algorithm. The perceptron learning rule is represented by a simple
algorithm that adjust the network weights w to minimize the difference
between the desired and the actual outputs. In detail, the algorithm is
described by the subsequent logical phases:
• Give random values to the weights.
• For each training vector pair (x,z) of the examples at disposal compute
the activation term a (a = w1x1 + w2x2 + w3x3 + ...+ wnxn).
• Compare the z obtained with the z of the example (called z̄).
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• If z 6= z̄ update the weight according to this rule: w′ = w+ γ(z̄− z)x.
• Repeat the procedure until z=z̄ in all the examples.
An example could help to understand this learning algorithm. Consider the






Table 10.1: The AND function: logical function.
.
The algorithm could be constructed with whatever computer program
130. The objective is to train the perceptron so that to classify correctly
the points. The algorithm (sometime called delta rule) allows to arrive to
a perfect separation of the inputs in the two classes as appears clear in the
figure 10.4.
Figure 10.4: The perceptron learning rule: with a learning rate equal to 2.
130For example the computer program MATLAB®; see an example of the algorithm for
the solution of the AND function developed with MATLAB® in the Appendix 10.4.
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The limits of the perceptron
We have seen that perceptron is able to solve classification problems (such
as the AND function). The algorithm will always converge to weights able
to solve the classification problem (i.e., converge to a solution) if a solution
exists. The problem is that perceptron is able to solve only linear problems.
A perceptron with n inputs is able to represent a n-dimensional hyperplane.
This means that a perceptron is able to solve only linear separable problems
in which inputs can be put in two different classes dividable with a line (per-
ceptron with 2 inputs), a plane (perceptron with 3 inputs) or a hyperplane
(perceptron with 3 inputs). A typical non-linear problem is the XOR. XOR






Table 10.2: The XOR function: logical function.
.
Despite the initial enthusiasm for the perceptron, once, in 1959, Marvin
Minsky and Seymour A. Papert demonstrated that perceptron was able to
solve only linear problems, the interest for neural network declined sharply.
Only after more than 10 years, the problem has been solved considering
more complex architecture of neural network (multi-layers perceptron) and
different algorithms for training. A pioneer in this field has been in 1974
Paul Werbos. One of the most famous training algorithms is the error back-
propagation proposed in 1986 by Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams. Before
talking about this class of training algorithms, we describe the more complex
architecture of neural networks.
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The architecture of neural networks
More neurons of the previously shown types can be combined in a layer. A
network can contain more layers. The basic example is a single layer of more
neurons as in the figure 10.5, but it is possible to have also multiple layers of
neurons. Each layer has his weights, inputs and outputs. The layers which
produces the output is called output layer while the others are called hidden
layers. The weights can be summarised in a matrix. These complex neural
networks, regardless of the number of layers or neurons, have in common
the fact that the signal propagation goes forward without circles or traversal
connections (i.e., arrows are straight line that goes ahead). For this reason,
this class of artificial neural networks are called feedforward. Recurrent or
feedback neural networks have instead another architecture that transform















Figure 10.5: A one-layer network: in this case there is one layer with 4 inputs and
3 output neurons.
196
Beyond the perceptron: the backpropagation algorithm
The limits of the perceptron can be solved considering multi-layers-perceptron.
This allows to have a more complex representation of inputs. Indeed, per-
ceptron can separate space only in two spaces. In the XOR case a more
complex division of the space is needed. With more layers and nodes, it
is possible to solve even more complex classification patterns problems (see
figure 10.6).
a b c d
Figure 10.6: Decision boundaries: the perceptron is able to solve only linear separable
classification problems such as the AND function (figure a). In order to solve more complex
classification problems such as the convex forms in figure b (e.g., the XOR function) and
figure c, it is sufficient to construct architecture with 2 layers. An architecture with 3 layers
is sufficient for whatever classification problem (figure d). This type of representation of
the decision boundaries has been developed by Cammarata (1990) and reported also in
Macchiavello (1992, p.120).
Consider for example the XOR problem. As it clearly appears from the
figure 10.7, a perceptron cannot solve this problem, because it does not
exist a line able to separate the input whose output is one (red points)
to the inputs which output is zero (blue points). In order to solve XOR
problem (and non-linear problem in general), it is necessary to consider
more complex architectures, with more neurons and layers. In the case of
the XOR problem, it is sufficient to consider two layers (i.e., the so called
multi-layer perceptron).
The learning process that allows to solve the XOR problem with a multi-
layer perceptron is the so called backpropagation algorithm (also called gen-
eralized delta rule based on the Widrow-Hoff learning rule). The fundamen-
tal idea of this algorithm is to identify the vector of weights and biases that
minimize a particular cost function (error function). The cost function is
represented by the mean squared error. For this reason, the backpropaga-
tion represents a generalization of the LMS (Least Mean Square) algorithm.
197
The function error is minimized using the gradient descendent algorithm.
The intuition at the base of this optimization algorithm is to minimize the
error by changing the weights. The first order partial derivative of error
with respect to weights (the gradient), scaled for a factor called learning
rate, gives a direction for the weights to change in order to reduce error
(Priddy and Keller, 2005, p.113). In the next section, the backpropagation
algorithm will be presented in detail.
Figure 10.7: The XOR function: logical function.
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The backpropagation algorithm: derivation
In order to understand the backpropagation algorithm consider for example












Figure 10.8: The multi-layer perceptron
Call input pattern ψ each couple of x1 and x2 (4 couples in the XOR
problem so that ψ=1,...,n and n=4). The value of the target corresponds
to z̄. If the initial weights are random values, the computation of the z will
be different with respect to the target. The objective is to minimize this
difference by adjusting the weights. The adjustment of the hidden layer is
not trivial. The idea is to adjust the weight in proportion to the error.
So we define an error function able to measure this difference and we
try to minimize it using the gradient descendent on the output units over
all the inputs patterns. The performance index that characterize this error
function is the mean squared error (MSE).
A generalization of the delta rule131 will be used. It calculates the error
for the current input example and then backpropagate this error from layer
to layer.
In order to understand how the backpropagation algorithm works, it
is useful to understand how to derive the fundamental equations of the
algorithm. Consider the figure 10.8. In general, we can have a number of
different output neurons zi, a number of different hidden neurons hj and a
number of different input neurons xk. For the XOR problem we have one
output neuron, 2 hidden neurons and 2 input neurons plus the 2 biases. The
131A gradient descent learning rule, precursor to backpropagation, used in perceptron
learning by Widrow and Hoff in the late 1950s (Priddy and Keller, 2005, p.111).
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input signal for an output neuron is called neti while the input signal for a
hidden neuron is called netj . wkj is the weight between one input and one
hidden neuron and wji is the weight between one hidden and one output










Now we can consider the equations for the input signals and the activa-






k + bj (10.4)
hψj = f(net
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j + bi (10.6)
zψi = f(net
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j + bi) (10.7)






















At this point we apply the iterative steepest gradient descent optimization
algorithm that allows to update the weights so that to minimize the error
function. Briefly, if we imagine the error function as the error surface, the
algorithm changes the weights in order to reach a minimum. The steps are
























Considering that δψi is the error signal for the output neuron i, for hidden







































At this point we can update the weights for the input pattern ψ:
wnewji = wji + ∆wji (10.13)
wnewkj = wkj + ∆wkj (10.14)
In order to compute the updated values of the weights, we need to define
the function of the inputs net. If we use the sigmond transfer function we













We can compute also the first derivatives as:
















= zψi (1− z
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i ) (10.17)
















= hψj (1− h
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j ) (10.18)



































The most important shortcomings of this method are connected to the fact
that it is not excluded that the algorithm could converge towards a local
minimum or it could converge too slowly to the solution. Despite this, the
backpropagation algorithm has some universal properties:
• “Any continuous function can be uniformly approximated by a con-
tinuous neural network having only one internal, hidden layer and
with an arbitrary continuous sigmoidal nonlinearity. [...] Arbitrary
decision functions can be arbitrarily well approximated by a neural
network with one internal layer and a continuous sigmoidal nonlinear-
ity” (Cybenko, 1989, p.312). This implies that it is sufficient a single
hidden layer in order to represent every boolean function.
• According to a result of Lippmann (1987) and Cybenko (1988) any
function can be approximated by a network with two hidden layers.
The backpropagation algorithm: a summary
This derivation brings to the fundamental equations of the backpropagation
algorithm that represents the steps that that have to be followed for each
input pattern ψ. The algorithm can be summarised in the steps reported
in the subsequent box. The algorithm has to be repeated until a solution is
reached. The solution is reached when the value of the error function E is
lower with respect to an exogenously fixed threshold θ. The number of time
that are needed in order to have E < θ represent the number of epochs that
have to be computed for solving the problem. In the appendix is present an
example of solution of the XOR problem using MATLAB® (see appendix
10.5).
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1. Consider the first input patters ψ (the relative values of x1,x2 and z)
and the initial values of the weights.
1.1 Compute the value of the input signal net and the neurons of the













1.2 Compute the value of the input signal net and the neurons of the













1.3 Compute the error signal for the output neuron i and the change














1.4 Compute the error signal for the hidden neuron j and the change















1.5 Compute the new values of the weights:
wnewji = wji + ∆wji w
new
kj = wkj + ∆wkj
2. Consider the second input patter ψ and the initial values of the weights.
Repeat the sequence 1.1-1.5. Repeat this sequence also for all the other
input patterns.
3. Compute for all input patterns the values of the output neurons using the










if E is bigger with respect to a determinate threshold θ repeat the al-
gorithm from step 1 considering the new values of the weight. If E < θ
the algorithm has reached a solution.
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10.3.4 Problems and limits of the neural network
Neural networks can represent a powerful tool for the resolution of complex
problems. In order to start to work with neural networks, it is necessary to
have a clear understanding of the problem to solve. Indeed, not all problems
are suitable to be solved through neural networks. Once it established that
the neural network is the right tool for the solution of the problem, there
are some fundamental steps to be followed in order to build properly the
neural network:
• Choose the type of neural network: first of all, it is necessary to choose
the type of architecture. This depends on the type of problem to solve
(e.g., feedforward or recurrent). After this, it is necessary to define
the architecture properties, such as the number of layers, neurons and
the type of transfer function.
• Choose the learning algorithm: for example, the backpropagation al-
gorithm. The learning algorithm is at the base of the computation of
the weights of the neural network.
• Collection and organization of the data: a proper collection and orga-
nization of the data is fundamental in order train, test and validate
properly the neural network.
• Train the neural network: use part of the data to fit the neural network.
In this phase are computed the optimal weights with the learning
algorithm.
• Validate the neural network: use part of the data in order to check
the fitness of the architecture of the neural network. In this phase it
is possible to estimate the optimal number of hidden neurons and to
compute an early stopping for the learning algorithm.
• Verification of the neural network: test the performance of a fully
trained neural network.
• Use the neural network: the optimal weights of the fully trained neural
network can be used for simulation.
As previously said, the developer of a neural network has to face some
possible shortcomings in the construction and use of the neural network.
However, there are some suggestions in order to solve these problems:
• The neural network may not find a good solution: the learning algo-
rithm could be trapped in a local minimum or it could converge too
slowly to the global minimum (see Nawi et al., 2013, p.1-2). Usually
a good tailoring of the architecture properties is able to minimize the
effects of this problem.
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• The neural network is sensible to the value of the learning rate: an
excessively low learning rate implies slow convergence, an excessively
high learning rate implies instability and poor performance. Usually
in order to solve slow convergence the suggestion is to increase the
learning rate or use momentum by modifying the learning rule.
• The performance is sensitive to initial conditions. Initial conditions
have a great influence in the computation of the weights. A solution
could be the computation of the weights starting with different initial
conditions. Usually it is a good method to normalize inputs with mean
equal to zero and variance equal to 1 (z-score). This avoids saturation.
• The neural network is sensible to the number of hidden layers and
neurons: despite most problems can be solved with two hidden layers,
the number of neurons present some trade-offs: too many neurons can
provoke overfitting/overtraining and too few underfitting. As heuristic
to start consider one hidden layer with a minimum number of neurons
equal to 5, or equal to (inputs+output)/2.
It has been said that collection and organization of the data is a funda-
mental step for a good training, test and validation of the neural network.
A good suggestion (Looney, 1996, p.216) is to divide the data set into 3
subsets with these proportions:
• Training set (65%): used for training the neural network (randomly
selected).
• Cross-validation set (10%): used for validating the neural network
(randomly selected).
• Verification testing set (25%): used for the verification of the neural
network (the remained data).
Others suggest also a division of the type 50% 25% and 25% respectively
(Friedman et al., 2001, p.196). These sets help the developer of the neural
network to avoid overtraining. Indeed, during training, after a certain num-
ber of epochs, the error on the training set tends asymptotically towards the
zero but the error of the validation set (that at the beginning decreases),
after a period, tends to increase. When this happens the developer has to
stop the training (early stopping) because at this point the error on the val-
idation set reach the minimum and the weights computed at this point of
the training represents the best estimation.
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10.3.5 The neural network considered in the thought experi-
ments
The brief introduction to the world of neural network is fundamental in
order to understand the one used inside the algorithm that determines the
announcement of prices and wages inside the thought experiments considered
in the present thesis.
As said, theoretically any function can be approximated by a network
with two hidden layers but it is possible to consider more suitable structures
for our task. Indeed, the algorithm that determines the announcement of
prices and wages inside the thought experiments has to elaborate data that
evolves in time.
For this reason the neural network used in the thought experiments is a
layer recurrent neural network. Layer recurrent neural networks are similar
to feedforward networks, except that each layer has a recurrent connection:
signals can travel in both directions and loops are created inside the network.
In order to train a layer recurrent neural network a more power training
algorithm is needed. We have already seen that backpropagation algorithm
suffers from 2 particular drawbacks that can be mitigated but not completely
solved: low and slow convergence and instability due to the possibility to be
trapped in a local minimum (Nawi et al., 2013, p.1). For better performance
second order learning algorithms have been introduced and among them
the so called Levenberg Marquardt algorithm is considered one of the most
effective and particularly suitable for training layer recurrent neural network
and overcome the problems of the backpropagation algorithm (Nawi et al.,
2013, p.2). The architecture of the neural network constructed has the
following characteristics132:
• 2 layers and 10 neurons for the hidden layer.
• Training function: backpropagation algorithm (Levenberg Marquardt
algorithm).
• Transfer function: hyperbolic tangent sigmoid transfer function.
• Linear transfer function for the output layer.
• Epochs: 5.
Once the neural network is validated and tested, it can be used for sim-
ulation using the final weights computed. In other words, in order to take
a decision with respect to the price (wage) to announce, the ARA select a
range of possible prices (wages) to announce according to past experience
132In order to develop the neural network in MATLAB® the Neural Network Toolbox
has been used.
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and use the neural network in order to predict which price (wage) should
correspond to the highest income. The data set is composed in each period
by the information set of the ARA. This means that the experience of the
ARA grows in time, as his information set grows. It is worth remembering
that neural networks need a big dataset in order to develop good predict-
ing capacities and also the initial random numbers used for initialize the
algorithm plays a role in the determination of the final weights. In order to
face these shortcomings, the suggestion descripted in the previous chapter
have been followed. Moreover, given that at the beginning of the experiment
experience is low (determined only by the starting equilibrium condition),
the effective number of neural networks created for each decision is equal to
10 and also the effective number of simulation is equal to 10 for each neural
network. The final decision is an average of the results of all simulations.
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10.4 The perceptron learning rule
1
2 %% THE PERCEPTRON LEARNING RULE (example: AND function)
3
4 x=[1 0 0;1 0 1;1 1 0; 1 1 1]; zhat=[0 0 0 1]; % training set
5 w1(1)=0.5; w2(1)=-1; w3(1)=1.5; % random weights
6 theta=0; % threshold
7 gamma=0.5; % learning rate
8 [nr,nc]=size(x); counter=0; check=0; % other variables
9
10 % compute the net for each row of the training set and update










21 % check the error
22 check=all(z==zhat);










33 %% algorithm developed by Sara Casagrande (2016)
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10.5 The XOR problem solved with the backpropagation al-
gorithm
An example of solution of the XOR problem using the backpropagation
algorithm is reported in this section. The algorithm has been reconstructed
using the computer program MATLAB®. The structure of the multi-layer











w15 w24 w25 w34
Figure 10.9: The multi-layer perceptron for solving the XOR problem
Consider the initial values of the weights equal to zero, a learning rate
η equal to 0.8 and a threshold equal to 0.000001. The values of the input







Table 10.3: The XOR function: logical function.
.
In the next pages the algorithm code is reported.
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1
2 %% BACKPROPAGATION ALGORITHM
3
4 %% Solve the XOR problem with the backpropagation algorithm.
5
6 % Training set: XOR problem
7 %x=[1 0;0 0;0 1; 1 1]; z=[1 0 1 0];
8 % bh=1; % error bz=1; % error
9 % b can be incorporated as b=x3 always with value 1:
10 x=[1 0 1 1;0 0 1 1;0 1 1 1; 1 1 1 1]; z=[1 0 1 0];
11 eta=0.8; % learning rate
12 threshold=0.000001; % threshold
13 w47=0; w57=0; w67=0; % weights with the output (z)
14 w14=0; w15=0; w24=0; % weights with the hidden (h)
15 w25=0; w34=0; w35=0;
16
17 w(1,1)=w14; w(1,2)=w24; w(1,3)=w34;
18 w(1,4)=w15; w(1,5)=w25; w(1,6)=w35;
19 w(1,7)=w47; w(1,8)=w57; w(1,9)=w67;
20
21 %v=1/(1+exp(-net)) activation function
22 % net=sum(w*x)
23
24 w1=w; w2=w; w3=w; w4=w; w=[w1;w2;w3;w4]; w new=w;
25 checktot=0; counter=0;
26
27 while checktot==0; % until err>threshold
28 counter=counter+1;
29 w=w new;
30 for i=1:4; % for each input pattern
31 [w new(i,:),zhat(i)] = ...
back algorithm(z(i),x(i,:),w(i,:),eta);
32 end
33 err=0.5*sum((zhat-z).ˆ2); % error function
34 for i=1:4; % check if err<threshold





40 %% algorithm developed by Sara Casagrande (2016)
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1 function [w,zhat] = back algorithm(z,x,w,eta)
2
3 % BACK ALGORITHM a function that allows the iteration of the
4 % backpropagation algorithm for each case: input z(1) x(1,:)
5
6 w14=w(1,1); w24=w(1,2); w34=w(1,3);
7 w15=w(1,4); w25=w(1,5); w35=w(1,6);
8 w47=w(1,7); w57=w(1,8); w67=w(1,9);
9 wh1=[w14 w24 w34]; wh2=[w15 w25 w35]; wh3=[w47 w57 w67];
10 neth1=x(1,1:3)*wh1'; h1=1/(1+exp(-neth1));
11 neth2=x(1,1:3)*wh2'; h2=1/(1+exp(-neth2));
12 xbis=[h1 h2 x(1,4)]; netz1=xbis*wh3'; zeff1=1/(1+exp(-netz1));
13
















30 % 3) compute the new weights:
31 w14=w14+dw14; w24=w24+dw24; w15=w15+dw15;
32 w25=w25+dw25; w34=w34+dw34; w35=w35+dw35;
33 w47=w47+dw47; w57=w57+dw57; w67=w67+dw67;
34
35 % Compute the new z
36 wh1=[w14 w24 w34]; wh2=[w15 w25 w35]; wh3=[w47 w57 w67];
37 neth1=x(1,1:3)*wh1'; h1=1/(1+exp(-neth1));
38 neth2=x(1,1:3)*wh2'; h2=1/(1+exp(-neth2));
39 xbis=[h1 h2 x(1,4)]; netz1=xbis*wh3'; zeff1=1/(1+exp(-netz1));
40
41 % output




46 %% algorithm developed by Sara Casagrande (2016)
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The backpropagation algorithm presented in the previous pages allowed
us to solve the XOR problem (i.e., converge towards a solution so that E< θ)
after 472107 iterations (epochs). The final values of the output neurons z






Table 10.4: The solution of the XOR function: values from the simulation.
In general, the number of iterations needed for convergence grows as the
value of the learning rate declines. The number of iterations can change also
according to the threshold. With a less compelling threshold the number of
iterations is in general lower as appears clear from the subsequent table:
η θ=0.000001 θ=0.001
3 126 006 184
2 188 931 276
1.5 251 858 369
1 377 714 553
0.5 755 288 571
Table 10.5: Number of iterations needed for convergence according to the
learning rate η and the threshold θ: the number of iterations needed for convergence
change according to the level fo the learning rate and the level of the threshold.
For level of the learning rate too high the convergence becomes impos-
sible.
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10.6 Table of contents
Notation Example Description
Bold Capital letters Et = [Eit] matrix (whole economy or single ARA)
small and bold letters q column vector
− q̄, ī rows vector or i producer inside a local mkt
{n} q{n},q̄{n} n(th) column vector/row vector
small letters wealth, q single value of a matrix
cgm/pgm (superscript) Scgm consumption/production goods market
d (superscript) Ld demand
e (superscript) pe expectation
ent (superscript) F ent enterprise
f (superscript) Lf free time
g (super/subscript) qg commodity g
i (also super/subscript) ci producer i
j (also subscript) cj worker j
L (superscript) RL labour market
p (superscript) wealthp producer
s (subscript) Dst local market s
s (superscript) Lst supply
t (subscript) cit time t
T (superscript) qT transpose matrix
w (superscript) wealthw all workers enrolled in the same enterprise
 qDI division element by element
~ D~R Hadamard product (product el. by el.)
∗ z∗ optimal/desired matrix/values
˜ ψ̃1 variants of existing matrices or values
Blackboard Bold A, φA, a technological matrix or coefficient
F FARApit function
Table 10.6: Table of the notation: The rules of notation are described in this table.
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Symbol Description
α % of actual production to keep for next exchange
β % of actual production devoted to consumption market
γ % of actual production to keep for next production and exchange
δ parameter for the calculus of ex ante investment demand
ε fraction of wage in the budget constraint
η % of actual production to keep for next production
Θ matrix of the preferece-propensity-technical parameters
ι ι(i)/ι(s): function indicating the good produced by i or inside s
κ parameter for the utility function
λ parameter for the utility function
µ series of natural numbers different from zero µ ∈ N0
Π expected profits for each method of production
ρ parameter for the calculus of production
Σ cost of production for each method
σ elements of the matrix Σ
τ logical phases of the period t
Υ matrix of the location of the ARA
Φ matrix of the methods of production of a single commodity g
φ single method of production of a single commodity g
χ matrix of the enrolled workers
χ element of the matrix of the enrolled workers
Ψ matrix of the producers inside each local market
ψ a particular producer of each local market
Ω information set
Table 10.7: Table of greek letters: in this table, all the variables and parameters
expressed in greek letters are described.
Table 10.8: Table of letters: variables and parameters
Letter Description
a technological input requirement (commodities)
ã demand of commodities
a quantity of commodities used in production
b technological output
b quantity of commodities produced
Table 10.8: go ahead in the next page
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Table 10.8: from previous page
Letter Description
c consumption
d aggregate demand of commodities (cgm or pgm)
e endowment for exchange




H matrix of the variables of the model
i producer i (identification number)
i∗ enterprise where worker decide to migrate
ī producer inside a local market
j worker j (identification number)
K total number of workers (for the whole economy)
k total number of producers/local markets
k̃ number of enrolled workers
l technological input requirement (labour)
l̃ demand of labour
l quantity of labour used in production
Ls labour supply
M migration matrix
mg number of alternative methods of production for commodity g
n total number of commodities
O access to techniques
p prices
profit level of profit
q real quantities bought
qprod real quantities devoted to production
qused real quantities used for production
r profit rate
rat rationing
residual residuals after production
revenues revenues
s aggregate supply of commodities (cgm or pgm)
s local market
shl share of labour
t period
T matrix of the methods of production
T̃ matrix of all the methods of production
uns unsold commodities
Table 10.8: go ahead in the next page
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Table 10.8: from previous page
Letter Description




x activity level or the matrix used in the utility function
zg alternative methods of production for commodity g












i output neuron i










Table 10.9: Table of symbols, variables and parameters for neural network section:
in this table there are all the symbols, variables and parameters used in appendix 10.3.3
devoted to artificial neural network.
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Başçı, E. (1999). Learning by imitation. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 23 (9), 1569–1585.
Becker, G. S. (1962). Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis.
Journal of Political Economy 70 (5, Part 2), 9–49.
Bellino, E. (2008). Book Reviews on Production of Commodities by Means of
Commodities. In G. Chiodi and L. Ditta (Eds.), Sraffa or An Alternative
Economics, Chapter 1, pp. 23–41. London: Macmillan.
Bertocco, G. (2011). On the monetary nature of the interest rate in Keynes’s
thought. Department of Economics, University of Insubria, Working Pa-
per 2.
Bharadwaj, K. (1983). On Effective Demand: Certain Recent Critiques. In
J. Kregel (Ed.), Distribution, Effective Demand and International Eco-
nomic Relations, Chapter 1, pp. 3–27. London: Macmillan.
Bidard, C. (1990). From Arrow-Debreu to Sraffa. Political Economy: Studies
in the Surplus Approach 6 (1-2), 125–38.
218
Blankenburg, S., R. Arena, and F. Wilkinson (2012). Piero Sraffa and the
true object of economics: the role of the unpublished manuscripts. Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics 36 (6), 1267–1290.
Blaug, M. (1980). The Methodology of Economics: Or, How Economists
Explain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bliss, C. J. (1975). Capital theory and the distribution of income. Oxford:
North-Holland.
Blume, L. E. and D. Easley (1998). Rational expectations and rational
learning. In M. Majumdar (Ed.), Organization with Incomplete Informa-
tion. Essays in Economic Analysis: A Tribute to Roy Radner, Chapter 3,
pp. 61–109. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Caminati, M. (1990). Gravitation: an introduction. Political Economy:
Studies in the surplus approach 6 (1-2), 11–44.
Cammarata, S. (1990). Reti neurali. Milan: Etas.
Chaturvedi, D. K. (2008). Soft computing: techniques and its applications
in electrical engineering. Berlin: Springer.
Chick, V. and S. C. Dow (2001). Formalism, logic and reality: a Keynesian
analysis. Cambridge Journal of Economics 25 (6), 705–721.
Clower, R. W. (1965). The Keynesian Counter-Revolution: A Theoreti-
cal Appraisal. In R. W. Clower (Ed.), Monetary Theory, pp. 270–297.
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Clower, R. W. (1994). Economics as an inductive science. Southern Eco-
nomic Journal 60 (4), 805–814.
Clower, R. W. (1997). Effective demand revisited. In G. Harcourt and
P. Riach (Eds.), A ‘Second Edition’ of the General Theory: Volume 1,
Chapter 3, pp. 28–51. New York: Routledge.
Copeland, B. J. (2017). Artificial Intelligence (AI). Encyclopædia Britan-
nica.
Cybenko, G. (1988). Continuous valued neural networks with two hidden
layers are sufficient. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Center
for Supercomputing Research and Development.
Cybenko, G. (1989). Approximation by superpositions of a sigmoidal func-
tion. Mathematics of Control, Signals and Systems 2 (4), 303–314.
Davis, J. B. (2012). The change in Sraffa’s philosophical thinking. Cambridge
Journal of Economics 36 (6), 1341–1356.
219
de Carvalho, F. J. C. (2013). Keynes and the endogeneity of money. Review
of Keynesian Economics 1 (4), 431–446.
Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of value: An axiomatic analysis of economic
equilibrium. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Febrero, E. (2006). Monetary Theory of Production: A Classical-Circuitist
Alternative Interpretation. In X Jornadas de Economı́a Cŕıtica in
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